Allocating the surplus induced by cooperation in distribution chains with multiple suppliers and retailers

The coordination of actions and the allocation of profit in supply chains under decentralized control plays an important role in improving the profits of retailers and suppliers in the supply chain. We focus on supply chains under decentralized control in which noncompeting retailers can order from multiple suppliers to replenish their stocks. The goal of the firms in the chain is to maximize their individual profits. As the outcome under decentralized control is inefficient, coordination of actions between cooperating agents can improve individual profits. Cooperative game theory is used to analyze cooperation between agents. We introduce multi-retailer-supplier games and show that agents can always achieve an optimal profit by cooperating and forming the grand coalition. Moreover, we show that there will always be stable allocations of total profit among the firms which cannot be improved by any coalition. In addition, we propose and characterize a stable allocation of the total surplus induced by cooperation.We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia, Spain, Innovación y Universidades (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE) through project PGC2018-097965-B-I00, PID2020-114594GB–{C21,C22}, PID2022-137211NB-100; and Fundación BBVA: project NetmeetData (Ayudas Fundación BBVA a equipos de investigación científica 2019), Spain; and by Generalitat Valenciana, Spain through project PROMETEO/2021/063

Profit allocation in agricultural supply chains: exploring the nexus of cooperation and compensation

In this paper, we focus on decentralized agricultural supply chains consisting of multiple non-competing distributors satisfying the demand of their respective markets. These distributors source a single product from a farmer through an agricultural cooperative, operating in a single period. The agents have the ability to coordinate their actions to maximize their profits, and we use cooperative game theory to analyze cooperation among them. The distributors can engage in joint ordering, increasing their order size, which leads to a decrease in the price per kilogram. Additionally, distributors have the opportunity to cooperate with the farmer, securing a reduced price per kilogram at the cost price, while compensating the farmer for any kilograms not acquired in the cooperation agreement. We introduce multidistributor-farmer games and we prove that all the agents have incentives to cooperate. We demonstrate the existence of stable allocations, where no subgroup of agents can be better off by separating. Moreover, we propose and characterize a distribution of the total profit that justly compensates the contribution of the farmer in any group of distributors. Finally, we explore the conditions under which the farmer can be compensated in order to maximize their revenues when cooperating with all players

p-additive games: a class of totally balanced games arising from inventory situations with temporary discounts

We introduce a new class of totally balanced cooperative TU games, namely p-additive games. It is inspired by the class of inventory games that arises from inventory situations with temporary discounts (Toledo Ph.D. thesis, Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche, 2002) and contains the class of inventory cost games (Meca et al. Math. Methods Oper. Res. 57:481–493, 2003). It is shown that every p-additive game and its corresponding subgames have a nonempty core. We also focus on studying the character of concave or convex and monotone p-additive games. In addition, the modified SOC-rule is proposed as a solution for p-additive games. This solution is suitable for p-additive games, since it is a core-allocation which can be reached through a population monotonic allocation scheme. Moreover, two characterizations of the modified SOC-rule are provided.This work was partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science and Generalitat Valenciana (grants MTM2005-09184-C02-02, ACOMP06/040, CSD2006-00032)

Unitary Owen Points in Cooperative Lot-Sizing Models with Backlogging

This paper analyzes cost sharing in uncapacitated lot-sizing models with backlogging and heterogeneous costs. It is assumed that several firms participate in a consortium aiming at satisfying their demand over the planning horizon with minimal operating cost. Each individual firm has its own ordering channel and holding technology, but cooperation with other firms consists in sharing that information. Therefore, the firms that cooperate can use the best ordering channels and holding technology among members of the consortium. This mode of cooperation is stable. in that allocations of the overall operating cost exist, so that no group of agents benefit from leaving the consortium. Our contribution in the current paper is to present a new family of cost sharing allocations with good properties for enforcing cooperation: the unitary Owen points. Necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for the unitary Owen points to belong to the core of the cooperative game. In addition, we provide empirical evidence, through simulation, showing that, in randomly-generated situations, the above condition is fulfilled in 99% of the cases. Additionally, a relationship between lot-sizing games and a certain family of production-inventory games, through Owen’s points of the latter, is described. This interesting relationship enables easily constructing a variety of coalitionally stable allocations for cooperative lot-sizing models.The research authors is supported from Spain’s Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (MCIU), from the Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) and from the Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER) under the projects MTM2016-74983-C02-01 and PGC2018-097965-B-I00. The research of the third author is also partially supported from projects FEDER-US-1256951, CEI-3-FQM331 and NetmeetData: Ayudas Fundación BBVA a equipos de investigación científica 2019

