On the Reality of Percepts: Husserl and Gibson

Although the theoretical background of Edmund Husserl and James Gibson respectively could be hardly more distant, their accounts of perception show high compatibility. This compatibility does not extend to the ontological status of percepts. We propose here a short contrastive analysis of Gibson’s and Husserl’s theses on the relation between perception and reality. We dwell on three restrictions formulated by Gibson with regard respectively to the nature of memory, imagination and the biological meaning of affordances. These restrictions, which are functional to Gibson’s direct realism, are then criticised in the light of relevant Husserlian analyses. Finally, we suggest a phenomenological line of inquiry able to address and resettle the ordinary notion of perceptual reality

A Phenomenological Discussion of Early Imitation

The following pages are devoted to an attempt to examine Andrew Meltzoff’s discoveries concerning neonatal imitation in the light of Husserl’s discussion of Fremderfahrung. We criticise Meltzoff’s explanatory model AIM (Active Intermodal Mapping), which is introduced to account for his empirical findings, for two main reasons. First, the AIM model does not seem to properly reconcile the vindication of the intermodal character of imitation with the idea that early imitation is based on organ identification: these two claims seem to be reconcilable only at the cost of sacrificing the active, non reflexlike character of imitation. Secondly, the account of AIM does not fit in with the ordinary first-person experience of adult imitation. In its stead we propose a different explanatory approach, which is consistent with a basic phenomenology of imitation and does not depend on organ identification, but on the “rhythmic resonance” of gestures

Naturalism and the Ethical Meaning of Phenomenology

The search for spaces of cooperation between the methodology of natural sciences (cognitive sciences in particular) and the phenomenological approach has gained importance over time. However, it is necessary not to lose sight of the fact that Husserlian phenomenology was first and foremost characterized by a profound critique of ontological naturalism, a critique crucial for understanding the ethical sense of the phenomenological operation. To clarify this point, it is necessary to clarify the problematic role that naturalism has played - and continues to play - on the ethical level, and the way in which phenomenological criticism is able to neutralize it. In the following pages we will first try to illustrate the impact of ontological naturalism on the contemporary ethical vision and then to show how the phenomenological perspective is best understandable as a way to reveal the blind spots of naturalism, to denounce its implicit reductionism, and to reopen an ethical perspective that the historical establishment of a naturalistic worldview had artificially closed

Habit and Mind. On the Teleology of Mental Habits

In the following pages we shall discuss the notion of habit in sight of its role in the constitution of meaning. We make use of Wittgenstein’s analysis of rule following to show the crucial role played by habits in the establishment of verbal meanings. Then, we show how habits can be established according to the Peircian model of abduction. The generalizing power of abduction (and habit) is explained in terms of teleological motivation, whose roots we expose by means of Husserl’s analyses on passive synthesis. Finally, we draw the conclusion that the notion of habit may lead to a “non-naturalistic naturalization” of mind, that is, a “naturalization” opposed to both objectivistic and reductionist accounts of mind

On Scheler’s Metaphysics of Love: an Appraisal

In the following pages we are going to briefly recollect some of Scheler’s main arguments concerning the status of “affective life” and to try a sympathetic appraisal of the bearing of these theses. After resuming Scheler’s assessment of love and showing its conceptual connections with intentionality, spiritual values and sensuous corporeality, we shall sketch an account of the ontological and axiological role of love. Love turns out to be interpretable as a pervasive drive that shapes both natural and cultural history, while history, in its most comprehensive sense, is not viewed either as sheer contingency or as teleology, but rather as an exploratory cosmological venture

Habit and Mind. On the Teleology of Mental Habits

In the following pages we shall discuss the notion of habit in sight of its role in the constitution of meaning. We make use of Wittgenstein’s analysis of rule following to show the crucial role played by habits in the establishment of verbal meanings. Then, we show how habits can be established according to the Peircian model of abduction. The generalizing power of abduction (and habit) is explained in terms of teleological motivation, whose roots we expose by means of Husserl’s analyses on passive synthesis. Finally, we draw the conclusion that the notion of habit may lead to a “non-naturalistic naturalization” of mind, that is, a “naturalization” opposed to both objectivistic and reductionist accounts of mind

