Addiction, procrastination, and failure points in decision-making systems

Journal ArticleRedish et al. suggest that their failures-in-decision-making framework for understanding addiction can also contribute to improving our understanding of a variety of psychiatric disorders. In the spirit of reflecting on the significance and scope of their research, I briefly develop the idea that their framework can also contribute to improving our understanding of the pervasive problem of procrastination

Getting on in a varied world

Journal ArticleAre greed and ruthlessness contrary to reason? Is immorality a form of irrationality? Much of contemporary ethical theory is a debate between Kantians, who argue that the dictates of morality are dictates of reason, and Humeans, who argue that reason is neutral between morality and immorality. The Kantian and Humean positions assume that the above questions can be answered uniformly for all possible rational agents. Recently, however, the Aristotelian view that the dictates of reason can vary depending on the agent's species has gained some ground. If such variation is possible, then it might be that greed and mthlessness are contrary to reason for agents of a certain species, rationally required for agents of another species, and rationally optional for agents of yet a third species

Instrumentally rational myopic planning

Journal ArticleI challenge the view that, in cases where time for deliberation is not an issue, instrumental rationality precludes myopic planning. 1 show where there is room for instrumentally rational myopic planning, and then argue that such planning is possible not only in theory, it is something human beings can and do engage in. The possibility of such planning has, however, been disregarded, and this disregard has skewed related debates concerning instrumental rationality

Η διάκριση πραγματικού και νομικού ζητήματος στην αναιρετική δίκη

Δορυφόρο της ανάλυσης της μελέτης αποτελεί η διάταξη του άρ. 561 παρ. 1 ΚΠολΔ, κατά την οποία «Η εκτίμηση από το δικαστήριο της ουσίας πραγματικών γεγονότων και ιδιαίτερα του περιεχομένου εγγράφων δεν υπόκειται στον έλεγχο του Αρείου Πάγου, εκτός αν παραβιάστηκαν κανόνες δικαίου, στους οποίους περιλαμβάνονται και οι ερμηνευτικοί ή αν υπάρχει λόγος αναίρεσης κατά το άρθρο 559 αρ. 19 και 20.». Η μελέτη εκκινεί με την αναφορά σε κάποια βασικά χαρακτηριστικά του ενδίκου μέσου της αναίρεσης και τη παρουσίαση των θεωρητικών απόψεων γύρω από το ζήτημα της διάκρισης των δύο αντίθετων πόλων η οποία διαπερνά και χαρακτηρίζει το ένδικο μέσο της αναίρεσης, ήτοι του πραγματικού και του νομικού ζητήματος στη πολιτική δίκη, συνεχίζει με τη παρουσίαση της έννοιας «πραγματικό ζήτημα» και ολοκληρώνεται με την ανάλυση της έννοιας «νομικό ζήτημα». Προκειμένου να γίνουν αντιληπτές οι λεπτές διακρίσεις που άπτονται της εν λόγω προβληματικής, επιχειρείται η εκτενής αναφορά στη δομή του κανόνα δικαίου, στις νομικές έννοιες και στις διακρίσεις τους, σε συγκεκριμένες ενότητες μεθοδολογικού και φιλοσοφικού ενδιαφέροντος, στα χαρακτηριστικά του δικανικού συλλογισμού του δικαστή της ουσίας και στα στάδια από τα οποία περνά η διανοητική του διεργασία εωσότου καταλήξει στο τελικό δικανικό πόρισμα. Κατεβλήθη ιδιαίτερη προσπάθεια να εξαχθούν και να διατυπωθούν οι αντιτιθέμενες θεωρητικές απόψεις γύρω από τα ζητήματα που αναλύονται, καθώς επίσης και να συγκεντρωθούν νομολογιακά παραδείγματα που αντικατοπτρίζουν τη στάση του Ανώτατου Ακυρωτικού απέναντι στον έλεγχο της απόφασης του δικαστηρίου της ουσίας.The dissertation’s title is “The distinction between facts and law in Cassation” and the analysis is focused in the interpretation of the Art. 561 par. 1 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure, according to which the facts of the case and the content of the documents shall not be subject to the control of the Supreme Court of Greece (Areios Pagos), unless the rules of law, including the interpretive rules, have been infringed, or there is a ground for cassation pursuant to Art. 559 (19) and (20) of Greek Code of Civil Procedure. The analysis begins with reference to basic elements of the remedy of cassation and the representation of the classic theoretical opinions with regards to the issue of the distinction between “facts” and “law” in the civil trial. The analysis proceeds with the presentation of the concept of “facts” and the concept of “law”. In order for the reader to better understand the distinction hereto, an extensive reference is made to the structure of the rule of law, the legal concepts and their distinctions, specific matters of methodological and philosophical interest, and the steps through which the mental process of the judge is passing through until they reache to the final judgment. I did my utmost to gather and represent the opposite theoretical views around the issues analyzed as well as to extract examples from the recent caselaw of the Supreme Court that reflect the extent of the control of the judgment of the Court of First Instance or/and the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court

Advantage, Restraint, and the Circumstances of Justice

I focus on the mutual advantage conception of justice and on a related Humean argument according to which “the circumstances of justice” obtain only when there is a conflict of ends, a suitable level of scarcity, and rough equality of power. I add to the challenges facing the argument by using a Millian illustration whose significance has not been appreciated in prior discussions of the circumstances of justice to show that, contrary to a key premise of the Humean argument, restraining ground rules concerning entitlement can be mutually advantageous even if there is no conflict of ends or rough equality of power. It follows from my reasoning that, if justice has a place and point when restraining ground rules concerning entitlement would be mutually advantageous, the circumstances of justice can obtain without a conflict of ends or rough equality of power

Communicative Action and Rational Choice by Joseph Heath [review]

Journal ArticleA review of Communicative Action and Rational Choice, in which the author, Joseph Heath, develops an insightful account of practical reason that builds on his critical evaluations of both Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action and the instrumental conception of rationality

Rationality and Freedom by Amartya Sen [review]

Journal ArticleA review of Rationality and Freedom, the first of two volumes of essays by Amartya Sen on rationality, freedom, and justice