Focal CA3 hippocampal subfield atrophy following LGI1 VGKC-complex antibody limbic encephalitis

Magnetic resonance imaging has linked chronic voltage-gated potassium channel (VGKC) complex antibody-mediated limbic encephalitis with generalized hippocampal atrophy. However, autoantibodies bind to specific rodent hippocampal subfields. Here, human hippocampal subfield (subiculum, cornu ammonis 1-3, and dentate gyrus) targets of immunomodulation-treated LGI1 VGKC-complex antibody-mediated limbic encephalitis were investigated using in vivo ultra-high resolution (0.39 x 0.39 x 1.0 mm³) 7.0T magnetic resonance imaging [n = 18 patients, 17 patients (94%) positive for LGI1 antibody and one patient negative for LGI1/CASPR2 but positive for VGKC-complex antibodies, mean age: 64.0 ± 2.55 years, median 4 years post-limbic encephalitis onset; n = 18 controls]. First, hippocampal subfield quantitative morphometry indicated significant volume loss confined to bilateral CA3 [F(1,34) = 16.87, P 3 months from symptom onset) were associated with CA3 atrophy. Third, whole-brain voxel-by-voxel morphometry revealed no significant grey matter loss. Fourth, CA3 subfield atrophy was associated with severe episodic but not semantic amnesia for postmorbid autobiographical events that was predicted by variability in CA3 volume. The results raise important questions about the links with histopathology, the impact of the observed focal atrophy on other CA3-mediated reconstructive and episodic mechanisms, and the role of potential antibody-mediated pathogenicity as part of the pathophysiology cascade in humans

The Ethics of Delusional Belief

In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can prevent a serious epistemic harm from occurring. For instance, delusions can allow agents to remain in touch with their environment overcoming the disruptive effect of negative emotions and anxiety. Moreover, agents are not blameworthy for adopting their delusions if their ability to believe otherwise is compromised. There is evidence suggesting that no evidence-related action that would counterfactually lead them to believe otherwise is typically available to them. The lack of ability to believe otherwise, together with some other conditions, implies that the agents are not blameworthy for their delusions. The examination of the epistemic status of delusions prompts us to acknowledge the complexity and contextual nature of epistemic evaluation, establish connections between consequentialist and deontological frameworks in epistemology, and introduce the notion of epistemic innocence into the vocabulary of epistemic evaluatio

Trait phenomenological control predicts experience of mirror synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion

In hypnotic responding, expectancies arising from imaginative suggestion drive striking experiential changes (e.g., hallucinations) — which are experienced as involuntary — according to a normally distributed and stable trait ability (hypnotisability). Such experiences can be triggered by implicit suggestion and occur outside the hypnotic context. In large sample studies (of 156, 404 and 353 participants), we report substantial relationships between hypnotisability and experimental measures of experiential change in mirror-sensory synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion comparable to relationships between hypnotisability and individual hypnosis scale items. The control of phenomenology to meet expectancies arising from perceived task requirements can account for experiential change in psychological experiments