British Society of Gastroenterology guidelines on the management of functional dyspepsia

Functional dyspepsia (FD) is a common disorder of gut-brain interaction, affecting approximately 7% of individuals in the community, with most patients managed in primary care. The last British Society of Gastroenterology (BSG) guideline for the management of dyspepsia was published in 1996. In the interim, substantial advances have been made in understanding the complex pathophysiology of FD, and there has been a considerable amount of new evidence published concerning its diagnosis and classification, with the advent of the Rome IV criteria, and management. The primary aim of this guideline, commissioned by the BSG, is to review and summarise the current evidence to inform and guide clinical practice, by providing a practical framework for evidence-based diagnosis and treatment of patients. The approach to investigating the patient presenting with dyspepsia is discussed, and efficacy of drugs in FD summarised based on evidence derived from a comprehensive search of the medical literature, which was used to inform an update of a series of pairwise and network meta-Analyses. Specific recommendations have been made according to the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation system. These provide both the strength of the recommendations and the overall quality of evidence. Finally, in this guideline, we consider novel treatments that are in development, as well as highlighting areas of unmet need and priorities for future research

Too Big to Fail — U.S. Banks’ Regulatory Alchemy: Converting an Obscure Agency Footnote into an “At Will” Nullification of Dodd-Frank’s Regulation of the Multi-Trillion Dollar Financial Swaps Market

The multi-trillion-dollar market for, what was at that time wholly unregulated, over-the-counter derivatives (“swaps”) is widely viewed as a principal cause of the 2008 worldwide financial meltdown. The Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law on July 21, 2010, was expressly considered by Congress to be a remedy for this troublesome deregulatory problem. The legislation required the swaps market to comply with a host of business conduct and anti-competitive protections, including that the swaps market be fully transparent to U.S. financial regulators, collateralized, and capitalized. The statute also expressly provides that it would cover foreign subsidiaries of big U.S. financial institutions if their swaps trading could adversely impact the U.S. economy or represent the use of extraterritorial trades as an attempt to “evade” Dodd-Frank. In July 2013, the CFTC promulgated an 80-page, triple-columned, and single-spaced “guidance” implementing Dodd-Frank’s extraterritorial reach, i.e., that manner in which Dodd-Frank would apply to swaps transactions executed outside the United States. The key point of that guidance was that swaps trading within the “guaranteed” foreign subsidiaries of U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers were subject to all of Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulations wherever in the world those subsidiaries’ swaps were executed. At that time, the standardized industry swaps agreement contemplated that, inter alia, U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers’ foreign subsidiaries would be “guaranteed” by their corporate parent, as was true since 1992. In August 2013, without notifying the CFTC, the principal U.S. bank holding company swaps dealer trade association privately circulated to its members standard contractual language that would, for the first time, “deguarantee” their foreign subsidiaries. By relying only on the obscure footnote 563 of the CFTC guidance’s 662 footnotes, the trade association assured its swaps dealer members that the newly deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries could (if they so chose) no longer be subject to Dodd-Frank. As a result, it has been reported (and it also has been understood by many experts within the swaps industry) that a substantial portion of the U.S. swaps market has shifted from the large U.S. bank holding companies swaps dealers and their U.S. affiliates to their newly deguaranteed “foreign” subsidiaries, with the attendant claim by these huge big U.S. bank swaps dealers that Dodd-Frank swaps regulation would not apply to these transactions. The CFTC also soon discovered that these huge U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers were “arranging, negotiating, and executing” (“ANE”) these swaps in the United States with U.S. bank personnel and, only after execution in the U.S., were these swaps formally “assigned” to the U.S. banks’ newly “deguaranteed” foreign subsidiaries with the accompanying claim that these swaps, even though executed in the U.S., were not covered by Dodd-Frank. In October 2016, the CFTC proposed a rule that would have closed the “deguarantee” and “ANE” loopholes completely. However, because it usually takes at least a year to finalize a “proposed” rule, this proposed rule closing the loopholes in question was not finalized prior to the inauguration of President Trump. All indications are that it will never be finalized during a Trump Administration. Thus, in the shadow of the recent tenth anniversary of the Lehman failure, there is an understanding among many market regulators and swaps trading experts that large portions of the swaps market have moved from U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers and their U.S. affiliates to their newly deguaranteed foreign affiliates where Dodd- Frank swaps regulation is not being followed. However, what has not moved abroad is the very real obligation of the lender of last resort to rescue these U.S. swaps dealer bank holding companies if they fail because of poorly regulated swaps in their deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries, i.e., the U.S. taxpayer. While relief is unlikely to be forthcoming from the Trump Administration or the Republican-controlled Senate, some other means will have to be found to avert another multi-trillion-dollar bank bailout and/or a financial calamity caused by poorly regulated swaps on the books of big U.S. banks. This paper notes that the relevant statutory framework affords state attorneys general and state financial regulators the right to bring so-called “parens patriae” actions in federal district court to enforce, inter alia, Dodd- Frank on behalf of a state’s citizens. That kind of litigation to enforce the statute’s extraterritorial provisions is now badly needed

The Rhetoric of the Coalition: Governing in the National Interest?

This article examines coalition rhetoric across two political dimensions. These are the economic and social spheres. To conduct this analysis, the article examines how elites frame their rhetoric towards drawing out specific reactions from their audiences by using their individual political credibility. For the Liberal Democrats, this implies ‘progressive’ forms of rhetoric, whilst for the Conservatives a more ‘market orientated’ form of rhetoric is utilised. Through emotive and/or logical language, it becomes possible for such elites to construct appealing rhetoric for their chosen audience. Central to both, however, is the national interest. The importance of the national interest overrides previous ideological concerns, given that it enables the coalition to claim governing legitimacy. Broadly defined, the national interest is conflated as the growth of capital, the promotion of ‘wealth creation’, enabling social welfare. In terms of the coalition, tied to this interest are economic and social reforms designed to promote a specific reconceptualisation of morality rooted in more traditional values. Consequently, this article presents a rhetorical assessment of the coalition tied to its economic and social reform agenda