Selfish Network Creation with Non-Uniform Edge Cost

Network creation games investigate complex networks from a game-theoretic point of view. Based on the original model by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03] many variants have been introduced. However, almost all versions have the drawback that edges are treated uniformly, i.e. every edge has the same cost and that this common parameter heavily influences the outcomes and the analysis of these games. We propose and analyze simple and natural parameter-free network creation games with non-uniform edge cost. Our models are inspired by social networks where the cost of forming a link is proportional to the popularity of the targeted node. Besides results on the complexity of computing a best response and on various properties of the sequential versions, we show that the most general version of our model has constant Price of Anarchy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first proof of a constant Price of Anarchy for any network creation game.Comment: To appear at SAGT'1

Strategic Network Formation with Attack and Immunization

Strategic network formation arises where agents receive benefit from connections to other agents, but also incur costs for forming links. We consider a new network formation game that incorporates an adversarial attack, as well as immunization against attack. An agent's benefit is the expected size of her connected component post-attack, and agents may also choose to immunize themselves from attack at some additional cost. Our framework is a stylized model of settings where reachability rather than centrality is the primary concern and vertices vulnerable to attacks may reduce risk via costly measures. In the reachability benefit model without attack or immunization, the set of equilibria is the empty graph and any tree. The introduction of attack and immunization changes the game dramatically; new equilibrium topologies emerge, some more sparse and some more dense than trees. We show that, under a mild assumption on the adversary, every equilibrium network with $n$ agents contains at most $2n-4$ edges for $n\geq 4$. So despite permitting topologies denser than trees, the amount of overbuilding is limited. We also show that attack and immunization don't significantly erode social welfare: every non-trivial equilibrium with respect to several adversaries has welfare at least as that of any equilibrium in the attack-free model. We complement our theory with simulations demonstrating fast convergence of a new bounded rationality dynamic which generalizes linkstable best response but is considerably more powerful in our game. The simulations further elucidate the wide variety of asymmetric equilibria and demonstrate topological consequences of the dynamics e.g. heavy-tailed degree distributions. Finally, we report on a behavioral experiment on our game with over 100 participants, where despite the complexity of the game, the resulting network was surprisingly close to equilibrium.Comment: The short version of this paper appears in the proceedings of WINE-1

Network Creation Games: Think Global - Act Local

We investigate a non-cooperative game-theoretic model for the formation of communication networks by selfish agents. Each agent aims for a central position at minimum cost for creating edges. In particular, the general model (Fabrikant et al., PODC'03) became popular for studying the structure of the Internet or social networks. Despite its significance, locality in this game was first studied only recently (Bil\`o et al., SPAA'14), where a worst case locality model was presented, which came with a high efficiency loss in terms of quality of equilibria. Our main contribution is a new and more optimistic view on locality: agents are limited in their knowledge and actions to their local view ranges, but can probe different strategies and finally choose the best. We study the influence of our locality notion on the hardness of computing best responses, convergence to equilibria, and quality of equilibria. Moreover, we compare the strength of local versus non-local strategy-changes. Our results address the gap between the original model and the worst case locality variant. On the bright side, our efficiency results are in line with observations from the original model, yet we have a non-constant lower bound on the price of anarchy.Comment: An extended abstract of this paper has been accepted for publication in the proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Mathematical Foundations on Computer Scienc

Geometric Network Creation Games

Network Creation Games are a well-known approach for explaining and analyzing the structure, quality and dynamics of real-world networks like the Internet and other infrastructure networks which evolved via the interaction of selfish agents without a central authority. In these games selfish agents which correspond to nodes in a network strategically buy incident edges to improve their centrality. However, past research on these games has only considered the creation of networks with unit-weight edges. In practice, e.g. when constructing a fiber-optic network, the choice of which nodes to connect and also the induced price for a link crucially depends on the distance between the involved nodes and such settings can be modeled via edge-weighted graphs. We incorporate arbitrary edge weights by generalizing the well-known model by Fabrikant et al.[PODC'03] to edge-weighted host graphs and focus on the geometric setting where the weights are induced by the distances in some metric space. In stark contrast to the state-of-the-art for the unit-weight version, where the Price of Anarchy is conjectured to be constant and where resolving this is a major open problem, we prove a tight non-constant bound on the Price of Anarchy for the metric version and a slightly weaker upper bound for the non-metric case. Moreover, we analyze the existence of equilibria, the computational hardness and the game dynamics for several natural metrics. The model we propose can be seen as the game-theoretic analogue of a variant of the classical Network Design Problem. Thus, low-cost equilibria of our game correspond to decentralized and stable approximations of the optimum network design.Comment: Accepted at 31st ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA '19). 33 pages, 11 figure

