Europium(III) Macrocyclic Chelates Appended with Tyrosine-based Chromophores and Di-(2-picolyl)amine-based Receptors: Turn-On Luminescent Chemosensors Selective to Zinc(II) Ions

[Abstract] Zinc ions play an important role in many biological processes in the human body. To selectively detect Zn²⁺, two EuDO3A‐based complexes (DO3A=1,4,7,10‐tetraazacyclododecane‐1,4,7‐tricarboxylic acid) appended with tyrosine as a chromophore and di‐(2‐picolyl)amine (DPA) as the Zn²⁺ recognition moiety were developed as suitable luminescent sensors. Their luminescence intensity is affected by the photoinduced electron transfer mechanism. Upon addition of Zn²⁺, both probes display an up to sevenfold enhancement in Eu³⁺ emission. Competition experiments demonstrated their specificity toward Zn²⁺ over other metal ions, while also revealing the nonspecificity of the derivatives lacking the DPA‐moiety, thus confirming the essential role of the DPA for the recognition of Zn²⁺. The induced emission changes of Eu³⁺ allow for precise quantitative analysis of Zn²⁺, establishing these lanthanide‐based complexes as viable chemosensors for biological applications.German Research Foundation; AN 716/7-

Слободниот стих како хиперобјект

Спасовска, Сузана В. Слободата на стихот, Студија за македонскиот слободен стих, Скопје, 2021, 272 стр

When to stop - a cardinal secretary search experiment

The cardinal secretary search problem confronts the decision-maker with more or less candidates who have identically and independently distributed values and appear successively in a random order without recall of earlier candidates. Its benchmark solution implies monotonically decreasing sequences of optimal value aspirations (acceptance thresholds) for any number of remaining candidates. We compare experimentally observed aspirations with optimal ones for different numbers of (remaining) candidates and methods of experimental choice elicitation: “hot” collects play data, “warm” asks for an acceptance threshold before confronting the next candidate, and “cold” for a complete profile of trial-specific acceptance thresholds. The initially available number of candidates varies across elicitation methods to obtain more balanced data. We find that actual search differs from benchmark behavior, in average search length and success, but also in some puzzling qualitative aspects

Examining motor unit stability of first dorsal interosseous (FDI) and biceps brachii (BB) muscles in healthy and older adults using decomposition-based quantitative electromyography (DQEMG)

Aging of the human neuromuscular system is associated with gradual decline in motor unit (MU) number leading to denervation of muscle fibers and subsequent compensatory reinnervation from surviving MUs. Lower limb muscles exhibit age-related increased MU instability (measured electrophysiologically), however not much is known regarding MU stability of aging upper limb muscles. The purpose of this study was to examine agerelated MU loss in upper limb muscles (first dorsal interosseous [FDI] and biceps brachii [BB]) and the impact on MU stability in younger and older healthy subjects using electrophysiological near fiber analysis from decomposition-based quantitative electromyography (DQEMG). FDI and BB muscles from older (74 ± 5 years) and younger (31 ± 13 years) healthy subjects were examined through surface and intramuscular collection of EMG signals during volitional contractions, which were analyzed with DQEMG. Older subjects showed significantly larger MUs associated with greater instability in the form of near fiber (NF) jiggle and NF jitter in the FDI and BB muscles when compared to younger controls. These results suggest that age-dependent MU remodeling and progressive reduction in FDI and BB MU pools are associated with greater transmission instability at the neuromuscular junction

Partial versus general compulsory solidarity: an experimental analysis

We focus on ways and means of solidarity and their more or less voluntary and involuntary character. Alternative ways of redistribution are modeled by combining redistribution as emergent from a non-discriminatory voluntary contribution mechanism, VCM, with an outside option for a “super-rich”, R, participant to donate to VCM participants. The outsider may discriminate between participants of the VCM on the basis of information accessible at a cost to her. Inclusion in and exclusion from the VCM are involuntary while contributions in it are voluntary. How involuntary inclusion of R in VCM affects her discriminatory voluntary donations and contribution behavior is explored experimentally

