Gaussian entanglement induced by an extended thermal environment

We study stationary entanglement among three harmonic oscillators which are dipole coupled to a one-dimensional or a three-dimensional bosonic environment. The analysis of the open-system dynamics is performed with generalized quantum Langevin equations which we solve exactly in Fourier representation. The focus lies on Gaussian bipartite and tripartite entanglement induced by the highly non-Markovian interaction mediated by the environment. This environment-induced interaction represents an effective many-parties interaction with a spatial long-range feature: a main finding is that the presence of a passive oscillator is detrimental for the stationary two-mode entanglement. Furthermore, our results strongly indicate that the environment-induced entanglement mechanism corresponds to uncontrolled feedback which is predominantly coherent at low temperatures and for moderate oscillator-environment coupling as compared to the oscillator frequency.Comment: 15 page, 6 figure

The Evolution of Extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of previous interactions. In the context of evolution of cooperation, repeated games represent the mechanism of reciprocation. Recently a new class of strategies has been proposed, so called 'zero determinant strategies'. These strategies enforce a fixed linear relationship between one's own payoff and that of the other player. A subset of those strategies are 'extortioners' which ensure that any increase in the own payoff exceeds that of the other player by a fixed percentage. Here we analyze the evolutionary performance of this new class of strategies. We show that in reasonably large populations they can act as catalysts for the evolution of cooperation, similar to tit-for-tat, but they are not the stable outcome of natural selection. In very small populations, however, relative payoff differences between two players in a contest matter, and extortioners hold their ground. Extortion strategies do particularly well in co-evolutionary arms races between two distinct populations: significantly, they benefit the population which evolves at the slower rate - an instance of the so-called Red King effect. This may affect the evolution of interactions between host species and their endosymbionts.Comment: contains 4 figure

Criminal Records --A Comparative Approach

There is in the United States a need to balance the interest of the public in the apprehension and conviction of criminals with that of individuals arrested but not convicted of any wrongdoing. As has been shown, some of the leading civil law countries have approached this goal in two ways: first, by not requiring an arrest in a great number of criminal cases and thus not furthering in the mind of the public the idea that arrest and criminal wrongdoing are identical, and second, by confining entries in criminal records, at least on principle, to final convictions of criminal violations. The recent West German codification of the law of criminal records appears to be striving for the greatest perfection both through concentration of criminal records and limitation of their availability only to those public authorities in serious need of them as well as to the person to whom the record refers; this protects at the same time his right to privacy as to his criminal record and also his right to its accuracy. To use an arrest in itself as an item suitable for a criminal record is an anachronism that shifts to the accused the burden of proving his innocence; this ought to be changed to the more civilized method of recording convictions rather than arrests

Sigmund A. Cohn

1898-1997 Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law 1944-64 Artist: George Mandus (1924 - 2012)Donor: (1988) Location: Rusk Centerhttps://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/portrait/1051/thumbnail.jp

A Statistical Analysis of Certain Data of Performance Achieved by Brockport State Teachers College Freshmen, 1949-57

This thesis project examines statistical data for incoming Brockport State Teachers College students from 1949-1957, including college entrance exam scores as well as other required testing. The researcher completed this project in an effort to organize and understand trends regarding incoming students and their academic performance during the first year of study. The study assists and advises admissions and curricula committees regarding the student population. It also examines the results of both the American Council on Education Psychological Examination and the Cooperative English Examination (Part 1, Reading Comprehension). The study group’s statistical information included any Brockport freshmen, 1949-1957, who possessed a high school average, ACE, SCAT, and other such college testing measurements. The project defines each measurement and includes an extensive appendices and table section to illustrate the study’s findings