The embodied user : corporeal awareness & media technology

Human beings are proficient users of tools and technology. At times, our interactions with a technological artifact appear so effortless, that the distinction between the artifact and the body starts to fade. When operating anthropomorphically designed teleoperation systems, for example, some people develop the vivid experience that they are physically there at the remote site (i.e., telepresence). Others might even come to sense the slave robot’s arms and hands as their own. The process in which the central nervous system categorizes an object as a part of the body, and in which a discrimination is made between what is contained within and outside the bodily boundaries, is called self-attribution. The aim of this thesis is twofold: (a) To determine the personal factors (e.g., the characteristics of an individual’s psychological makeup) and situational factors (e.g., the appearance of objects) that constrain or facilitate self-attribution, and (b) to determine the degree to which these factors affect people’s experiences with media technology. In Chapter 2, we describe the theoretical framework of our research which is centered on a conception of the user of technology as an embodied agent. In this chapter we distinguish two important, but often confused aspects of embodiment: the body schema, and the body image. The body schema is defined as a dynamic distributed network of procedures aimed at guiding behavior. In contrast, we defined the body image as a part of the process of consciousness and, thus, as consisting of those higher-order discriminations (or qualia) that pertain to the body, and one’s self-perception thereof. To investigate the individual and situational factors that constrain or facilitate selfattribution (i.e., incorporation into the body image), we employ the experimental paradigm of the rubber-hand illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). In this illusion, which is induced by stroking a person’s concealed hand together with a visible fake one, some people start to sense the fake hand as an actual part of their body. In Chapter 3, we investigate the rubberhand illusion under two mediated conditions: (1) a virtual reality condition, where both the fake hand and its stimulation were projected on the table in front of the participant, and (2) a mixed reality condition, where the fake hand was projected, but its stimulation was unmediated. Our experiment reveals that people can develop the rubber-hand illusion under mediated conditions, but the resulting illusion may, depending on the technology used, be less vivid than in the traditional unmediated setup. In Chapter 4, we investigate the extent to which visual discrepancies between the foreign object and a human hand affect people in developing a vivid rubber-hand illusion. We found that people experience a more vivid illusion when the foreign object resembles the human hand in terms of both shape and texture. Taken together, the experiments in Chapters 3 and 4 support the view that the rubber-hand illusion is not merely governed by a bottom-up process (i.e., based on visuotactile integration), but is affected, top-down, by a cognitive representation of what the human body is like (e.g., Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). In the rubber-hand illusion, people commonly misperceive the location of their concealed hand toward the direction of the fake hand (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). As such, this so-called proprioceptive drift is often used as an alternative to self-reports in assessing the vividness of the illusion (e.g., Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). In Chapter 5, we investigate the extent to which the observed shift in felt position of the concealed hand can be attributed to experiencing the illusion. For this purpose, we test how various features of the experimental setup of the rubber-hand illusion, which in themselves are not sufficient to elicit the illusion, affect proprioceptive drift. We corroborate existing research which demonstrates that looking at a fake hand or a tabletop for five minutes, in absence of visuotactile stimulation, is sufficient to induce a change in the felt position of an unseen hand (e.g., Gross et al., 1974). Moreover, our experiments indicate that the use of proprioceptive drift as a measure for the strength of the rubber-hand illusion yields different conclusions than an assessment by means of self-reports. Based on these results, we question the validity of proprioceptive drift as an alternative measure of the vividness of the rubber-hand illusion. In Chapter 6, we propose and test a model of the vividness of the rubber-hand illusion. In two experiments, we successfully modeled people’s self-reported experiences related to the illusion (e.g., "the fake hand felt as my own") based on three estimates: (a) a person’s susceptibility for the rubber-hand illusion, (b) the processing demand that is required for a particular experience, and (c) the suppression/constraints imposed by the situation. We demonstrate that the impressions related to the rubber-hand illusion, and by inference the processes behind them, are comparable for different persons. This is a non-trivial finding as such invariance is required for an objective scaling of individual susceptibility and situational impediment on the basis of self-reported experiences. Regarding the validity of our vividness model, we confirm that asynchrony (e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) and information-poor stimulation (e.g., Armel & Ramachandran, 2003) constrain the development of a vivid rubber-hand illusion. Moreover, we demonstrate that the correlation between a person’s susceptibility for the rubber-hand illusion and the extent of his of her proprioceptive drift is fairly moderate, thereby confirming our conclusions from Chapter 5 regarding the limited validity of proprioceptive drift as a measure of the vividness of the rubber-hand illusion. In Chapter 7, we investigate the extent to which the large individual differences in people’s susceptibility for the illusion can be explained by body image instability, and the ability to engage in motor imagery of the hand (i.e., in mental own hand transformations). In addition, we investigate whether the vividness of the illusion is dependent on the anatomical implausibility of the fake hand’s orientation. With respect to body image instability, we corroborate a small, but significant, correlation between susceptibility and body image aberration scores: As expected, people with a more unstable body image are also more susceptible to the rubber-hand illusion (cf. Burrack & Brugger, 2005). With respect to the position and orientation of the fake hand on the table, we demonstrate that people experience a less vivid rubber-hand illusion when the fake hand is orientated in an anatomically impossible, as compared to an anatomically possible manner. This finding suggests that the attribution of foreign objects to the self is constrained by the morphological capabilities of the human body. With respect to motor imagery, our results indicate a small, but significant, correlation between susceptibility and response times to a speeded left and right hands identification task. In other words, people who are more attuned to engage in mental own hand transformations are also better equipped to develop vivid rubber-hand illusions. In Chapter 8, we examine the role of self-attribution in the experience of telepresence. For this purpose, we introduce the technological domain of mediated social touch (i.e., interpersonal touching over a distance). We anticipated that, compared to a morphologically incongruent input medium, a morphologically congruent medium would be more easily attributed to the self. As a result, we expected our participants to develop a stronger sense of telepresence when they could see their interaction partner performing the touches on a sensor-equipped mannequin as opposed to a touch screen. Our participants, as expected, reported higher levels of telepresence, and demonstrated more physiological arousal with the mannequin input medium. At the same time, our experiment revealed that these effects might not have resulted from self-attribution, and thus that other psychological mechanisms of identification might play a role in telepresence experiences. In Chapter 9, the epilogue, we discuss the main contributions and limitations of this thesis, while taking a broader perspective on the field of research on media technologies and corporeal awareness

