Stochastic slowdown in evolutionary processes

We examine birth--death processes with state dependent transition probabilities and at least one absorbing boundary. In evolution, this describes selection acting on two different types in a finite population where reproductive events occur successively. If the two types have equal fitness the system performs a random walk. If one type has a fitness advantage it is favored by selection, which introduces a bias (asymmetry) in the transition probabilities. How long does it take until advantageous mutants have invaded and taken over? Surprisingly, we find that the average time of such a process can increase, even if the mutant type always has a fitness advantage. We discuss this finding for the Moran process and develop a simplified model which allows a more intuitive understanding. We show that this effect can occur for weak but non--vanishing bias (selection) in the state dependent transition rates and infer the scaling with system size. We also address the Wright-Fisher model commonly used in population genetics, which shows that this stochastic slowdown is not restricted to birth-death processes.Comment: 8 pages, 3 figures, accepted for publicatio

Universality of weak selection

Weak selection, which means a phenotype is slightly advantageous over another, is an important limiting case in evolutionary biology. Recently it has been introduced into evolutionary game theory. In evolutionary game dynamics, the probability to be imitated or to reproduce depends on the performance in a game. The influence of the game on the stochastic dynamics in finite populations is governed by the intensity of selection. In many models of both unstructured and structured populations, a key assumption allowing analytical calculations is weak selection, which means that all individuals perform approximately equally well. In the weak selection limit many different microscopic evolutionary models have the same or similar properties. How universal is weak selection for those microscopic evolutionary processes? We answer this question by investigating the fixation probability and the average fixation time not only up to linear, but also up to higher orders in selection intensity. We find universal higher order expansions, which allow a rescaling of the selection intensity. With this, we can identify specific models which violate (linear) weak selection results, such as the one--third rule of coordination games in finite but large populations.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figures, accepted for publication in Physical Review

First Steps towards Underdominant Genetic Transformation of Insect Populations

The idea of introducing genetic modifications into wild populations of insects to stop them from spreading diseases is more than 40 years old. Synthetic disease refractory genes have been successfully generated for mosquito vectors of dengue fever and human malaria. Equally important is the development of population transformation systems to drive and maintain disease refractory genes at high frequency in populations. We demonstrate an underdominant population transformation system in Drosophila melanogaster that has the property of being both spatially self-limiting and reversible to the original genetic state. Both population transformation and its reversal can be largely achieved within as few as 5 generations. The described genetic construct {Ud} is composed of two genes; (1) a UAS-RpL14.dsRNA targeting RNAi to a haploinsufficient gene RpL14 and (2) an RNAi insensitive RpL14 rescue. In this proof-of-principle system the UAS-RpL14.dsRNA knock-down gene is placed under the control of an Actin5c-GAL4 driver located on a different chromosome to the {Ud} insert. This configuration would not be effective in wild populations without incorporating the Actin5c-GAL4 driver as part of the {Ud} construct (or replacing the UAS promoter with an appropriate direct promoter). It is however anticipated that the approach that underlies this underdominant system could potentially be applied to a number of species. Figure

The edge of neutral evolution in social dilemmas

The functioning of animal as well as human societies fundamentally relies on cooperation. Yet, defection is often favorable for the selfish individual, and social dilemmas arise. Selection by individuals' fitness, usually the basic driving force of evolution, quickly eliminates cooperators. However, evolution is also governed by fluctuations that can be of greater importance than fitness differences, and can render evolution effectively neutral. Here, we investigate the effects of selection versus fluctuations in social dilemmas. By studying the mean extinction times of cooperators and defectors, a variable sensitive to fluctuations, we are able to identify and quantify an emerging 'edge of neutral evolution' that delineates regimes of neutral and Darwinian evolution. Our results reveal that cooperation is significantly maintained in the neutral regimes. In contrast, the classical predictions of evolutionary game theory, where defectors beat cooperators, are recovered in the Darwinian regimes. Our studies demonstrate that fluctuations can provide a surprisingly simple way to partly resolve social dilemmas. Our methods are generally applicable to estimate the role of random drift in evolutionary dynamics.Comment: 17 pages, 4 figure

Fixation times in evolutionary games under weak selection

In evolutionary game dynamics, reproductive success increases with the performance in an evolutionary game. If strategy $A$ performs better than strategy $B$, strategy $A$ will spread in the population. Under stochastic dynamics, a single mutant will sooner or later take over the entire population or go extinct. We analyze the mean exit times (or average fixation times) associated with this process. We show analytically that these times depend on the payoff matrix of the game in an amazingly simple way under weak selection, ie strong stochasticity: The payoff difference $\Delta \pi$ is a linear function of the number of $A$ individuals $i$, $\Delta \pi = u i + v$. The unconditional mean exit time depends only on the constant term $v$. Given that a single $A$ mutant takes over the population, the corresponding conditional mean exit time depends only on the density dependent term $u$. We demonstrate this finding for two commonly applied microscopic evolutionary processes.Comment: Forthcoming in New Journal of Physic

Large Fluctuations and Fixation in Evolutionary Games

We study large fluctuations in evolutionary games belonging to the coordination and anti-coordination classes. The dynamics of these games, modeling cooperation dilemmas, is characterized by a coexistence fixed point separating two absorbing states. We are particularly interested in the problem of fixation that refers to the possibility that a few mutants take over the entire population. Here, the fixation phenomenon is induced by large fluctuations and is investigated by a semi-classical WKB (Wentzel-Kramers-Brillouin) theory generalized to treat stochastic systems possessing multiple absorbing states. Importantly, this method allows us to analyze the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics \textit{beyond} the weak selection limit often considered in previous works. We accurately compute, including pre-exponential factors, the probability distribution function in the long-lived coexistence state and the mean fixation time necessary for a few mutants to take over the entire population in anti-coordination games, and also the fixation probability in the coordination class. Our analytical results compare excellently with extensive numerical simulations. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our treatment is superior to the Fokker-Planck approximation when the selection intensity is finite.Comment: 17 pages, 10 figures, to appear in JSTA

Deterministic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations

Evolutionary game dynamics describes the spreading of successful strategies in a population of reproducing individuals. Typically, the microscopic definition of strategy spreading is stochastic, such that the dynamics becomes deterministic only in infinitely large populations. Here, we introduce a new microscopic birth--death process that has a fully deterministic strong selection limit in well--mixed populations of any size. Additionally, under weak selection, from this new process the frequency dependent Moran process is recovered. This makes it a natural extension of the usual evolutionary dynamics under weak selection. We find simple expressions for the fixation probabilities and average fixation times of the new process in evolutionary games with two players and two strategies. For cyclic games with two players and three strategies, we show that the resulting deterministic dynamics crucially depends on the initial condition in a non--trivial way.Comment: 11 pages, 7 figure

The role of Allee effect in modelling post resection recurrence of glioblastoma

Resection of the bulk of a tumour often cannot eliminate all cancer cells, due to their infiltration into the surrounding healthy tissue. This may lead to recurrence of the tumour at a later time. We use a reaction-diffusion equation based model of tumour growth to investigate how the invasion front is delayed by resection, and how this depends on the density and behaviour of the remaining cancer cells. We show that the delay time is highly sensitive to qualitative details of the proliferation dynamics of the cancer cell population. The typically assumed logistic type proliferation leads to unrealistic results, predicting immediate recurrence. We find that in glioblastoma cell cultures the cell proliferation rate is an increasing function of the density at small cell densities. Our analysis suggests that cooperative behaviour of cancer cells, analogous to the Allee effect in ecology, can play a critical role in determining the time until tumour recurrence