Restos arquitectónicos de la Guerra Civil en Almansa. Propuesta de producto turístico

La continua búsqueda de innovación en las ofertas turísticas ha llevado a muchos territorios a ver en su propia cultura e historia una oportunidad de desarrollo turístico. El turismo cultural y todas sus variantes, son vistos como una oportunidad para diversificar las ofertas más tradicionales, además de ser una tipología turística que favorece el desarrollo local y la activación de cualquier territorio. El presente estudio busca crear un producto turístico a partir de unos restos arquitectónicos construidos durante la Guerra Civil española en el municipio de Almansa. El análisis de esta investigación se ha desarrollado mediante un estudio exploratorio cualitativo para conocer el potencial real de estos restos

Production-inventory games and PMAS-games: characterizations of the Owen point

Production-inventory games were introduced in [Guardiola, L.A., Meca, A., Puerto, J. (2008). Production-Inventory games: A new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games. Games Econom. Behav. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.02.003] as a new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games. From among all core-allocations, the Owen point was proposed as a specifically appealing solution. In this paper we study some relationships of the class of production-inventory games and other classes of new and known games. In addition, we propose three axiomatic characterizations of the Owen point. We use eight axioms for these characterizations, among those, inessentiality and additivity of players’ demands are used for the first time in this paper

Dynamic realization games in newsvendor inventory centralization

Consider a set N of n (> 1) stores with single-item and single-period nondeterministic demands like in a classic newsvendor setting with holding and penalty costs only. Assume a risk-pooling single-warehouse centralized inventory ordering option. Allocation of costs in the centralized inventory ordering corresponds to modelling it as a cooperative cost game whose players are the stores. It has been shown that when holding and penalty costs are identical for all subsets of stores, the game based on optimal expected costs has a non empty core (Hartman et al. 2000, Games Econ Behav 31:26–49; Muller et al. 2002, Games Econ Behav 38:118–126). In this paper we examine a related inventory centralization game based on demand realizations that has, in general, an empty core even with identical penalty and holding costs (Hartman and Dror 2005, IIE Trans Scheduling Logistics 37:93–107). We propose a repeated cost allocation scheme for dynamic realization games based on allocation processes introduced by Lehrer (2002a, Int J Game Theor 31:341–351). We prove that the cost subsequences of the dynamic realization game process, based on Lehrer’s rules, converge almost surely to either a least square value or the core of the expected game. We extend the above results to more general dynamic cost games and relax the independence hypothesis of the sequence of players’ demands at different stages

The blooming in the rural landscape of Cieza as a driver of tourism and local development

Los paisajes rurales son el resultado visible de la interacción hombre-medio, la expresión del modo de vida de una sociedad cuya funcionalidad más relevante es la agricultura, dando lugar a la existencia de un patrimonio representativo de la cultura rural que, en la actualidad, constituye un elemento de valor con gran significado para su aprovechamiento desde el punto de vista del ocio y el turismo. Un buen ejemplo es el paisaje rural de Cieza, por lo que, mediante un método mixto, cualitativo, y cuantitativo, no experimental, descriptivo y exploratorio, y del análisis de los datos obtenidos de diferentes fuentes.Rural landscapes are the visible result of the human-environment interaction, the expression of the way of life of a society whose most relevant functionality is the agriculture, giving rise to the existence of a representative heritage of the rural culture that nowadays constitutes an element of value with a great meaning for its use from the standpoint of leisure and tourism. A representative sample is the rural landscape of Cieza, that by means of a mixed, qualitative, quantitative, no experimental, descriptive and exploratory method, and the analysis of the data gathered of different sources

Is it necessary the introduction in the curriculum of Emotional Intelligence programmes?

El objetivo principal del presente artículo, es la pregunta de si introducir o no en el currículum de educación primaria los programas de inteligencia emocional, para trabajarlos en las aulas. Sin embargo, para su inclusión en el colegio, es necesaria la participación de las familias, profesionales del centro y alumnado, usando un lenguaje positivo y creando un ambiente positivo tanto en nuestros hogares como en el colegio. Para llevarlo a cabo, es indispensable un cambio metodológico.The main goal of this essay is the question of introducing in the curriculum of primary education or not all the Emotional Intelligence programmes available, and using them inside the classroom. However, for the inclusion of this programme in the school, it is necessary the participation on the part of the families, school professionals and the student body, using a positive language and creating a positive environment in our homes and in the school. For doing so, it is required a methodological change