Updating, Self-Confidence and Discrimination

In a laboratory experiment, we show that subjects incorporate irrelevant group information into their evaluations of individuals. Individuals from on average worse performing groups receive lower evaluations, even if they are known to perform equally well as individuals from better performing groups. Our experiment leaves room neither for statistical nor taste-based discrimination. The discrimination we find is rather due to conservatism in updating beliefs. This conservatism is more pronounced in females. Furthermore, self-confident male evaluators overvalue male performers. Additionally, we use our data to simulate a job promotion ladder: Few rounds of moderate discrimination virtually eliminate females in higher positions.updating, conservatism, gender, discrimination, self-confidence

Animal welfare and human ethics: a personality study

We elicit concern for animal welfare in an incentivized, direct and real setup that allows us to separate genuine interest in animal welfare from confounding factors like advertisement, replacement arguments or image concerns. Subjects choose between intensive farming and organic living conditions for a laying hen. Opting for better living conditions is costly, but guarantees better food, daylight, and more space to the hen. Hence subjects have to trade off a selfish benefit (money) against the welfare of a hen. Our data shed light on a long-standing philosophical debate about the relationship between animal welfare and human ethics. We confirm that subjects with higher interests in the hen's well-being exhibit higher moral standards towards humans. Supporters of intensive farming are significantly less prosocial and open-minded, and more Machiavellian than others

Animal welfare and human ethics: A personality study

We elicit concern for animal welfare in an incentivized, direct and real setup that allows us to separate genuine interest in animal welfare from confounding factors like advertisement, replacement arguments or image concerns. Subjects choose between intensive farming and organic living conditions for a laying hen. Opting for better living conditions is costly, but guarantees better food, daylight, and more space to the hen. Hence subjects have to trade off a selfish benefit (money) against the welfare of a hen. Our data shed light on a long-standing philosophical debate about the relationship between animal welfare and human ethics. We confirm that subjects with higher interests in the hen’s well-being exhibit higher moral standards towards humans. Supporters of intensive farming are significantly less prosocial and open-minded, and more Machiavellian than others

Imaging in cochlear implant patients

Imaging procedures are a mainstream tool in the daily ENT workflow. Cochlear Implant patients are representing a special population with specific demands for imaging. There are different imaging techniques available for pre-operative evaluation, surgery and postoperative controls with different indications and consequences. High-resolution computed tomography and magnetic resonance imaging are mainly used in the evaluation process. New procedures, as digital volume tomography, are increasingly used intra- and postoperatively. Especially the intracochlear positioning in malformations of the inner ear, eventually added with radiological assisted navigation, can be considered a standard of modern cochlear implant surgery. In addition, digital volume tomography may serve as a quality control tool focusing on the evaluation of the intracochlear electrode position. The range of applications, indications and current results are illustrated

Brain correlates of cognitive processes underlying intertemporal choice for self and other

