How to Knit Your Own Markov Blanket

Hohwy (Hohwy 2016, Hohwy 2017) argues there is a tension between the free energy principle and leading depictions of mind as embodied, enactive, and extended (so-called ‘EEE1 cognition’). The tension is traced to the importance, in free energy formulations, of a conception of mind and agency that depends upon the presence of a ‘Markov blanket’ demarcating the agent from the surrounding world. In what follows I show that the Markov blanket considerations do not, in fact, lead to the kinds of tension that Hohwy depicts. On the contrary, they actively favour the EEE story. This is because the Markov property, as exemplified in biological agents, picks out neither a unique nor a stationary boundary. It is this multiplicity and mutability– rather than the absence of agent-environment boundaries as such - that EEE cognition celebrates

What Do Complex Adaptive Systems Look Like and What Are the Implications for Innovation Policy?

This paper explores the use of complex adaptive systems theory in development policy analysis using a case study drawn from recent events in Uganda. It documents the changes that took place in the farming system in Soroti district during an outbreak of African cassava mosaic virus disease (ACMVD) and the subsequent decline in cassava production - the main staple food in the area. Resultant adaptation impacts are analysed across cropping, biological, economic and social systems each of which operate as an interlinked sub-system. The policy implications of this story suggest a policy agenda that recognises adaptation capacity as the life blood of complex adaptive systems. Since these types of systems are found in all realms of human activity, it follows that strengthening this capacity is a key developmental priority that requires linking together new configurations of actors and resources to tackle an ever-changing set of contexts.Complex Adaptive Systems, Innovation Policy, Uganda, Cassava, Adaptation Capacity, Smallholder Production, Policy

The many faces of precision (Replies to commentaries on “Whatever next? Neural prediction, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science”)

An appreciation of the many roles of ‘precision-weighting’ (upping the gain on select populations of prediction error units) opens the door to better accounts of planning and ‘offline simulation’, makes suggestive contact with large bodies of work on embodied and situated cognition, and offers new perspectives on the ‘active brain’. Combined with the complex affordances of language and culture, and operating against the essential backdrop of a variety of more biologically basic ploys and stratagems, the result is a maximally context-sensitive, restless, constantly self-reconfiguring architecture

Predictions, precision, and agentive attention

The use of forward models (mechanisms that predict the future state of a system) is well established in cognitive and computational neuroscience. We compare and contrast two recent, but interestingly divergent, accounts of the place of forward models in the human cognitive architecture. On the Auxiliary Forward Model (AFM) account, forward models are special-purpose prediction mechanisms implemented by additional circuitry distinct from core mechanisms of perception and action. On the Integral Forward Model (IFM) account, forward models lie at the heart of all forms of perception and action. We compare these neighbouring but importantly different visions and consider their implications for the cognitive sciences. We end by asking what kinds of empirical research might offer evidence favouring one or the other of these approaches

Word, Niche and Super-Niche: How Language Makes Minds Matter More

How does language (spoken or written) impact thought? One useful way to approach this important but elusive question may be to consider language itself as a cognition-enhancing animal-built structure. To take this perspective is to view language as a kind of self-constructed cognitive niche. These self-constructed cognitive niches play, I suggest, three distinct but deeply interlocking roles in human thought and reason. Working together, these three interlocking routines radically transform the human mind, and mark a genuine discontinuity in the space of animal minds

Technology Supply Chain or Innovation Capacity?: Contrasting Experiences of Promoting Small Scale Irrigation Technology in South Asia

The most effective approach to agricultural technology promotion and innovation is still a source of considerable debate, and nowhere more so than in the context of agricultural engineering hardware. Contemporary perspective on agricultural innovation stress the importance of institutional change and give emphasis to the need to develop innovation capacity in systems terms rather address limitations of technology transfer mechanisms. This paper illustrates using the case of manual irrigation technology - treadle pumps -- in Bangladesh and India. It identifies 5 elements of this capacity: (i) A sector coordination mechanism; (ii) a developmental rather than technical organising principle for sector development; (iii) habits and practices (institutions) of key organisations; (iv) Interaction as a learning and knowledge transmission mechanism (v) Market demand as key an incentive for innovation; and (vi) Policies and institutional innovations to ensure adequate stakeholder participation. The paper concludes by suggesting that identifying new sources of institutional innovation is the most presses task for initiatives that seek to make more effective use of knowledge and technology in development.Agricultural Technology, Innovation Systems, Innovation Capacity, Agricultural Research, Poverty Reduction, Small Scale Irrigation, Supply Chains

Beyond the 'Bayesian blur': predictive processing and the nature of subjective experience

Recent work in cognitive and computational neuroscience depicts the brain as in some (perhaps merely approximate) sense implementing probabilistic inference. This suggests a puzzle. If the processing that enables perceptual experience involves representing or approximating probability distributions, why does experience itself appear univocal and determinate, apparently bearing no traces of those probabilistic roots? In this paper, I canvass a range of responses, including the denial of univocality and determinacy itself. I argue that there is reason to think that it is our conception of perception itself that is flawed. Once we see perception aright, as the slave of action, the puzzlement recedes. Perceptual determinacy reflects only the mundane fact that we are embodied, active, agents who must constantly engage the world they perceptually encounter