LATE ANTIQUE RESIDENTIAL OBJECT FROM THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITE KALE-VINICA

The archaeological site Kale is located on a small hill in the south-western part of today’s modern Vinica and it is known mostly because of the exclusive finds from the 5-th and the beginning of the 6-th century - the terracotta reliefs with Christian motifs, known by its popular name as terracotta “icons”. A section of the ancient traffic network in the Bregalnica River area reached this fortified city, which name is still unknown. The last elation of the Roman Empire in the time of Justinian I (527-565) can be observed in the architectonic remains on the Kale Fortress. The architectonic complex from the 5-6 century consists of objects build in the spirit of the new living philosophy. Justinian renews the city walls, and from the latest excavations (2008-2011) a few houses were discovered on the north-east terrace of the site, as well as the objects for military purpose by the south-west fortification wall. This article refers on one residential object, which was eventually used as a church residence.   Keywords: Late antique, residential objects, Kale Fortress, Vinica, episcopalia &nbsp

Rank-order competition in the voluntary provision of impure public goods

Publicly provided goods often create differential payoffs due to timely or spatial distances of group members. We design and test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank competition to mitigate free-riding in impure public goods. In our Rank-Order Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Rank-Order-VCM) group members compete via observable contributions for a larger share of the public good; high contributors receive preferential access (a larger share), while low contributors receive restricted access (a lower share). In a laboratory experiment Rank-Order-VCM elicits median contributions equal to the full endowment throughout the finitely played games with constant groups. In the control treatment, with randomly assigned ranks, the contributions are significantly lower and decline over time. We thus provide evidence of rank competition, in situations where discriminatory access to public goods is possible, being efficiency enhancing

Equal and unequal profit sharing in highly interdependent work groups: a laboratory experiment

We study behavior in a simplified representation of an organization with high task interdependence. The production process involves three stages such that output of earlier stages is the necessary input for subsequent stages. Work at earlier stages is easier than at later stages and the product is only final if it goes successfully through the highest stage. We compare the effects on the performance of the organization of a payment scheme in which profits are equally shared by all those involved in the production process with one where the participation in profits is strongly increasing in the production stage. The comparison is made for two ways of assigning individuals to the production stage: randomly or by merit. We find that initially there is no difference in the organization’s profit between the two sharing schemes, but over time profits increase more with the equal sharing scheme. Changes in profits over time can be explained by changes in production performance over time. After participants have gained experience in the tasks, the equal profit sharing scheme has positive performance effects both at the lowest and the highest production stages. There are only minor differences in the results depending on whether the payment scheme is exogenously imposed or chosen by the person at the highest stage

Trusting versus monitoring: an experiment of endogenous institutional choices

We investigate the problem of deciding between trusting and monitoring, and how this decision affects subsequent behavior, using a laboratory experiment where subjects choose between the Ultimatum and the Yes-No Game. Despite the similarity of the two games in Ultimatum Games responders monitor the allocation proposal, while in Yes-No games responders react without monitoring, i.e. have to rely on trust. We permit either the proposer or responder to make the game choice and analyze how both roles choose between trusting and monitoring, what the ensuing effects of their choices are, and how they vary depending on who has chosen the game. We, also, experimentally vary the cost of monitoring and the responder’s conflict payoff. Since monitoring is usually costly, the amount to share in Yes-No Games (YNG) can exceed that in Ultimatum Games (UG). Regarding the conflict payoff, it can be positive or negative with the former rendering Yes-No interaction a social dilemma. According to our results, proposers (responders) opt for trusting significantly more (less) often than for monitoring. Average offers are higher in Ultimatum than in Yes-No games, but neither UG nor YNG offers depend on who has chosen between games

Deciding for Others: Local Public Good Contributions with Intermediaries

Given the prevalence of local public goods, whose broader use is often limited by distance and borders, we propose a potential solution to the free-riding problem by having each participant/beneficiary delegate the public good contribution decision to a non-local intermediary who neither puts in own endowment into the public good nor benefits from it. Intermediaries make decisions under two compensation mechanisms where the incentives for the intermediary are either non-aligned (fixed) or aligned (variable) with those of the beneficiary. We find that the use of intermediaries, regardless of whether their compensation is aligned or not with that of the beneficiary, significantly increases contributions to the provision of the public good. We conclude that individuals behave differently when they (formally) make decisions for someone else even if their incentive structures are identical