An observation on highest weight crystals

As shown by Stembridge, crystal graphs can be characterized by their local behavior. In this paper, we observe that a certain local property on highest weight crystals forces a more global property. In type $A$, this statement says that if a node has a single parent and single grandparent, then there is a unique walk from the highest weight node to it. In other classical types, there is a similar (but necessarily more technical) statement. This walk is obtained from the associated level 1 perfect crystal, $B^{1,1}$. (It is unique unless the Dynkin diagram contains that of $D_4$ as a subdiagram.) This crystal observation was motivated by representation-theoretic behavior of the affine Hecke algebra of type $A$, which is known to be captured by highest weight crystals of type $A^{(1)}$ by results of Grojnowski. As discussed below, the proofs in either setting are straightforward, and so the theorem linking the two phenomena is not needed. However, the result is presented here for crystals as one can say something in all types (Grojnowski's theorem is only in type $A$), and because the statement seems more surprising in the language of crystals than it does for affine Hecke algebra modules

Categorifying the tensor product of a level 1 highest weight and perfect crystal in type A

We use Khovanov-Lauda-Rouquier algebras to categorify a crystal isomorphism between a highest weight crystal and the tensor product of a perfect crystal and another highest weight crystal, all in level 1 type A affine. The nodes of the perfect crystal correspond to a family of trivial modules and the nodes of the highest weight crystal correspond to simple modules, which we may also parameterize by $\ell$-restricted partitions. In the case $\ell$ is a prime, one can reinterpret all the results for the symmetric group in characteristic $\ell$. The crystal operators correspond to socle of restriction and behave compatibly with the rule for tensor product of crystal graphs.Comment: 29 pages; to appear in Proc. Sympos. Pure Math. as part of the Proceedings of the 2012-2014 Southeastern Lie Theory Workshop

Non-Separable, Quasiconcave Utilities are Easy -- in a Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model

Recent results, establishing evidence of intractability for such restrictive utility functions as additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave, under both Fisher and Arrow-Debreu market models, have prompted the question of whether we have failed to capture some essential elements of real markets, which seem to do a good job of finding prices that maintain parity between supply and demand. The main point of this paper is to show that even non-separable, quasiconcave utility functions can be handled efficiently in a suitably chosen, though natural, realistic and useful, market model; our model allows for perfect price discrimination. Our model supports unique equilibrium prices and, for the restriction to concave utilities, satisfies both welfare theorems

Categorifying the tensor product of the Kirillov-Reshetikhin crystal B1,1B^{1,1} and a fundamental crystal

We use Khovanov-Lauda-Rouquier (KLR) algebras to categorify a crystal isomorphism between a fundamental crystal and the tensor product of a Kirillov-Reshetikhin crystal and another fundamental crystal, all in affine type. The nodes of the Kirillov-Reshetikhin crystal correspond to a family of "trivial" modules. The nodes of the fundamental crystal correspond to simple modules of the corresponding cyclotomic KLR algebra. The crystal operators correspond to socle of restriction and behave compatibly with the rule for tensor product of crystal graphs.Comment: 58 pages, 4 figures, 4 table

An Incentive Compatible, Efficient Market for Air Traffic Flow Management

We present a market-based approach to the Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) problem. The goods in our market are delays and buyers are airline companies; the latter pay money to the FAA to buy away the desired amount of delay on a per flight basis. We give a notion of equilibrium for this market and an LP whose solution gives an equilibrium allocation of flights to landing slots as well as equilibrium prices for the landing slots. Via a reduction to matching, we show that this equilibrium can be computed combinatorially in strongly polynomial time. Moreover, there is a special set of equilibrium prices, which can be computed easily, that is identical to the VCG solution, and therefore the market is incentive compatible in dominant strategy.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1109.521