Greedy Selfish Network Creation

We introduce and analyze greedy equilibria (GE) for the well-known model of selfish network creation by Fabrikant et al.[PODC'03]. GE are interesting for two reasons: (1) they model outcomes found by agents which prefer smooth adaptations over radical strategy-changes, (2) GE are outcomes found by agents which do not have enough computational resources to play optimally. In the model of Fabrikant et al. agents correspond to Internet Service Providers which buy network links to improve their quality of network usage. It is known that computing a best response in this model is NP-hard. Hence, poly-time agents are likely not to play optimally. But how good are networks created by such agents? We answer this question for very simple agents. Quite surprisingly, naive greedy play suffices to create remarkably stable networks. Specifically, we show that in the SUM version, where agents attempt to minimize their average distance to all other agents, GE capture Nash equilibria (NE) on trees and that any GE is in 3-approximate NE on general networks. For the latter we also provide a lower bound of 3/2 on the approximation ratio. For the MAX version, where agents attempt to minimize their maximum distance, we show that any GE-star is in 2-approximate NE and any GE-tree having larger diameter is in 6/5-approximate NE. Both bounds are tight. We contrast these positive results by providing a linear lower bound on the approximation ratio for the MAX version on general networks in GE. This result implies a locality gap of $\Omega(n)$ for the metric min-max facility location problem, where n is the number of clients.Comment: 28 pages, 8 figures. An extended abstract of this work was accepted at WINE'1

Patterns and drivers of climatic niche dynamics during biological invasions of island-endemic amphibians, reptiles, and birds

Shifts between native and alien climatic niches pose a major challenge for predicting biological invasions. This is particularly true for insular species because geophysical barriers could constrain the realization of their fundamental niches, which may lead to underestimates of their invasion potential. To investigate this idea, we estimated the frequency of shifts between native and alien climatic niches and the magnitude of climatic mismatches using 80,148 alien occurrences of 46 endemic insular amphibian, reptile, and bird species. Then, we assessed the influence of nine potential predictors on climatic mismatches across taxa, based on species' characteristics, native range physical characteristics, and alien range properties. We found that climatic mismatch is common during invasions of endemic insular birds and reptiles: 78.3% and 55.1% of their respective alien records occurred outside of the environmental space of species' native climatic niche. In comparison, climatic mismatch was evident for only 16.2% of the amphibian invasions analyzed. Several predictors significantly explained climatic mismatch, and these varied among taxonomic groups. For amphibians, only native range size was associated with climatic mismatch. For reptiles, the magnitude of climatic mismatch was higher for species with narrow native altitudinal ranges, occurring in topographically complex or less remote islands, as well as for species with larger distances between their native and alien ranges. For birds, climatic mismatch was significantly larger for invasions on continents with higher phylogenetic diversity of the recipient community, and when the invader was more evolutionarily distinct. Our findings highlight that apparently common niche shifts of insular species may jeopardize our ability to forecast their potential invasions using correlative methods based on climatic variables. Also, we show which factors provide additional insights on the actual invasion potential of insular endemic amphibians, reptiles, and birds

Theory for the ultrafast ablation of graphite films

The physical mechanisms for damage formation in graphite films induced by femtosecond laser pulses are analyzed using a microscopic electronic theory. We describe the nonequilibrium dynamics of electrons and lattice by performing molecular dynamics simulations on time-dependent potential energy surfaces. We show that graphite has the unique property of exhibiting two distinct laser induced structural instabilities. For high absorbed energies (> 3.3 eV/atom) we find nonequilibrium melting followed by fast evaporation. For low intensities above the damage threshold (> 2.0 eV/atom) ablation occurs via removal of intact graphite sheets.Comment: 5 pages RevTeX, 3 PostScript figures, submitted to Phys. Re

High-harmonic generation from a confined atom

The order of high harmonics emitted by an atom in an intense laser field is limited by the so-called cutoff frequency. Solving the time-dependent Schr\"odinger equation, we show that this frequency can be increased considerably by a parabolic confining potential, if the confinement parameters are suitably chosen. Furthermore, due to confinement, the radiation intensity remains high throughout the extended emission range. All features observed can be explained with classical arguments.Comment: 4 pages(tex files), 4 figures(eps files); added references and comment

Relativistic treatment of harmonics from impurity systems in quantum wires

Within a one particle approximation of the Dirac equation we investigate a defect system in a quantum wire. We demonstrate that by minimally coupling a laser field of frequency omega to such an impurity system, one may generate harmonics of multiples of the driving frequency. In a multiple defect system one may employ the distance between the defects in order to tune the cut-off frequency.Comment: 9 pages Latex, 8 eps figures, section added, numerics improve

Enhancement of bichromatic high-harmonic generation with a high-frequency field

Using a high-frequency field superposed to a linearly polarized bichromatic laser field composed by a wave with frequency $\omega$ and a wave with frequency $2\omega$, we show it is possible to enhance the intensity of a group of high harmonics in orders of magnitude. These harmonics have frequencies about 30% higher than the monochromatic-cutoff frequency, and, within the three-step-model framework, correspond to a set of electron trajectories for which tunneling ionization is strongly suppressed. Particular features in the observed enhancement suggest that the high-frequency field provides an additional mechanism for the electron to reach the continuum. This interpretation is supported by a time-frequency analysis of the harmonic yield. The additional high frequency field permits the control of this group of harmonics leaving all other sets of harmonics practically unchanged, which is an advantage over schemes involving only bichromatic fields.Comment: 6 pages RevTex, 5 figures (ps files), Changes in text, figures, references and equations include