A framework for interactivity and presence in novel bodies

Researchers are beginning to explore the consequences of interacting with virtual worlds using non-human bodies. As virtual environments become more advanced, it is possible for participants to interact with their environments in increasingly sophisticated ways. Using trackers, users can control multiple avatar limbs in order to manipulate objects, move through space, and otherwise act in the virtual world. However, these avatar bodies need not conform to the normal human configuration, either in their appearance or in the way the tracked movements of the user are rendered to control the movements of the avatar. In this chapter we use the framework developed by Haans and IJsselsteijn to investigate the experience of self-presence in cases of nonhuman avatars or avatars that otherwise differ in ability or control schema from the user’s own body; for example, avatars with more than two arms. We focus on cases where participants inhabit avatars in which the veridical mapping between tracking and rendering is disrupted

Intelligent dynamic street lighting and perceived personal safety

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The infuence of skin colour on the experience of ownership in the rubber hand illusion

Racial prejudice is associated with a fundamental distinction between "us" and "them"-a distinction linked to the perceived overlap between representations of the self and others. Implicit prejudice has been shown to reduce the intensity of White individuals' hand ownership sensation as induced by the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) with dark rubber hands. However, evidence for this link to implicit prejudice comes from self-report questionnaire data regarding the RHI. As an alternative, we assessed the onset time of the RHI. We hypothesized that onset time of the RHI would be higher for the black compared to the white RH, acting as the mediator between implicit prejudice and magnitude of the RH illusion and proprioceptive drift. As expected, participants took longer to incorporate the black RH and presented lower RH illusion magnitude and a smaller proprioceptive drift for the black RH. Mediation analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of implicit racial bias on proprioceptive drift and magnitude of illusion through onset time to illusion only for the black RH. These findings further illuminate the connection between implicit prejudice and embodied perception, suggesting new perspectives on how implicit biases operate.This work was supported by Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnologico (CNPq; grant numbers: 466922/2014-0 and 401143/2014-7).info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Entrepreneurs’ age, institutions, and social value creation goals: a multi-country study

This study explores the relationship between an entrepreneur's age and his/her social value creation goals. Building on the lifespan developmental psychology literature and institutional theory, we hypothesize a U-shaped relationship between entrepreneurs’ age and their choice to create social value through their ventures, such that younger and older entrepreneurs create more social value with their businesses while middle age entrepreneurs are relatively more economically and less socially oriented with their ventures. We further hypothesize that the quality of a country’s formal institutions in terms of economic, social, and political freedom steepen the U-shaped relationship between entrepreneurs’ age and their choice to pursue social value creation as supportive institutional environments allow entrepreneurs to follow their age-based preferences. We confirm our predictions using multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions on a sample of over 15,000 entrepreneurs (aged between 18 and 64 years) in 45 countries from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data. The findings are robust to several alternative specifications. Based on our findings, we discuss implications for theory and practice, and we propose future research directions

Is my hand connected to my body? The impact of body continuity and arm alignment on the virtual hand illusion

When a rubber hand is placed on a table top in a plausible position as if part of a person"s body, and is stroked synchronously with the person"s corresponding hidden real hand, an illusion of ownership over the rubber hand can occur (Botvinick and Cohen 1998). A similar result has been found with respect to a virtual hand portrayed in a virtual environment, a virtual hand illusion (Slater et al. 2008). The conditions under which these illusions occur have been the subject of considerable study. Here we exploited the flexibility of virtual reality to examine four contributory factors: visuo-tactile synchrony while stroking the virtual and the real arms, body continuity, alignment between the real and virtual arms, and the distance between them. We carried out three experiments on a total of 32 participants where these factors were varied. The results show that the subjective illusion of ownership over the virtual arm and the time to evoke this illusion are highly dependent on synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation and on connectivity of the virtual arm with the rest of the virtual body. The alignment between the real and virtual arms and the distance between these were less important. It was found that proprioceptive drift was not a sensitive measure of the illusion, but was only related to the distance between the real and virtual arms

Één onderzoek is géén onderzoek : het belang van replicaties voor de psychologische wetenschap

Recent criticisms on the way psychologists analyze their data, as well as cases of scientific fraud, have led both researchers and the general public to question the reliability of psychologicalresearch. At the same time, researchers have an excellent tool at their disposal to guarantee the robustness of scientific findings: replication studies. Why do researchers rarely perform replication studies? We explain why p-values for single studies fail to provideany indication of whether observed effects are real or not. Onlycumulative science, where important effects are demonstratedrepeatedly, is able to address the challenge to guarantee thereliability of psychological findings. We highlight some novelinitiatives, such as the Open Science Framework, that aim tounderline the importance of replication studies