Introduction: According to traditional economic theory, people behave rationally, selfish, consistently over time, and utility maximizing (Samuelson, 1937). Yet, manifold violations from this model have been found in empirical psychological and economic research (Ainslie, 1975; Frederick, et al., 2002). It has been shown that people do not behave consistently over time; instead, they show preference reversals in specific decision situations that are termed intertemporal choice. For example, given the choice between € 10 now and € 12 in a week, many people would discount the future reward and decide to take the immediate reward. Offered the same choice shifted in time by a year, i.e., between € 10 in one year and € 12 in a year and a week, several of those who chose the sooner option before would now choose to wait for the larger payoff. This choice behavior is a strong violation of the discounted utility model, which assumes exponential discounting of future rewards, and models no such preference reversals (Samuelson, 1937). More recent discount models take into account preference reversals by assuming hyperbolic (Ainslie & Haslam, 1992; Frederick, et al., 2002) or quasi-hyperbolic (Laibson, 1997) discounting. Both these models fit empirical data well, but make different assumptions concerning the underlying processes: Hyperbolic discounting uses only one parameter, assuming an integration of all information and desires into one process. The quasi-hyperbolic discount model on the contrary posits two parameters based on psychological dual-processing theory. This theory assumes that two kinds of processes (or systems) are engaged in temporal discounting: Fast, automatic, emotional, and intuitive processes impulsively going for immediate gratification (hot system processes, modelled by the β parameter), which are opposed by slow, deliberative, and reflective processes (cool system processes, modelled by the δ parameter); (McClure, et al., 2004, 2007; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). It is suggested that due to the temporal proximity of the reward, hot system processes play a bigger role when an immediate reward is available than when both rewards are delayed (McClure, et al., 2004, 2007; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Hence, € 10 are preferred to € 12 when available immediately, but not when available after a delay period. This is also in line with assumptions of psychological and philosophical self theories, suggesting multiple selves with a future self being treated as if it was another person rather than being the same as the present self (James, 1890; Parfit, 1984). Treating one’s “selves” differently can lead to preference reversals, since people might assume a future self to have other preferences than a present self (Kivetz & Tyler, 2007). Choices for a future self have been shown to be idealistic (i.e., participants chose to attend a future college course offering respectful treatment of the students and serious consideration of the students’ points of view). On the contrary, choices for a present self are more pragmatic (i.e., participants chose to attend an immediately starting college course offering good grades and a low work load); (Kivetz & Tyler, 2007). Accordingly, human beings seem to go for immediate rewards because it is pragmatic, but want themselves to be more patient and self-controlled in the future, and thus their preferences may change when no immediate reward is available. McClure and colleagues (2004) investigated the assumption of two systems (or processes, or selves) using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Their work showed that hemodynamic activation in the ventral striatum (vStr), pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pACC), and precuneus was larger in choices involving immediate rewards (e.g. €10 now vs. €12 in a week) compared to choices involving exclusively delayed rewards (e.g. €10 in a year vs. €12 in a year and a week). The authors labelled these areas, which have often been reported to be involved in reward and emotion processing, as “hot system areas” or “β areas”. They claim that due to a higher involvement of these areas when immediate rewards are involved, choices made are more impulsive (i.e., the sooner reward is chosen over the later reward more often). In the present studies, we investigated to what extent a future self is treated as if it was another person rather than the same as the present self (James, 1890; Parfit, 1984). We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate whether intertemporal choice for another person relies on different processes than intertemporal choice for oneself. In particular, we wanted to answer the following questions: 1) Are different brain areas involved when people make intertemporal choices (including immediate versus delayed rewards) for themselves and for other persons? 2) Do human beings make choices for other persons on a more deliberative basis, behave more consistently with economic theory, and hence decide more rationally when they themselves are not affected by their decisions? This is of importance in different fields of decision delegation, such as politics, medical treatments, and legal cases. Not only is expertise asked in these fields, but also an objective view leading to a more rational decision. Patients or clients themselves might often not be able to decide in this manner, because of their personal and emotional involvement (Moran, et al., 2006). We were further interested in brain activation of participants observing choices being made for them by other persons. We studied whether the brain activations found in active intertemporal decision making are also present when the same decisions are merely observed. An affirmative answer would support the idea that a robust brain network is engaged whenever immediate gratification is available, irrespective of whether decisions are actively made or passively observed. With our study design, we were further able to disentangle between brain activation elicited by merely being exposed to a (available) immediate reward and by actually receiving an immediate reward. Experiment 1In this first experiment, participants made a series of intertemporal choices, each either between an immediate, smaller reward and a later, larger reward (today trials), or between a sooner, but not immediate, smaller and a later, larger reward (delay trials). They made 40 of the 80 choices for themselves, and 40 choices for another, unknown person. We hypothesized that intertemporal choice would show no preference reversals when choices were made for another person. This prediction was made on the basis of the aforementioned self theories and empirical findings on intertemporal choice, that assume human beings to treat other (present and future) persons and future selves similarly (James, 1890; Parfit, 1984). Accordingly, we further expected brain correlates of intertemporal choice to differ when choices were made for self and other. We predicted activation differences between choices involving immediate rewards and choices involving exclusively delayed rewards in the areas found by McClure and colleagues (2004) only, when choices were made for oneself. We did not expect these differences when choices were made for another person. This would be in line with dual processing theories and self theories stating multiple selves and distinguishing present selves and future selves. Since previous research found behavioral differences in decision making for self and other depending on the emotional involvement of the participants in the task (Beisswanger, et al., 2003; McClure, et al., 2006), we further expected that emotional involvement, expressed by impulsivity, would play a role. We hypothesized that higher impulsivity leads to higher behavioral and activation differences in today trials between self and other. In accordance with our hypotheses, we observed an influence of impulsivity on decision making for self and other: Highly impulsive participants (defined by the value of the β parameter) chose the immediate reward less often for the other person than for themselves. Concerning overall choice behavior, contrary to our hypothesis, participants showed preference reversals for both themselves and other persons when making intertemporal choices. That is, participants chose the sooner over the later option more often if it was available immediately than if it was delayed (irrespective of the receiver). As expected, we observed activation within a medial-prefrontal-medial-parietal brain network including the ventral striatum for the effects of immediacy when choices were made for oneself, but not when choices were made for another person. These activation differences were larger in strongly discounting participants, suggesting a correspondence of the observed activation and intertemporal choice behavior. Experiment 2In this second experiment, participants observed intertemporal choices being made for themselves and for other persons. The paradigm equalled that of experiment 1, but here, instead of pressing a button to indicate their choice, participants only saw which of the two options was chosen. They were told that this choice was being made by another participant on a computer outside of the fMRI-scanner. Participants in the scanner observed 80 choices made (outside the scanner). 40 of these choices were made for themselves and 40 choices were made for yet another, unknown person (outside the scanner).We expected increased activation in the aforementioned emotion- and reward-related areas when immediate personal gratification for the self was an option, which would be consistent with studies on observational learning (Bellebaum, Jokisch, Gizewski, Forsting, & Daum, 2011) as well as experiments investigating brain correlates of valuation in the absence of choice (Levy, Lazzaro, Rutledge, & Glimcher, 2011). This assumption should be reflected in the interaction of “beneficiary of the choice” (receiver type: SELF vs. OTHER) and “immediacy” (temporal distance: today vs. delay) as has been shown in our first study within an active decision context: Activation in the aforementioned areas should be higher for the combination of SELF and today than for all other combinations of receiver type and temporal distance.Our results support our hypotheses: Activation in the according brain areas was higher when immediate gratification was possible for oneself. This activation pattern is in accordance with the activation pattern for active choice, suggesting that a robust brain network is engaged whenever immediate gratification is available, irrespective of whether decisions are actively made or passively observed.Further, explorative analyses of the feedback phase (i.e., when participants learned what has been chosen for them) suggest a division of brain areas into three classes: Those that code the mere presence and reception of immediate rewards (i.e., the MPFC and MOFC), those that code the availability and reception of immediate rewards (i.e., the vStr), and those that only code the mere presence of immediate rewards (i.e., the pACC, PCC, and Pcu).ConclusionIn summary, the present studies could show that immediacy (i.e., the possibility of receiving immediate rewards) differs compared to receiving delayed rewards. Activation in emotion- and reward-related regions like the ventral striatum and pregenual anterior cingulate cortex was elevated more highly when immediate rewards were available for oneself compared to for another person. This suggests that different, probably less affective processes are engaged when choices are made for another person, underlining the importance of decision delegation in cases such as negotiation. Further, the special role of immediacy also showed when choices were observed being made by another person, suggesting that a robust brain network is involved in intertemporal decision making. ReferencesAinslie, G. (1975). Specious reward: A behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impulse control. Psychological Bulletin, 82(4), 463-496.Ainslie, G., & Haslam, N. (1992). Hyperbolic discounting. In G. Loewenstein & J. Elster (Eds.), Choice over time (pp. 57-92). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.Beisswanger, A., Stone, E., Hupp, J., & Allgaier, L. (2003). Risk taking in relationships: Differences in deciding for oneself versus for a friend. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 25(2), 121-135.Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., & O'Donoghue, T. (2002). Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review. Journal of Economic Literature40(2), 351-401.James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology. New York: Holt.Kivetz, Y., & Tyler, T. (2007). Tomorrow I'll be me: The effect of time perspective on the activation of idealistic versus pragmatic selves. [Journal; Peer Reviewed Journal]. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 102(2), 193-211.Laibson, D. (1997). Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 443-477.Levy, I., Lazzaro, S., Rutledge, R., & Glimcher, P. (2011). Choice from non-choice: predicting consumer preferences from BOLD signals obtained during passive viewing. Journal of Neuroscience, 31(1), 118-125.McClure, S., Botvinick, M., Yeung, N., Greene, J., & Cohen, J. (2006). Conflict monitoring in cognition-emotion competition. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 204-226). New York, NY: Guilford Press.McClure, S., Ericson, K., Laibson, D., Loewenstein, G., & Cohen, J. (2007). Time discounting for primary rewards. Journal of Neuroscience, 27(21), 5796-5804.McClure, S., Laibson, D., Loewenstein, G., & Cohen, J. (2004). Separate neural systems value immediate and delayed monetary rewards. Science, 306(5695), 503-507.Metcalfe, J., & Mischel, W. (1999). A hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification: Dynamics of willpower. Psychological Review, 106(1), 3-19.Moran, J., Macrae, C., Heatherton, T., Wyland, C., & Kelley, W. (2006). Neuroanatomical evidence for distinct cognitive and affective components of self. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18(9), 1586-1594.Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons: Oxford University Press.Samuelson, P. (1937). A note on measurement of utility. Review of Economic Studies, 4, 155-161

