Social games in a social network

We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different topologies, ranging from regular lattices to random graphs, produce a variety of emergent behaviors. This is a contribution towards the study of social phenomena and transitions governed by the topology of the community

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with optional participation

Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This results in a rock-scissors-paper type cyclic dominance of the three strategies. The players are located either on square lattices or random regular graphs with the same connectivity. Occasionally, every player reassesses its strategy by sampling the payoffs in its neighborhood. The loner strategy efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish, defective behavior and avoids deadlocks in states of mutual defection. On square lattices, Monte Carlo simulations reveal self-organizing patterns driven by the cyclic dominance, whereas on random regular graphs different types of oscillatory behavior are observed: the temptation to defect determines whether damped, periodic or increasing oscillations occur. These results are compared to predictions by pair approximation. Although pair approximation is incapable of distinguishing the two scenarios because of the equal connectivity, the average frequencies as well as the oscillations on random regular graphs are well reproduced.Comment: 6 pages, 7 figure

Dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence: Prisoners' dilemma game on small-world networks

A two-dimensional small-world type network, subject to spatial prisoners' dilemma dynamics and containing an influential node defined as a special node with a finite density of directed random links to the other nodes in the network, is numerically investigated. It is shown that the degree of cooperation does not remain at a steady state level but displays a punctuated equilibrium type behavior manifested by the existence of sudden breakdowns of cooperation. The breakdown of cooperation is linked to an imitation of a successful selfish strategy of the influential node. It is also found that while the breakdown of cooperation occurs suddenly, the recovery of it requires longer time. This recovery time may, depending on the degree of steady state cooperation, either increase or decrease with an increasing number of long range connections.Comment: 5 pages, 6 figure

Two-dimensional projections of an hypercube

We present a method to project a hypercube of arbitrary dimension on the plane, in such a way as to preserve, as well as possible, the distribution of distances between vertices. The method relies on a Montecarlo optimization procedure that minimizes the squared difference between distances in the plane and in the hypercube, appropriately weighted. The plane projections provide a convenient way of visualization for dynamical processes taking place on the hypercube.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figures, Revtex

Diffusion-limited reaction for the one-dimensional trap system

We have previously discussed the one-dimensional multitrap system of finite range and found the somewhat unexpected result that the larger is the number of imperfect traps the higher is the transmission through them. We discuss in this work the effect of a small number of such traps arrayed along either a constant or a variable finite spatial section. It is shown that under specific conditions, to be described in the following, the remarked high transmission may be obtained for this case also. Thus, compared to the theoretical large number of traps case these results may be experimentally applied to real phenomenaComment: 18 pages, 8 PS Figures; 3 former figures were removed, a new section added and the representation is improve

Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor's strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategy therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.Comment: 7 pages, 7 figure

Systematic Regge theory analysis of omega photoproduction

Systematic analysis of available data for $\omega$-meson photoproduction is given in frame of Regge theory. At photon energies above 20 GeV the $\gamma{+}p{\to}\omega{+}p$ reaction is entirely dominated by Pomeron exchange. However, it was found that Pomeron exchange model can not reproduce the $\gamma{+}p{\to}\rho{+}p$ and $\gamma{+}p{\to}\omega{+}p$ data at high energies simultaneously with the same set of parameters. The comparison between $\rho$ and $\omega$ data indicates a large room for meson exchange contribution to $\omega$-meson photoproduction at low energies. It was found that at low energies the dominant contribution comes from $\pi$ and $f_2$-meson exchanges. There is smooth transition between the meson exchange model at low energies and Regge theory at high energies.Comment: 7 pages, 8 figures, revtex

Disordered Environments in Spatial Games

The Prisoner's dilemma is the main game theoretical framework in which the onset and maintainance of cooperation in biological populations is studied. In the spatial version of the model, we study the robustness of cooperation in heterogeneous ecosystems in spatial evolutionary games by considering site diluted lattices. The main result is that due to disorder, the fraction of cooperators in the population is enhanced. Moreover, the system presents a dynamical transition at $\rho^*$, separating a region with spatial chaos from one with localized, stable groups of cooperators.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figure

Cooperation and its evolution in growing systems with cultural reproduction

We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present a minimal model taking into account the growing process of the systems and individuals with imitation capacity. We consider the topological structure and the evolution of strategies decoupled instead of a coevolutionary dynamic. We show conditions to build up a cooperative system with real topological structures for any natural selection intensity. When the system starts to grow, cooperation is unstable but becomes stable as soon as the system reaches a small core of cooperators whose size increase when the intensity of natural selection decreases. Thus, we reduce the emergence of cooperative systems with cultural reproduction to justify a small initial cooperative structure that we call cooperative seed. Otherwise, given that the system grows principally as cooperator whose cooperators inhabit the most linked parts of the system, the benefit-cost ratio required for cooperation evolve is drastically reduced compared to the found in static networks. In this way, we show that in systems whose individuals have imitation capacity the growing process is essential for the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 16 pages, 2 figures. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1111.247