The Lord\u27s Anointed: Covenantal Kingship in Psalm 2 and Acts 4

This study examines the title “Christ” as applied to Jesus in Acts 4:25-27. “Christ” or “Anointed One” here is directly connected to Psalm 2:1-2, and ultimately derives from the royal anointing ceremony of Israel. That ceremony symbolizes a commitment by God to the monarch which is made most specific in the Davidic covenant. The Gospel of Luke uses the title “Christ” to connect these Davidic themes to Jesus. In Acts 4:25-27, “Christ” continues to signify Israel’s king backed by the Davidic covenant. The apostles’ reading of Psalm 2 provides a foundation for understanding their own recent persecution and for their hope that the opponents of the King they represent—like those in Psalm 2—will not prevail

In what sense can instruments and bodies be said to form spaces?

My recent work is an exploration of the physical and conceptual mechanisms that interface people with instruments. Central to this investigation is a conception of the performer/instrument assemblage as a symbiosis of two parallel and interdependent systems: one – the performer – moves through space established by the other – the instrument. Each system possesses its own intrinsic properties and characteristics; each possesses capacities to affect and be affected by one another. The music emanates from this contiguous interaction. Instrument surface is understood as a compositional resource itself, a topological façade, defined by ordinal distances, that guides gestures along its contours. Within these fluctuating constellations of spatial coordinates, I consider all the relevant ways a body can move, and establish some general combinatory rules that inform the convergence of forces within the body. The traditional subjects of compositional contemplation such as form, duration, dynamic, etc. are not attributing features to the work per se but emerge as results from spatiotemporal relations of (bodily) movement’s correspondence with (instrumental) surface and mechanism. This liberation of movement is understood as a liberation of timbre, and the inherent indeterminacy of this relationship is embraced. As such, I would hypothesize that sound is, to an extent, freed from the subtractive tendencies of perception that might otherwise subvert it into generalized typological categories. Once liberated from the imagination, sound can bypass the brain and directly engage the nervous system

Classification of the maximal subalgebras of exceptional Lie algebras over fields of good characteristic

Let $G$ be an exceptional simple algebraic group over an algebraically closed field $k$ and suppose that the characteristic $p$ of $k$ is a good prime for $G$. In this paper we classify the maximal Lie subalgebras $\mathfrak{m}$ of the Lie algebra $\mathfrak{g}={\rm Lie}(G)$. Specifically, we show that one of the following holds: $\mathfrak{m}={\rm Lie}(M)$ for some maximal connected subgroup $M$ of $G$, or $\mathfrak{m}$ is a maximal Witt subalgebra of $\mathfrak{g}$, or $\mathfrak{m}$ is a maximal \it{\mbox{exotic semidirect product}}. The conjugacy classes of maximal connected subgroups of G are known thanks to the work of Seitz, Testerman and Liebeck--Seitz. All maximal Witt subalgebras of $\mathfrak{g}$ are $G$-conjugate and they occur when $G$ is not of type ${\rm E}_6$ and $p-1$ coincides with the Coxeter number of $G$. We show that there are two conjugacy classes of maximal exotic semidirect products in $\mathfrak{g}$, one in characteristic $5$ and one in characteristic $7$, and both occur when $G$ is a group of type ${\rm E}_7$.Comment: This version is accepted for publication in Journal of the American Mathematical Society; 40 page

Rigid orbits and sheets in reductive Lie algebras over fields of prime characteristic

Let $G$ be a simple simply-connected algebraic group over an algebraically closed field $k$ of characteristic $p>0$ with $\mathfrak{g}={\rm Lie}(G)$. We discuss various properties of nilpotent orbits in $\mathfrak{g}$, which have previously only been considered over $\mathbb{C}$. Using a combination of theoretical and computational methods, we extend to positive characteristic various calculations of de Graaf with nilpotent orbits in exceptional Lie algebras. In particular, we classify those orbits which are reachable, those which satisfy a certain related condition due to Panyushev, and determine the codimension in the centraliser $\mathfrak{g}_e$ of its the derived subalgebra $[\mathfrak{g}_e,\mathfrak{g}_e]$. Some of these calculations are used to show that the list of rigid nilpotent orbits in $\mathfrak{g}$, the classification of sheets of $\mathfrak{g}$ and the distribution of the nilpotent orbits amongst them are independent of good characteristic, remaining the same as in the characteristic zero case. We also give a comprehensive account of the theory of sheets in reductive Lie algebras over algebraically closed fields of good characteristic.Comment: revised version, many typos corrected, 25 page

