[W]e present two multi-dimensional models of coalition-formation which are closely related. Both models predict policy outcomes and the winning coalitions that are associated with these outcomes. The basic idea of the two models is that distances between players' preferences contain information about the extent of conflict existing between them. The models in this [paper] differ in at least two respects from more traditional theories of coalition-formation. First, coalition-formation so far mainly has been described in terms of solution concepts for spatial voting games. Among the more well-known concepts are the competitive solution the a-core, the Copeland set, the uncovered set, the yolk and the minimal response point. Our models differ from these concepts in the sense that they are built on two parts, namely, a descriptive and a solution part. The descriptive part of the model focuses on the policy positions of the players, the formation of individual coalition preferences, and the rules that define winning (and, hence, also losing). On the basis of the descriptive part of the model, the solution part then formulates predictions. The distinction between the solution and the description parts is due to Shubik
