Ad networks and consumer tracking

We study the role of ad networks in the online advertising market. Our baseline model considers two publishers that can outsource the sale of their ad inventories to an ad network, in a market where consumers and advertisers multi-home. The ad network increases total advertising revenue by tracking consumers across outlets and reduces competition between publishers by centralizing the sale of ads. Consequently, outsourcing to the ad network is beneficial to the publishers, but may penalize the advertisers. We show that the ad network’s ability to track consumers may either expand or reduce the provision of ads, depending on consumers’ preferences for the publishers and how advertisers use tracking information. Specifically, tracking is more likely to expand (resp. reduce) the provision of ads when consumers’ preferences for the publishers are positively (resp. negatively) correlated. Tracking is also more likely to expand (resp. reduce) the provision of ads when advertisers use tracking information to cap the frequency of impressions (resp. target specific consumers). Furthermore, we study the implications of consumers’ choice to block tracking. Generally, blocking generates a negative impact on the advertising industry, by making the allocation of ads less effective. Blocking also entails an externality on consumers, which is negative when tracking reduces the provision of ads. Given these conditions, regulatory restrictions on tracking may reduce consumer surplus as well as advertising revenue. These findings contrast with the presumption that regulation should make it easier for consumers to avoid tracking. We propose further extensions, including competing ad networks, more than two publishers and networks that do not sell ads, but only tracking information to the advertisers.</div

Has COVID-19 Delayed the Diagnosis and Worsened the Presentation of Type 1 Diabetes in Children?

Objective: To evaluate whether the diagnosis of pediatric type 1 diabetes or its acute complications changed during the early phase of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in Italy. Research design and methods: This was a cross-sectional, Web-based survey of all Italian pediatric diabetes centers to collect diabetes, diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA), and COVID-19 data in patients presenting with new-onset or established type 1 diabetes between 20 February and 14 April in 2019 and 2020. Results: Fifty-three of 68 centers (77.9%) responded. There was a 23% reduction in new diabetes cases in 2020 compared with 2019. Among those newly diagnosed patient who presented in a state of DKA, the proportion with severe DKA was 44.3% in 2020 vs. 36.1% in 2019 (P = 0.03). There were no differences in acute complications. Eight patients with asymptomatic or mild COVID-19 had laboratory-confirmed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. Conclusions: The COVID-19 pandemic might have altered diabetes presentation and DKA severity. Preparing for any "second wave" requires strategies to educate and reassure parents about timely emergency department attendance for non-COVID-19 symptoms

The Silent Epidemic of Diabetic Ketoacidosis at Diagnosis of Type 1 Diabetes in Children and Adolescents in Italy During the COVID-19 Pandemic in 2020

To compare the frequency of diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA) at diagnosis of type 1 diabetes in Italy during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 with the frequency of DKA during 2017-2019

A Multicenter Retrospective Survey regarding Diabetic Ketoacidosis Management in Italian Children with Type 1 Diabetes

We conducted a retrospective survey in pediatric centers belonging to the Italian Society for Pediatric Diabetology and Endocrinology. The following data were collected for all new-onset diabetes patients aged 0-18 years: DKA (pH < 7.30), severe DKA (pH < 7.1), DKA in preschool children, DKA treatment according to ISPAD protocol, type of rehydrating solution used, bicarbonates use, and amount of insulin infused. Records (n = 2453) of children with newly diagnosed diabetes were collected from 68/77 centers (87%), 39 of which are tertiary referral centers, the majority of whom (n = 1536, 89.4%) were diagnosed in the tertiary referral centers. DKA was observed in 38.5% and severe DKA in 10.3%. Considering preschool children, DKA was observed in 72%, and severe DKA in 16.7%. Cerebral edema following DKA treatment was observed in 5 (0.5%). DKA treatment according to ISPAD guidelines was adopted in 68% of the centers. In the first 2 hours, rehydration was started with normal saline in all centers, but with different amount. Bicarbonate was quite never been used. Insulin was infused starting from third hour at the rate of 0.05-0.1 U/kg/h in 72% of centers. Despite prevention campaign, DKA is still observed in Italian children at onset, with significant variability in DKA treatment, underlying the need to share guidelines among centers

Network neutrality, access to content and online advertising

We investigate possible effects of network neutrality regulation on the distribution of content in the Internet. We model a two-sided market, where consumers and advertisers interact through Content Providers (CPs), and CPs and consumers through Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Multiple impressions of an ad on a consumer are partially wasteful. Thus, equilibrium ad rates decrease with the number of CPs consumers can browse. Under network neutrality, CPs can connect to any ISP for free, while in the unregulated regime they have to pay a (non-discriminatory) access fee set by the ISP.We show that universal distribution of content is always an equilibrium with net neutrality regulation. Instead, in the unregulated regime, ISPs can use access fees to rule out universal distribution when it is not profitable, i.e. when repeated impressions of an ad rapidly lose value and consumers care for content availability to a small extent. We also find that the unregulated regime is never superior to net neutrality from a welfare point of view. Consumer and advertiser surplus are weakly higher under net neutrality. ISPs are unambiguously better off in the unregulated regime, while CPs are unambiguously worse off

Co-investment in ultra-fast broadband access networks: Is there a role for content providers?

In many countries, Next Generation Access networks (NGA) deployment and penetration rate proceed at a slower pace than expected. It is argued that an ex ante contractual arrangement among residential-access Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Content Providers (CPs), which builds on the complementarity between infrastructure and content, can promote the roll out of NGA. Indeed, one such contract brings down the portion of the investment cost borne by the ISPs (for a given cost of investment), increases end users' demand for improved connectivity and internalizes investment externalities. It is studied how a departure from network neutrality (NN) regulation of the Internet, allowing the ISP to negotiate with the CP a fee for (priority) delivery of content, affects firms' investment incentives. Using a simple model, it is shown that the ISP may invest more with than without NN, since the CP may have high bargaining power ex post (after NGA investment is sunk). Instead, the CP may be more willing to co-invest when NN is abandoned, either to evade high ex post fees (if the investment cost is low), or to foster NGA deployment (if the investment cost is high and the ISP has low bargaining power ex post)

Bundling, Competition and Quality Investment: a Welfare Analysis

We show how a monopolist in a primary market uses mixed bundling to extract surplus from quality-enhancing investment by a single-product rival in a complementary market, or even force the rival to provide low quality. In our model, bundling does not hinge on commitment ability. Although we assume that bundling creates efficiency gains, we find that bundling reduces consumer surplus and may reduce social welfare, even if the rival is not foreclosed, and investment is not blockaded. Nonetheless, bundling improves welfare when prevents inefficient investment. We propose to check bundled offers via a price test that controls the monopoly component stand-alone price to preserve efficiencies from both bundling and investment. When the rival invests, the test improves consumer surplus and welfare compared with the ‘do-nothing’ scenario, or a ban on bundling. The test is not consistent with the predatory pricing framework. Qualitative results hold when we endogenize the bundling strategy

Bundling, Competition and Quality Investment: A Welfare Analysis

We investigate how bundling affects investment in product quality, and derive welfare implications. A monopolist in a primary market competes with a rival in a complementary market. Bundling is the monopolist's preferred strategy, since it either extracts surplus from the rival's investment, or forces the rival to provide low quality. Bundling may reduce welfare without foreclosing the rival, but improves welfare when preventing undesirable investment. Since prohibiting bundling is not appropriate, we introduce a price test for bundled offers that preserves efficiencies from both bundling and quality investment, thereby improving welfare relative to the 'do-nothing' scenario. We consequently argue that this test should be applied whenever possible