Actuality Entailments, negation, and free choice inferences

In some languages, (certain) root modals license Actuality Entailments (AEs) when they are perfective-marked. We discuss two puzzling properties of these constructions: (i) when AE-licensing modals are negated, the result entails the negation of actuality, and (ii) when AE-licensing modals embed disjunctions, no Free Choice inferences are available. We develop an account of (i) and show that, given an implicature-based view of Free Choice, (ii) follows as a consequence.

Modeling Concept Combinations in a Quantum-theoretic Framework

We present modeling for conceptual combinations which uses the mathematical formalism of quantum theory. Our model faithfully describes a large amount of experimental data collected by different scholars on concept conjunctions and disjunctions. Furthermore, our approach sheds a new light on long standing drawbacks connected with vagueness, or fuzziness, of concepts, and puts forward a completely novel possible solution to the 'combination problem' in concept theory. Additionally, we introduce an explanation for the occurrence of quantum structures in the mechanisms and dynamics of concepts and, more generally, in cognitive and decision processes, according to which human thought is a well structured superposition of a 'logical thought' and a 'conceptual thought', and the latter usually prevails over the former, at variance with some widespread beliefsComment: 5 pages. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1311.605

A Quantum Probability Perspective on Borderline Vagueness

The term “vagueness” describes a property of natural concepts, which normally have fuzzy boundaries, admit borderline cases, and are susceptible to Zeno's sorites paradox. We will discuss the psychology of vagueness, especially experiments investigating the judgment of borderline cases and contradictions. In the theoretical part, we will propose a probabilistic model that describes the quantitative characteristics of the experimental finding and extends Alxatib's and Pelletier's () theoretical analysis. The model is based on a Hopfield network for predicting truth values. Powerful as this classical perspective is, we show that it falls short of providing an adequate coverage of the relevant empirical results. In the final part, we will argue that a substantial modification of the analysis put forward by Alxatib and Pelletier and its probabilistic pendant is needed. The proposed modification replaces the standard notion of probabilities by quantum probabilities. The crucial phenomenon of borderline contradictions can be explained then as a quantum interference phenomenon

Acceptable Contradictions : Pragmatics or Semantics? A Reply to Cobreros et al.

Naive speakers find some logical contradictions acceptable, specifically borderline contradictions involving vague predicates such as Joe is and isn't tall. In a recent paper, Cobreros et al. (J Philos Logic, 2012) suggest a pragmatic account of the acceptability of borderline contradictions. We show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong truth conditions for some examples with disjunction. As a remedy, we propose a semantic analysis instead. The analysis is close to a variant of fuzzy logic, but conjunction and disjunction are interpreted as intensional operators.AuthorCount:3;</p

Are Gaps Preferred to Gluts? A Closer Look at Borderline Contradictions

International audienceThis paper examines the acceptance of so-called borderline contradictions involving vague adjectives. A close look at the available data from previous studies points toward a preference for “gappy” descriptions of the form “x is neither P nor not P” over “glutty” descriptions of the form “x is P and not P”. We present the results of an experiment in which we tested for that difference systematically, using relative gradable adjectives. Our findings confirm that both kinds of descriptions are accepted, but indeed that “neither”-descriptions are to a large extent preferred to “and”-descriptions. We examine several possible explanations for that preference. Our account relies on the distinction proposed by Cobreros et al. (J Philos Logic, 1–39, 2012) between strict and tolerant meaning for vague adjectives, as well as on a specific implementation of the strongest meaning hypothesis endorsed by Cobreros et al. as well as Alxatib and Pelletier (Mind Lang 26(3): 287–326 2011a). Our approach, however, argues in favor of local pragmatic strengthening instead of global strengthening in order to derive that preference