On Wittgenstein’s Analogy between Philosophy and Psychoanalysis

Wittgenstein’s remarks on psychoanalysis can be viewed as a critical approach to Freudian speculation, but this is not our concern in the present essay. Here we want to examine the analogy, which Wittgenstein acknowledges, between his own understanding of philosophy and the style of thinking that characterizes psychoanalytic therapy. Both psychoanalysis and philosophy appear as precious pursuits and, in different respects, as dangerous enterprises. In Wittgenstein’s eyes they are to be appreciated as ‘therapeutic activities’. However, when they try to become theories with scientific ambitions, they turn out to be dubious or even harmful spiritual offshoots. In the present essay we explore three features that are essential to such analogy. 1) Both philosophy and psychoanalysis appear as thera- pies that make use of language: they are ‘treatments’ that take place at the level of reasons, and not causes. 2) Both treatments are attempts to tackle motivational conflicts, which are at the roots of specific forms of ‘mental unease’. 3) The relevant motivational conflicts are characterized by being inscrutable as to their real grounds, and their harmfulness is proportional to their inscrutable (‘unconscious’) character. Our purpose is to discuss this qualified analogy between philosophy and psychoanalysis in order to improve our understanding of the role of metaphysics in human reflection

The spirit of money

ZHOK, Andrea. Lo spirito del denaro e la liquidazione del mondo. Antropologia filosofica delle transazioni. Milano: Jaca Book, 2006. p. 360-370. Tradução portuguesa de Selvino J. Assmann Tradução de dois textos (um excerto de um livro e uma recente entrevista) originalmente publicados em italiano por Andrea Zhok, docente de Filosofia Moral na Università Statale de Milão. Ambos têm como tema geral a tentativa – ainda pouco comum na filosofia e nas ciências humanas - de compreender o que é o dinheiro, o que é a economia, e de quais as conseqüências dessa primazia do dinheiro e da economia nas relações entre os seres humanos. E por fim se procura verificar se há alguma possibilidade de sairmos de uma forma de vida marcada pela primazia do dinheiro e do mercado financeiro. Andrea Zhok escreveu dois livros para discutir especificamente estes assuntos: Il concetto di valore: dall'etica all'economia. Milano: Mimesis, 2002; Lo spirito del denaro e la liquidazione del mondo. Antropologia filosofica delle transazioni, Milano: Jaca Book, 2006.Se a breve entrevista, publicada em 2011 pela revista Communitas, é traduzida na sua íntegra, do livro traduzimos apenas as conclusões, que apresentam as teses gerais de toda obra. A permissão para publicar tais traduções foi obtida em primeiro lugar junto ao autor, e também junto à redação da revista Communitas, com sede em Milão, e à editora Jaca Book, da mesma cidade italiana. Agradecemos muito ao autor e às redações mencionadas. Ambas as traduções são de Selvino José Assmann, docente do curso de graduação de Filosofia e da pós-graduação de Filosofia e do Doutorado Interdisciplinar em Ciências Humanas, da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. ZHOK, Andrea. Lo spirito del denaro e la liquidazione del mondo. Antropologia filosofica delle transazioni. Milano: Jaca Book, 2006. p. 360-370. Tradução portuguesa de Selvino J. Assmann ZHOK, Andrea. Lo spirito del denaro e la liquidazione del mondo. Antropologia filosofica delle transazioni. Milano: Jaca Book, 2006. p. 360-370. Tradução portuguesa de Selvino J. Assman

Ludwing Wittgenstein: l'etica del metodo

Dottorato di ricerca in filosofia. A.a. 1995-96. 10. Ciclo. Tutore Carlo Sini. Coordinatore Giambattista GoriConsiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche - Biblioteca Centrale - P.le Aldo Moro, 7, Rome; Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale - P.za Cavalleggeri, 1, Florence / CNR - Consiglio Nazionale delle RichercheSIGLEITItal