SHOULD THE PUBLIC SECTOR CONDUCT GENOMICS R&D?

The nature of the observed market structure and R&D competition in genomics research is used as the basis for a comparative analysis of research under a mixed oligopoly, pure oligopoly and monopoly when the timing of the innovation outcome is uncertain (as in an R&D race), the winner-take-all assumption is relaxed and the profits in later stages are a function of the R&D expenditures of prior stages. The sufficient conditions under which a mixed oligopoly performs more R&D than the pure oligopoly and monopoly markets are derived and are shown to be a function of a) that public firm's objective is strictly greater than in the winning state then in the losing state, b) profits for the winning and losing private firms in the private duopoly are equal, post innovation, and c) the objective function of the firms in the mixed duopoly are increasing in research faster than they are for firms in the other two cases. It is suggested that when these conditions are met, the public firm can play a role in increasing the level of research in genomics.Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

Spillovers, Joint Ventures and Social Welfare in a Mixed Duopoly R&D Race

Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

WTO’s Trade Liberalisation, Agricultural Growth, and Poverty Alleviation in Pakistan

Pakistan is an agrarian based developing country, and like many other developing countries, its agriculture sector is subjected to domestic forces of demand and supply and changes in prices at international level, as well. More specifically, in the late 1990s, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) emerged as one the major players affecting such market changes more vigorously at international arena. The WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture, which was established as a result of the 1986–94 Uraguay Round talks, requires, for both developed and developing countries, to initiate a process of reforms in their agrarian economies with the objective of establishing a fair and market oriented agricultural trading system through multilateral trade negotiations. This Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) specifically asks for major reductions in export subsidies, domestic support and import barriers on agricultural products to achieve this objective, the WTO’s Agreement of Agriculture [WTO (2001)] had set the following quantitative targets for cuts in each of the three specified area, namely import tariffs, domestic supports and export subsidies.

An Analysis of Major Determinants of Poverty in Agriculture Sector in Pakistan

Replaced with revised version of paper 05/21/08.Food Security and Poverty,

MODIFIKASI PEMBELAJARAN DENGAN PERMAINAN TONNIS TERHADAP HASIL BELAJAR PUKULAN FOREHAND TENIS LAPANGAN (Studi Pada Siswa Peserta Ekstrakurikuler Tenis Lapangan SMAN 3 Mojokerto)

Abstract Forehand stroke is a matter that feels difficult for student. Many students that unable to perform those movement wehther on game nor when asked by teacher to practice it. One o fthe learning model is learning modification by tonnis game. Tonnis game played with similar way to tennis and suitable to become basic game before play field tennis. The aim of this reserarch was to detect : 1) the effect of field tennis learning modification by tonnis game to the forehand stroke learning result on student’s field tennis extracurricular participant of SMAN 3 Mojokerto. 2) The rate of tonnis modification to the forehand stroke learning result on student’s field tennis extracurricular participant of SMAN 3 Mojokerto. The conclusion of research result are : 1) there is significant effect from field tennis learning modification by tonnis game to the forehand stroke learning result on student’s field tennis extracurricular participant of SMAN 3 Mojokerto. It proved based on t test result namely tcount score 8.995 > ttable 2.045. 2) Learning modification by tonnis game give improvement to the forehand stroke learning result on student’s field tennis extracurricular participant of SMAN 3 Mojokerto as big as 22.65%. Keywords : modification, Tonnis learning result forehand, Field tennis

Student-project allocation with preferences over projects

We study the problem of allocating students to projects, where both students and lecturers have preferences over projects, and both projects and lecturers have capacities. In this context we seek a stable matching of students to projects, which respects these preference and capacity constraints. Here, the stability definition generalises the corresponding notion in the context of the classical Hospitals/Residents problem. We show that stable matchings can have different sizes, which motivates max-spa-p, the problem of finding maximum cardinality stable matching. We prove that max-spa-p is NP-hard and not approximable within δ, for some δ>1, unless P=NP. On the other hand, we give an approximation algorithm with a performance guarantee of 2 for max-spa-p