644 research outputs found
Near-optimal asymmetric binary matrix partitions
We study the asymmetric binary matrix partition problem that was recently
introduced by Alon et al. (WINE 2013) to model the impact of asymmetric
information on the revenue of the seller in take-it-or-leave-it sales.
Instances of the problem consist of an binary matrix and a
probability distribution over its columns. A partition scheme
consists of a partition for each row of . The partition acts
as a smoothing operator on row that distributes the expected value of each
partition subset proportionally to all its entries. Given a scheme that
induces a smooth matrix , the partition value is the expected maximum
column entry of . The objective is to find a partition scheme such that
the resulting partition value is maximized. We present a -approximation
algorithm for the case where the probability distribution is uniform and a
-approximation algorithm for non-uniform distributions, significantly
improving results of Alon et al. Although our first algorithm is combinatorial
(and very simple), the analysis is based on linear programming and duality
arguments. In our second result we exploit a nice relation of the problem to
submodular welfare maximization.Comment: 17 page
The Price of Uncertainty in Present-Biased Planning
The tendency to overestimate immediate utility is a common cognitive bias. As a result people behave inconsistently over time and fail
to reach long-term goals. Behavioral economics tries to help affected individuals
by implementing external incentives. However, designing robust
incentives is often difficult due to imperfect knowledge of the parameter
β ∈ (0, 1] quantifying a person’s present bias. Using the graphical model
of Kleinberg and Oren [8], we approach this problem from an algorithmic
perspective. Based on the assumption that the only information about
β is its membership in some set B ⊂ (0, 1], we distinguish between two
models of uncertainty: one in which β is fixed and one in which it varies
over time. As our main result we show that the conceptual loss of effi-
ciency incurred by incentives in the form of penalty fees is at most 2
in the former and 1 + max B/ min B in the latter model. We also give
asymptotically matching lower bounds and approximation algorithms
Near-Optimal Asymmetric Binary Matrix Partitions
We study the asymmetric binary matrix partition problem that was recently introduced by Alon et al. (Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), pp 1–14, 2013). Instances of the problem consist of an n× m binary matrix A and a probability distribution over its columns. A partition schemeB= (B1, … , Bn) consists of a partition Bifor each row i of A. The partition Biacts as a smoothing operator on row i that distributes the expected value of each partition subset proportionally to all its entries. Given a scheme B that induces a smooth matrix AB, the partition value is the expected maximum column entry of AB. The objective is to find a partition scheme such that the resulting partition value is maximized. We present a 9/10-approximation algorithm for the case where the probability distribution is uniform and a (1 - 1 / e) -approximation algorithm for non-uniform distributions, significantly improving results of Alon et al. Although our first algorithm is combinatorial (and very simple), the analysis is based on linear programming and duality arguments. In our second result we exploit a nice relation of the problem to submodular welfare maximization
Co-opetition models for governing professional football
In recent years, models for co-creating value in a business-to-business context have
often been examined with the aim of studying the strategies implemented by and
among organisations for competitive and co-operative purposes. The traditional
concepts of competition and co-operation between businesses have now evolved,
both in terms of the sector in which the businesses operate and in terms of the type
of goods they produce.
Many researchers have, in recent times, investigated the determinants that can
influence the way in which the model of co-opetition can be applied to the football
world. Research interest lies in the particular features of what makes a good football.
In this paper, the aim is to conduct an analysis of the rules governing the “football
system”, while also looking at the determinants of the demand function within
football entertainment. This entails applying to football match management the
co-opetition model, a recognised model that combines competition and co-operation
with the view of creating and distributing value. It can, therefore, be said that, for a
spectator, watching sport is an experience of high suspense, and this suspense, in turn,
depends upon the degree of uncertainty in the outcome. It follows that the rules
ensuring that both these elements can be satisfied are a fertile ground for co-operation
between clubs, as it is in the interest of all stakeholders to offer increasingly more
attractive football, in comparison with other competing products. Our end purpose is
to understand how co-opetition can be achieved within professional football
Uptake of Multiple Microinsurance Schemes: Evidence from Sri Lanka
Since it is common among households to use more than one form of microinsurance, this paper estimates the uptake of different kinds of microinsurance by the same population. We use a multivariate probit model which examines the participation in the different forms of insurance simultaneously. By doing this, we can establish whether participation patterns in different types of microinsurance options indicate if the participation in specific insurance schemes is complementary or a substitute. We establish that membership of a microfinance institution means that households are more likely to have purchased an insurance policy. Furthermore, the study describes a need for more inclusive and composite packages of microinsurance products for greater financial inclusion of the poor
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Public service markets: their economics, institutional oversight and regulation
Public services in the UK have been transformed over the past 25 years with the introduction of market oriented solutions into their provision. This has been characterised by a shift away from state provision to independent providers, and by the introduction of competition and choice. This shift was partly ideologically motivated and partly driven by budget cutting considerations following the financial crisis. As such it has been lacking a comprehensive economic justification or method of analysis. It is now commonly accepted that the language of economic markets is essential to frame arguments about how effectively public services are achieving their intended outcomes.