The collapse of cooperation in evolving games

Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as a robust outcome in evolving populations. Here we extend evolutionary game theory by allowing players' strategies as well as their payoffs to evolve in response to selection on heritable mutations. In nature, many organisms engage in mutually beneficial interactions, and individuals may seek to change the ratio of risk to reward for cooperation by altering the resources they commit to cooperative interactions. To study this, we construct a general framework for the co-evolution of strategies and payoffs in arbitrary iterated games. We show that, as payoffs evolve, a trade-off between the benefits and costs of cooperation precipitates a dramatic loss of cooperation under the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; and eventually to evolution away from the Prisoner's Dilemma altogether. The collapse of cooperation is so extreme that the average payoff in a population may decline, even as the potential payoff for mutual cooperation increases. Our work offers a new perspective on the Prisoner's Dilemma and its predictions for cooperation in natural populations; and it provides a general framework to understand the co-evolution of strategies and payoffs in iterated interactions.Comment: 33 pages, 13 figure

Small games and long memories promote cooperation

Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists in particular the question is often how such behaviors can arise \textit{de novo} in a simple evolving system. How can group behaviors such as collective action, or decision making that accounts for memories of past experience, emerge and persist? Evolutionary game theory provides a framework for formalizing these questions and admitting them to rigorous study. Here we develop such a framework to study the evolution of sustained collective action in multi-player public-goods games, in which players have arbitrarily long memories of prior rounds of play and can react to their experience in an arbitrary way. To study this problem we construct a coordinate system for memory-$m$ strategies in iterated $n$-player games that permits us to characterize all the cooperative strategies that resist invasion by any mutant strategy, and thus stabilize cooperative behavior. We show that while larger games inevitably make cooperation harder to evolve, there nevertheless always exists a positive volume of strategies that stabilize cooperation provided the population size is large enough. We also show that, when games are small, longer-memory strategies make cooperation easier to evolve, by increasing the number of ways to stabilize cooperation. Finally we explore the co-evolution of behavior and memory capacity, and we find that longer-memory strategies tend to evolve in small games, which in turn drives the evolution of cooperation even when the benefits for cooperation are low

The evolution of complex gene regulation by low specificity binding sites

Transcription factor binding sites vary in their specificity, both within and between species. Binding specificity has a strong impact on the evolution of gene expression, because it determines how easily regulatory interactions are gained and lost. Nevertheless, we have a relatively poor understanding of what evolutionary forces determine the specificity of binding sites. Here we address this question by studying regulatory modules composed of multiple binding sites. Using a population-genetic model, we show that more complex regulatory modules, composed of a greater number of binding sites, must employ binding sites that are individually less specific, compared to less complex regulatory modules. This effect is extremely general, and it hold regardless of the regulatory logic of a module. We attribute this phenomenon to the inability of stabilising selection to maintain highly specific sites in large regulatory modules. Our analysis helps to explain broad empirical trends in the yeast regulatory network: those genes with a greater number of transcriptional regulators feature by less specific binding sites, and there is less variance in their specificity, compared to genes with fewer regulators. Likewise, our results also help to explain the well-known trend towards lower specificity in the transcription factor binding sites of higher eukaryotes, which perform complex regulatory tasks, compared to prokaryotes

Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity

Iterated games provide a framework to describe social interactions among groups of individuals. Recent work stimulated by the discovery of "zero-determinant" strategies has rapidly expanded our ability to analyze such interactions. This body of work has primarily focused on games in which players face a simple binary choice, to "cooperate" or "defect". Real individuals, however, often exhibit behavioral diversity, varying their input to a social interaction both qualitatively and quantitatively. Here we explore how access to a greater diversity of behavioral choices impacts the evolution of social dynamics in finite populations. We show that, in public goods games, some two-choice strategies can nonetheless resist invasion by all possible multi-choice invaders, even while engaging in relatively little punishment. We also show that access to greater behavioral choice results in more "rugged " fitness landscapes, with populations able to stabilize cooperation at multiple levels of investment, such that choice facilitates cooperation when returns on investments are low, but hinders cooperation when returns on investments are high. Finally, we analyze iterated rock-paper-scissors games, whose non-transitive payoff structure means unilateral control is difficult and zero-determinant strategies do not exist in general. Despite this, we find that a large portion of multi-choice strategies can invade and resist invasion by strategies that lack behavioral diversity -- so that even well-mixed populations will tend to evolve behavioral diversity.Comment: 26 pages, 4 figure