Why do authoritarian regimes provide public goods? Policy communities, external shocks and ideas in China’s rural social policy making

Recent research on authoritarian regimes argues that they provide public goods in order to prevent rebellion. This essay shows that the ‘threat of rebellion’ alone cannot explain Chinese party-state policies to extend public goods to rural residents in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Drawing on theories of policy making, it argues that China’s one-party regime extended public goods to the rural population under the influence of ideas and policy options generated by policy communities of officials, researchers, international organisations and other actors. The party-state centre adopted and implemented these ideas and policy options when they provided solutions to external shocks and supported economic development goals. Explanations of policies and their outcomes in authoritarian political systems need to include not only ‘dictators’ but also other actors, and the ideas they generate

No Banquet Can Do without Liquor: Alcohol counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China

The illegal trade in alcohol has been an empirical manifestation of organised crime with a very long history; yet, the nature of the illegal trade in alcohol has received relatively limited academic attention in recent years despite the fact that it has been linked with significant tax evasion as well as serious health problems and even deaths. The current article focuses on a specific type associated with the illegal trade in alcohol, the counterfeiting of alcohol in China. The article pays particular attention to the counterfeiting of baijiu, Chinese liquor in mainland China. The aim of the article is to offer an account of the social organisation of alcohol counterfeiting business in China by illustrating the counterfeiting process, the actors in the business as well as its possible embeddedness in legal practices and industries/trades. The alcohol counterfeiting business is highly reflective to the market demand and consumer needs. Alcohol counterfeiting in China is characterised primarily by independent actors many of whom are subcontracted to provide commodities and services about the counterfeiting process. The business relies on personal networks – family and extended family members, friends and acquaintances. Relationships between actors in the business are very often based on a customer-supplier relationship or a ‘business-to-business market’. The alcohol counterfeiting business in China highlights the symbiotic relationship between illegal and legal businesses

The changing role of china in the global illegal cigarette trade

This study explores the history of the illegal production, distribution, and smuggling of cigarettes in mainland China. Data were obtained from a content analysis of 931 media reports retrieved from LexisNexis for the time period 1975 until 2010, and from other open sources. The illegal cigarette trade first emerged in the form of violations of state tobacco monopoly regulations. In the course of the restructuring of the legal tobacco sector, which occurred under external political pressure to open the Chinese market to foreign competition, an illegal cigarette industry emerged which at first primarily produced fake Chinese brand cigarettes for the domestic black market. At the same time, China became a destination country for smuggled genuine Western brand cigarettes. It was only after effective crackdowns against cigarette smuggling and domestic distribution channels in the late 1990s that the Chinese illegal cigarette industry shifted to exporting large numbers of counterfeit Western brand cigarettes to black markets abroad. China’s current role as a leading supplier of counterfeit cigarettes is a result of the contradictions of the economic reform process and of external licit and illicit forces that worked toward opening up the Chinese tobacco sector to the outside world

Cultural Contestation in China: Ethnicity, Identity and the State

This chapter explores how the political-administrative design of the Chinese state, characterized as “multi-level governance”, might be the cause of more subtle forms of resistance. By looking at the formulation of heritage policies of Lancang County, Christina Maags illustrates how the administrative fragmentation resulted in both administrative contestation and cultural contestation, with a threatened local identity at its core

Dinamika Multipartai dalam Penetapan APBD (Studi Kasus Dprd Kabupaten Tabanan dan Dprd Kabupaten Klungkung)

This research have the purpose is to find out the comparison between Tabanan Regency which is dominated by a particular party and Klungkung Regency which is not dominated in the process of determining the APBD to find out how the debate during the process of determining the APBD takes place. Descriptive qualitative research methods used in this research with purposive sampling technique. The findings of this study are that Tabanan Regency is dominated by a dominant party system. This condition causes the determination of APBD in Tabanan Regency without experiencing significant obstacles and debates. Determination of APBD in Klungkung Regency is still multi-stakeholder and experiences quite a lot of debate and the dominant party system and polarized pluralism system directly affect the process of determining the APBD in Tabanan and Klungkung Regencies.  Key words:APBD, Party System, Tabanan Regency, and Klungkung Regency

How China Built the World’s Biggest Patent Office: The Pressure Driving Mechanism

In 2011 China’s patent office received more patent applications than any other patent office in the world. While explanations for this patent surge focus on some relevant factors such as the use of subsidies for application fees, what is missing from the literature is an analysis of how China turns its fragmented levels of government into an efficient system for obtaining compliance with patent targets set by the higher levels of government. Drawing on the governance literature from China we introduce the concept of the pressure driving mechanism and show how this mechanism enables China to reach the goals and targets that it sets for its patent system. We discuss goal and target-setting at the higher levels of government and show how these are then transmitted to lower levels of government. We explain how performance evaluation and peer transparency are used to generate pressure on Chinese officials to comply with patent targets. Provincial-level patent data are presented to show how well compliance works, as well as to demonstrate how the mechanism operates to make the patent system responsive to changes in targets. Through the application of the pressure driving mechanism, China is developing a unique tool of patent regulation

Dams, neoliberalism, and rights: Mainstreaming environmental justice claims

10.1002/sd.1996Sustainable Development282424-43