QoE-enabled unlicensed spectrum sharing in 5G : a game-theoretic approach

Spectrum sharing is an important aspect of 5G new radio, as it plays a complementary role for fulfilling diversified service requirements. This paper studies unlicensed spectrum sharing, namely, local thermal equilibrium (LTE) over unlicensed bands (LTE-U), for providing a better quality of experience (QoE) in 5G networks. Specifically, unlicensed band selection and resource allocation (time, licensed, and unlicensed) are jointly designed, and an optimization problem is formulated with the objective of maximizing LTE users' QoE [measured in mean opinion score (MOS)] while protecting incumbent wireless systems such as Wi-Fi in the unlicensed spectrum. To solve the multi-player interaction in this spectrum space fairly, we employ a game-theoretic approach. A virtual coalition formation game (VCFG) is used to solve the unlicensed band selection problem. The outcome of the VCFG defines the optimization problem within each coalition. This optimization problem is then decomposed into two sub-problems: 1) time-sharing problem between the LTE-U and Wi-Fi systems and 2) a resource allocation problem for the LTE-U system. The cooperative Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution is used for solving the first sub-problem, whereas the Q-learning algorithm is used for solving the second. VCFG and Q-learning-based resource allocation algorithms are proposed in this paper. In addition, the stability of VCFG and optimal sharing time are also proved in this paper. Simulation results show the advantages of the proposed approach over other baseline methods in terms of the MOS, percentage of unsatisfied users, and fairness. The results also show that the proposed approach can better protect the performance of Wi-Fi users compared to the conventional listen-before-talk scheme.Published versio

Incentive mechanism for competitive edge caching in 5G-enabled Internet of things

International audienceThe fifth generation (5G) of cellular networks provides the enabling environment for the Internet of Things (IoT) applications. Hence, the vast proliferation of 5G-enabled IoT devices and services led to an overwhelming growth of data traffic that could saturate the core network’s backhaul links. Nowadays, caching is an unavoidable technique to solve this issue, whereby popular contents are stored on edge nodes near to end-users. There exist several initiatives to motivate caching actors for improving the caching process, but not designed for the real-world competitive caching market. In this work, we propose an incentive caching strategy in a 5G-enabled IoT network by considering a completely competitive caching scenario with multiple 5G mobile network operators (MNOs) and multiple content providers (CPs). The MNOs manage a set of edge caches on their base stations and they are competing to fill these caching resources, while the CPs detain a set of popular contents and are in conflict to rent the MNOs’ caches. Each MNO aims to maximize its monetary profit and offload its backhaul links, as each CP aims to improve the quality of experience (QoE) of its end-users. Then, we formulate a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game to model the interaction between MNOs and CPs and define the different players’ utilities. Subsequently, we propose an iterative algorithm based on the convex optimization method to investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, the numerical results of the different experimentations demonstrate that our game-based incentive strategy can significantly alleviate the backhaul links while improving the user QoE

Controlling the Outbreak of COVID-19 : A Noncooperative Game Perspective

COVID-19 is a global epidemic. Till now, there is no remedy for this epidemic. However, isolation and social distancing are seemed to be effective preventive measures to control this pandemic. Therefore, in this article, an optimization problem is formulated that accommodates both isolation and social distancing features of the individuals. To promote social distancing, we solve the formulated problem by applying a noncooperative game that can provide an incentive for maintaining social distancing to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Furthermore, the sustainability of the lockdown policy is interpreted with the help of our proposed game-theoretic incentive model for maintaining social distancing where there exists a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we perform an extensive numerical analysis that shows the effectiveness of the proposed approach in terms of achieving the desired social-distancing to prevent the outbreak of the COVID-19 in a noncooperative environment. Numerical results show that the individual incentive increases more than 85% with an increasing percentage of home isolation from 25% to 100% for all considered scenarios. The numerical results also demonstrate that in a particular percentage of home isolation, the individual incentive decreases with an increasing number of individuals