Unintended Consequences of Cigarette Taxation and Regulation

Tobacco smoking harms health. Taxes and regulations can reduce that harm. But evasion reduces the efficacy of taxes and regulations and creates harms of its own in the form of illicit markets. Enforcement can reduce evasion but creates additional harms, including incarceration and violence. Peter Reu-ter has pointed out that a flat ban on cigarettes would be likely to generate illicit-market harms similar to the harms of existing illicit drug markets. Taxes and regulations can be thought of as “lesser prohibitions,” subject to the same sorts of risks. Minimizing total harm means minimizing the sum of abuse harms and control harms. Tighter regulations and higher taxes on cigarettes risk increasing the size of the existing illicit tobacco markets, which are already substantial. That risk can be somewhat blunted by increasing enforcement effort, but doing so can be costly on several dimensions and might, under plausible assumptions, lead to an increase in violence. Tobacco policymaking should therefore consider illicit markets and the need for enforcement; some of the health benefits of regula-tion and taxation may be offset by increased illicit-market side effects and enforcement costs. The presence of licit substitutes, such as e-cigarettes, can greatly reduce the size of the problem; the regulation of e-cigarettes should take this effect into account. If enforcement is to be increased to counterbal-ance tightened controls, positive-feedback dynamics suggest that the enforcement increase should precede, rather than follow, the tightening

Measuring the growth rate of structure around cosmic voids

Using an algorithm based on searching for empty spheres we identified 245 voids in the VIMOS Public Extragalactic Redshift Survey (VIPERS). We show how by modelling the anisotropic void-galaxy cross correlation function we can probe the growth rate of structure

High Tax States: Options for Gleaning Revenue from Legal Cannabis

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Evaluation of the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act

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Tracking and Locating Itinerant Subjects With a Rechargeable Incentive Card: Results of a Randomized Trial

BackgroundHigh attrition among research participants undermines the validity and generalizability of field research. This study contrasted two incentivizing methods--money orders (MOs) or rechargeable incentive cards (RICs)--with regard to rates of participants' study engagement and follow-up contact over a 6-month period.MethodsSubstance abusers (N = 303) in Los Angeles, California were recruited and randomized to either an MO (control) or RIC (experimental) condition. All participants were asked to call the researchers at the beginning of each calendar month for the ensuing 5 months to update their locator information, even if nothing had changed. Each call resulted in a $10 payment, issued immediately via the RIC system or by MO by mail. Research staff located and interviewed all participants at Month 6. Contact logs assessed level of effort required to locate participants and conduct follow-up interviews.ResultsRelative to controls, RIC participants, especially those with low ability to defer gratification, initiated more monthly calls. Six-month follow-up rates did not differ between RIC (75%) and controls (79%), though the RIC condition was associated with an average staff time savings of 39.8 minutes per study participant.DiscussionFor longitudinal public health research involving itinerant study participants, the RIC method produces a modest benefit in study engagement and reduced staff time devoted to participant tracking and payments. However, the overall cost-effectiveness of this approach will depend on the pricing model of the card-issuing vendor (which in turns depends on the scale of the project, with per-unit costs falling for larger projects)