Self-Commitment-Institutions and Cooperation in Overlapping Generations Games

This paper focuses on a two-period OLG economy with public imperfect observability over the intergenerational cooperative dimension. Individual endowment is at free disposal and perfectly observable. In this environment we study how a new mechanism, we call Self-Commitment-Institution (SCI), outperforms personal and community enforcement in achieving higher ex-ante e¢ ciency. Social norms with and without SCI are characterized. If social norms with SCI are implemented, agents might freely dispose of their endowment. As long as they reduce their marginal gain from deviation in terms of current utility, they also credibly self-commit on intergenerational cooperation. Under quite general conditions we .nd that, even if individual strategies are still characterized by behavioral uncertainty, the introduction of SCI relaxes the inclination toward opportunistic behavior and sustains higher e¢ ciency compared to social norms without SCI. We quantify the value of SCI and investigate the role of memory with di¤erent social norms. Finally, applications on intergenerational public good games and transfer games with productive SCI are providedCooperation; Free disposal; Imperfect public monitoring; Memory; Overlapping generation game; Self-Commitment Institution;

A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Contracts

This paper investigates the conditions for the emergence of implicit intergenerational contracts without assuming reputation mechanisms, commitment technology and altruism. We present a tractable dynamic politico-economic model in OLG environment where politicians play Markovian strategies in a probabilistic voting environment, setting multidimensional political agenda. Both backward and forward intergenerational transfers, respectively in the form of pension benefits and higher education investments, are simultaneously considered in an endogenous human capital setting with labor income taxation. On one hand, social security sustains investment in public education; on the other hand investment in education creates a dynamic linkage across periods through both human and physical capital driving the economy toward di¤erent Welfare State Regimes. Embedding a repeated-voting setup of electoral competition, we find that in a dynamic efficient economy both forward and backward intergenerational transfers simultaneously arise. The equilibrium allocation is education efficient, but, due to political overrepresentation of elderly agents, the electoral competition process induces overtaxation compared with a Benevolent Government solution with balanced welfare weights.aging, Benevolent Government allocation, intergenerational redistribution, Markovian equilibria, repeated voting;

Self-Commitment-Institutions and Cooperation in Overlapping Generations Games

This paper focuses on a two-period OLG economy with public imperfect observability over the intergenerational cooperative dimension. Individual endowment is at free disposal and perfectly observable. In this environment we study how a new mechanism, we call Self-Commitment-Institution (SCI), outperforms personal and community enforcement in achieving higher ex-ante efficiency. Social norms with and without SCI are characterized. If social norms with SCI are implemented, agents might freely dispose of their endowment. As long as they reduce their marginal gain from deviation in terms of current utility, they also credibly self-commit on intergenerational cooperation. Under quite general conditions we find that, even if individual strategies are still characterized by behavioral uncertainty, the introduction of SCI relaxes the inclination toward opportunistic behavior and sustains higher efficiency compared to social norms without SCI. We quantify the value of SCI and investigate the role of memory with different social norms. Finally, applications on intergenerational public good games and transfer games with productive SCI are provided.Cooperation, Free disposal, Imperfect public monitoring, Memory, Overlapping generation game, Self-Commitment Institution

A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Contracts

This paper investigates the conditions for the emergence of implicit intergenerational contracts without assuming reputation mechanisms, commitment technology and altruism. We present a tractable dynamic politico-economic model in OLG environment where politicians play Markovian strategies in a probabilistic voting environment, setting multidimensional political agenda. Both backward and forward intergenerational transfers, respectively in the form of pension benefits and higher education investments, are simultaneously considered in an endogenous human capital setting with labor income taxation. On the one hand, social security sustains investment in public education; on the other hand investment in education creates a dynamic linkage across periods through both human and physical capital driving the economy toward different Welfare State Regimes. Embedding a repeated-voting setup of electoral competition, we find that in a dynamic efficient economy both forward and backward intergenerational transfers simultaneously arise. The equilibrium allocation is education efficient, but, due to political overrepresentation of elderly agents, the electoral competition process induces overtaxation compared with a Benevolent Government solution with balanced welfare weights.aging, Benevolent Government allocation, intergenerational redistribution, Markovian equilibria, repeated voting.