Infants' visual and auditory communication when a partner is or is not visually attending

In the current study we investigated infants' communication in the visual and auditory modalities as a function of the recipient's visual attention. We elicited pointing at interesting events from thiny-two 12-month olds and thirty-two 18-month olds in two conditions: when the recipient either was or was not visually attending to them before and during the point. The main result was that infants initiated more pointing when the recipient's visual attention was on them than when it was not. In addition, when the recipient did not respond by sharing interest in the designated event, infants initiated more repairs (repeated pointing) than when she did, again, especially when the recipient was visually attending to them. Interestingly, accompanying vocalizations were used intentionally and increased in both experimental conditions when the recipient did not share attention and interest. However, there was little evidence that infants used their vocalizations to direct attention to their gestures when the recipient was not attending to them. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.</p

Infants' visual and auditory communication when a partner is or is not visually attending

In the current study we investigated infants' communication in the visual and auditory modalities as a function of the recipient's visual attention. We elicited pointing at interesting events from thiny-two 12-month olds and thirty-two 18-month olds in two conditions: when the recipient either was or was not visually attending to them before and during the point. The main result was that infants initiated more pointing when the recipient's visual attention was on them than when it was not. In addition, when the recipient did not respond by sharing interest in the designated event, infants initiated more repairs (repeated pointing) than when she did, again, especially when the recipient was visually attending to them. Interestingly, accompanying vocalizations were used intentionally and increased in both experimental conditions when the recipient did not share attention and interest. However, there was little evidence that infants used their vocalizations to direct attention to their gestures when the recipient was not attending to them. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.</p