Using market language and concepts may not always be comfortable for those from a traditional policy-making background. It can nevertheless be very useful when designing investigations into the effectiveness and value for money in the mechanisms of delivery of such services, whenever these services entail a degree of user choice as is currently the case in large parts of health, social care and education (referred to as competition in the market). Our paper wants to provide a conceptual basis on the way of thinking in these terms. We provide a description of the current state and then comment on the desirability of this quasi market approach. Uniquely in the literature, we analyse the expected and desired developments by distinguishing between choice and compulsory merit goods.
In choice merit goods markets many users are unable to choose effectively because of the existence of a number of demand side or supply side market failures. Moreover, conflicts may exist between how service users actually make choices, and policy objectives such as universality or equity which may not be achieved simply by ‘leaving it to the market’.
The users of compulsory merit goods are typically a minority and unable to internalise the full social benefits of their actions; hence it may be welfare-enhancing for society to coerce them ‘consume’ these services. As choice cannot be an objective, the commissioning (competition for the market) or direct provision by the state of such goods may meet public policy objectives more effectively than the market mechanism alone.
Building on these foundations the paper discusses when public service markets are likely to be an effective method of achieving public policy objectives, and when they may not be. Our paper analyses the implications for the institutional and legal framework, funding oversight and regulation of public service markets as a result of their transformation into quasi-markets. The paper concludes with some suggestions for those charged with overseeing public service markets in practice based on this analysis
Global Development and Climate Change: A Game Theory Approach
The increasing concern with climate change is one of the main issues of our time, and thus we aim to theoretically and mathematically analyse its causes. However our approach follows a different stream of thought, presenting the reasoning and decision-making processes between technical and moral solutions. We have resorted to game theory models in order to demonstrate cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios, ranging from the traditional to the evolutionary within game theory. In doing so we are able to glimpse the development of modern society and a paradigm shift regarding human control over nature and to what extent it is harmful to the sustainability of our environment and the survival of future generations. Merging different fields of knowledge, we present a theoretical-philosophical approach, combined with empirical-mathematical solutions taking into account the agent-based behaviour guided blindly by instrumental rationality
Understanding time-inconsistent heterogeneous preferences in economics and finance:A practice theory approach
Bank performance and executive pay: tournament or teamwork
We investigate the relationship between the dispersion of executive pay and bank performance/valuation by examining two competing theories, the tournament theory (hierarchical wage structure) and the equity fairness theory (compressed wage structure). The key variable of executive pay dispersion is measured using a hand-collected dataset composed of 63 banks from OECD countries and 29 banks from developing countries. The dataset covers the period 2004 to 2012. By combining and modifying a translog profit function and a pay-dispersion model, we are able to address the potential problems of relying on reduced-form estimation. In our subsample of developed and civil law countries, where bank performance is measured by either Tobin’s Q or by the price-to-book ratio, the overall impact of executive pay dispersion is mostly negative, and we find supporting evidence for the equity fairness theory, except for very high levels of dispersion. There is a non-linear effect, as banks perform best when there is either very low or very high executive pay dispersion. For developing country sample banks, greater executive pay dispersion has a negative impact on bank profit. In our subsample of common law countries, however, we find no evidence of a significant impact of executive pay dispersion on bank performance. We conclude that lower executive pay dispersion, a proxy for teamwork, is mostly effective in enhancing bank performance in a significant section of sample banks, i.e., civil law and developing countries
Do Good Times Breed Cheats? Prosperous Times Have Immediate and Lasting Implications for CEO Misconduct
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