A note on extended stable sets

Contains fulltext : 160073pub.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)We study abstract decision problems by introducing an extended dominance relation with respect to a set of alternatives. This extension is in between the traditional dominance relation as formulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (Theory of games and economic behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1944) and the transitive closure of it. Subsequently, stable sets are defined and studied for this extended relation. We formulate a characterization of stable sets for this relation and an existence theorem. Finally, we discuss its relation with Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets and generalized stable sets.12 april 201

An experimental study of computer-based negotiation in property development processes

This paper reports an experiment based on the model of bilateral sequential bargaining over the distribution of a certain value in a laboratory setting within a real specific context of property development in the Netherlands. We have involved only property development professionals as participants in the experiment who have experience with the context. We have also extended the experiment into three different negotiation games distinguished by the availability of information to the participants: a negotiation game with incomplete information, asymmetric information, and complete information. We have found in this experiment that the availability of information could affect the plausibility to reach an agreement, particularly due to a restricted communication setting. This study also provides evidences that it is in the negotiators’ concern to reach an agreement with a fair outcome, which is defined here as the equilibrium, regardless the availability of the information to them

"A cooperative approach to decision-making in the European Union"

[W]e present two multi-dimensional models of coalition-formation which are closely related. Both models predict policy outcomes and the winning coalitions that are associated with these outcomes. The basic idea of the two models is that distances between players' preferences contain information about the extent of conflict existing between them. The models in this [paper] differ in at least two respects from more traditional theories of coalition-formation. First, coalition-formation so far mainly has been described in terms of solution concepts for spatial voting games. Among the more well-known concepts are the competitive solution the a-core, the Copeland set, the uncovered set, the yolk and the minimal response point. Our models differ from these concepts in the sense that they are built on two parts, namely, a descriptive and a solution part. The descriptive part of the model focuses on the policy positions of the players, the formation of individual coalition preferences, and the rules that define winning (and, hence, also losing). On the basis of the descriptive part of the model, the solution part then formulates predictions. The distinction between the solution and the description parts is due to Shubik

Existence of a dictatorial subgroup in social choice with independent subgroup utility scales, an alternative proof

Social welfare orderings for different scales of individual utility measurement in distinct population subgroups are studied. In Khmelnitskaya (2000), employing the continuous version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, it was shown that for combinations of independent subgroups scales every corresponding social welfare ordering depends on the utilities of only one of the subgroups and is determined in accordance with the scale type proper to this dictatorial subgroup. In this article we introduce an alternative completely self-contained proof based on the study of the structure of level surfaces of a social welfare function which provides a real-valued representation of the social welfare ordering