Physicians self selection of a payment mechanism: Capitation versus fee-for-service

The main question raised in this paper is whether GPs should self select their paymentmechanism or not. To answer it, we model GPs' behavior under the most commonpayment schemes (capitation and fee-for-service) and when GPs can select one amongthose. Our analysis considers GPs heterogeneity in terms of both ability and sense ofprofessional duty. We conclude that when savings on specialists costs are the mainconcern of a regulator, GPs should be paid on a fee-for-service basis. Instead, whenfailures to identify severe conditions are the main concern, then payment self selection byGPs can be optimal.GPs; gatekeeping; payment scheme; self selection; ability; professional duty

Provider Competition in a Dynamic Setting

In this paper, we examine provider and patient behaviour where effort is non-contractible and where competition between providers is modeled in an explicit way. More specifically, we construct a model where physicians repeatedly compete for patients and where patients’ outside options are solved for in equilibrium. In our model, physicians are characterized by an individual-specific ethical constraint which allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the physicians market. By doing so, we introduce uncertainty in the patient’s likely treatment if he were in fact to leave his current physician to seek care elsewhere. We find that competition between providers may serve as an important incentive for physicians in treating their patients with desired levels of care.Physician Payment Mechanisms, Physician heterogeneity, Competition, Information Asymmetry, Insurance.

A Vortex Method for Bi-phasic Fluids Interacting with Rigid Bodies

We present an accurate Lagrangian method based on vortex particles, level-sets, and immersed boundary methods, for animating the interplay between two fluids and rigid solids. We show that a vortex method is a good choice for simulating bi-phase flow, such as liquid and gas, with a good level of realism. Vortex particles are localized at the interfaces between the two fluids and within the regions of high turbulence. We gain local precision and efficiency from the stable advection permitted by the vorticity formulation. Moreover, our numerical method straightforwardly solves the two-way coupling problem between the fluids and animated rigid solids. This new approach is validated through numerical comparisons with reference experiments from the computational fluid community. We also show that the visually appealing results obtained in the CG community can be reproduced with increased efficiency and an easier implementation

Légaliser la vente de reins : à quel prix… Compte-rendu de The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran par Sigrid Fry-Revere

Compte-rendu / ReviewThe Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran est un ouvrage qui présente la mise en place d’un marché légal de reins comme la solution au problème du manque d’organes. L’auteure, Sigrid Fry-Revere, s’est rendue en Iran pour y étudier les effets de ce marché balisé. Le livre est clairement en faveur d’un marché. Les conséquences néfastes encourues à long terme par les vendeurs sont très peu décrites et les autres moyens visant à augmenter les dons d’organes ne sont pas abordés.The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran is a book that describes the implementation of a regulated kidney market as a means to solve the organ shortage. The author, Sigrid Fry-Revere, travelled to Iran to study the effects of the regulated market in that country. The book is clearly in favour of a market. The long-term adverse consequences to those selling their organs are very poorly described, nor are other means to increase organ donations rates addressed

Note sur la théorie néo-keynésienne du producteur

While the meaningful theorems of neo-classical theory of the producer are well known, the neo-keynesian counterparts are not. Therefore, this paper will present those new meaningful theorems and their relations with neo-classical theory. On the one hand, this paper is of interest to the theoretician who would want to use the properties of comparative statics of the producer with quantitative rationing. On the other hand, since a neo-keynesian structural form is presented, the econometrician will be interested in imposing the meaningful theorems of this theory as a priori restrictions

Aversion Analysis

In this paper : a) the consumer’s problem is studied over two periods, the second one involving S states, and the consumer being endowed with S+1 incomes and having access to N financial assets; b) the consumer is then representable by a continuously differentiable system of demands, commodity demands, asset demands and desirabilities of incomes (the S+1 Lagrange multiplier of the S+1 constraints); c) the multipliers can be transformed into subjective Arrow prices; d) the effects of the various incomes on these Arrow prices decompose into a compensation effect (an Antonelli matrix) and a wealth effect; e) the Antonelli matrix has rank S-N, the dimension of incompleteness, if the consumer can financially adjust himself when facing income shocks; f) the matrix has rank S, if not; g) in the first case, the matrix represents a residual aversion; in the second case, a fundamental aversion; the difference between them is an aversion to illiquidity; this last relation corresponds to the Drèze-Modigliani decomposition (1972); h) the fundamental aversion decomposes also into an aversion to impatience and a risk aversion; i) the above decompositions span a third decomposition; if there exists a sure asset (to be defined, the usual definition being too specific), the fundamental aversion admits a three-component decomposition, an aversion to impatience, a residual aversion and an aversion to the illiquidity of risky assets; j) the formulas of the corresponding financial premiums are also presented.Dans cet article : a) on étudie le problème du consommateur sur deux périodes, la seconde comportant a priori S états et le consommateur disposant de S+1 revenus et N≤S actifs; b) le consommateur est alors représentable par un système de fonctions de demande continûment dérivables portant sur les biens et services, les actifs financiers, la désirabilité des revenus (les S+1 multiplicateurs de Lagrange associés aux contraintes); c) les multiplicateurs se transforment en prix d’Arrow subjectifs ou individuels; d) l’effet des divers revenus sur les prix d’Arrow se décomposent en un effet compensé (une matrice d’Antonelli) et un effet-richesse; e) la matrice d’Antonelli est de rang S-N, la dimension de l’incomplétude, si le consommateur peut s’ajuster financièrement aux chocs représentés par une variation des revenus; f) elle est de rang S sinon; g) dans le premier cas, elle représente une aversion résiduelle; dans le deuxième cas, une aversion fondamentale; la différence entre les deux est une aversion à l’illiquidité; cette dernière relation correspond à la décomposition de Drèze-Modigliani (1972); h) l’aversion fondamentale se décompose aussi en une aversion à l’impatience et une aversion au risque; i) les deux décompositions précédentes conduisent à une troisième; s’il existe un actif sûr (ce qu’il faut définir, la définition usuelle n’a pas de ......... générale) l’aversion fondamentale se décompose en trois, une aversion à l’impatience, une aversion résiduelle et une aversion à l’illiquidité des actifs risqués; j) à ces diverses aversions correspondent autant de primes financières, on en donne les différentes formules