The positive impact of physical activity on working memory abilities: Evidence from a large Italian pre-adolescent sample

Physical activity (PA) is an essential component of people's well-being. Copious evidence argues for its protective effect across individuals' lifespan. However, its role as a factor of enhancement for human cognitive skills is still a matter of study. The present work aims to provide conclusive evidence about PA's role in modulating working memory skills in active pre-adolescent children. By enrolling a large number of participants, we tested the effect of PA on Digit Span Backwards (DSB), a well-consolidated test taxing primarily short-term auditory memory, i.e., less dependent on attention fluctuations. Higher working memory capacity was assumed to emerge in the participants practising PA compared to the less active ones. Moreover, due to the different activities participants reported to practice, we expected that children practising open-skill activities manifested better memory skills than the peers practising closed-skill activities, due to the intrinsic nature of the two forms of exercises. Data supported the previous hypothesis highlighting PA's positive effect; however, they did not keep the assumed differences for open vs closed skills. Results are discussed in the light of the cognitive efforts required to sport beginners, particularly in the light of what they are prompted to code, remember and recall in each step of the proposed exercises

Advances in the genetics of hypertension: The effect of rare variants

Worldwide, hypertension still represents a serious health burden with nine million people dying as a consequence of hypertension-related complications. Essential hypertension is a complex trait supported by multifactorial genetic inheritance together with environmental factors. The heritability of blood pressure (BP) is estimated to be 30–50%. A great effort was made to find genetic variants affecting BP levels through Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS). This approach relies on the “common disease–common variant” hypothesis and led to the identification of multiple genetic variants which explain, in aggregate, only 2–3% of the genetic variance of hypertension. Part of the missing genetic information could be caused by variants too rare to be detected by GWAS. The use of exome chips and Next-Generation Sequencing facilitated the discovery of causative variants. Here, we report the advances in the detection of novel rare variants, genes, and/or pathways through the most promising approaches, and the recent statistical tests that have emerged to handle rare variants. We also discuss the need to further support rare novel variants with replication studies within larger consortia and with deeper functional studies to better understand how new genes might improve patient care and the stratification of the response to antihypertensive treatments

A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Contracts

This paper investigates the conditions for the emergence of implicit intergenerational contracts without assuming reputation mechanisms, commitment technology and altruism. We present a tractable dynamic politico-economic model in OLG environment where politicians play Markovian strategies in a probabilistic voting environment, setting multidimensional political agenda. Both backward and forward intergenerational transfers, respectively in the form of pension benefits and higher education investments, are simultaneously considered in an endogenous human capital setting with labor income taxation. On the one hand, social security sustains investment in public education; on the other hand investment in education creates a dynamic linkage across periods through both human and physical capital driving the economy toward different Welfare State Regimes. Embedding a repeated-voting setup of electoral competition, we find that in a dynamic efficient economy both forward and backward intergenerational transfers simultaneously arise. The equilibrium allocation is education efficient, but, due to political overrepresentation of elderly agents, the electoral competition process induces overtaxation compared with a Benevolent Government solution with balanced welfare weights

A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Contracts

This paper investigates the conditions for the emergence of implicit intergenerational contracts without assuming reputation mechanisms, commitment technology and altruism. We present a tractable dynamic politico-economic model in OLG environment where politicians play Markovian strategies in a probabilistic voting environment, setting multidimensional political agenda. Both backward and forward intergenerational transfers, respectively in the form of pension benefits and higher education investments, are simultaneously considered in an endogenous human capital setting with labor income taxation. On the one hand, social security sustains investment in public education; on the other hand investment in education creates a dynamic linkage across periods through both human and physical capital driving the economy toward different Welfare State Regimes. Embedding a repeated-voting setup of electoral competition, we find that in a dynamic efficient economy both forward and backward intergenerational transfers simultaneously arise. The equilibrium allocation is education efficient, but, due to political overrepresentation of elderly agents, the electoral competition process induces overtaxation compared with a Benevolent Government solution with balanced welfare weights

Molecular adaptations in Antarctic fish and bacteria

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