Design study and evaluation of a hypergolic engine for a space power system, phase 2 Final report, 1 Jul. 1964 - 10 Feb. 1966

Design feasibility of hypergolic engine for space power syste

The Role of GNB4 and SULF2 in Human Oligodendrocyte Differentiation

The principle function of oligodendrocytes is to synthesize and maintain myelin, a lipid-based substance essential for rapid conduction between neurons. Demyelinating diseases such as multiple sclerosis (MS) are characterized by a loss of oligodendrocytes and their myelin. Remyelination restores myelin but is limited due to impaired human oligodendrocyte progenitor cell (hOPC) differentiation. Unfortunately, current understanding of the genes involved in human oligodendrocyte development is lacking. To expand our knowledge in this field, we sought to identify and characterize genes that regulate differentiation by extracting mRNA from CD140a+ hOPCs undergoing oligodendrocyte differentiation in vitro. Microarray-based differential gene expression analysis identified 49 genes that were greatly regulated in OPC differentiation. Weighted Gene Co-expression Network Analysis (WGCNA) was used to define differentiation-specific networks and identified GNB4, SULF2, PPP161RB and ITM2A as genes that may act as key regulators of hOPC differentiation. Interestingly, lentiviral over-expression of GNB4 and SULF2 could significantly promote and inhibit OPC differentiation respectively in vitro. We sought to validate the functions of these genes in vivo. As such, we transplanted lentiviral infected hOPCs over-expressing SULF2, GNB4, or mCherry, the control, into the corpus callosum of neonatal shiverer/rag2 hypomyelinating mice. At 8 and 12 weeks post-implantation we perfused, sectioned, and stained their brains via immunohistochemistry using markers for proliferation (Ki67), and differentiation as astrocyte (GFAP) and oligodendrocyte lineages (CC1 and MBP). At 8 weeks, GNB4-infected hOPC transplanted animals exhibited more than a 3 fold increase in MBP within the corpus callosum (unpaired t-test p \u3c 0.05, n=4). SULF2 over-expression greatly reduced the percentage of transplanted cells undergoing CC1+ oligodendrocyte differentiation (9.8 ± 0.6% vs mCherry 15.9 ± 2%, unpaired t-test p = 0.013, n=4). These results confirm the roles of GNB4 and SULF2 in hOPC differentiation and suggest that SULF2 and GNB4 could represent future pharmacological targets for remyelinating therapy

Treatment Differences and Political Realities in the GAAP-IFRS Debate

The Securities Exchange Commission has introduced a Roadmap that describes a process leading to mandatory use of IFRS by domestic issuers by 2014. The SEC justifies this initiative on the grounds that global standardization yields cost savings and an ultimate gain in comparability, facilitating the search for global opportunities by U.S. investors and making U.S. capital markets more attractive to foreign issuers. This paper enters an objection, noting that the stakes include more than the choice of the framework for standard setting. The accounting treatments themselves are at issue, treatments that for the most part concern domestic reporting firms and domestic users of financial statements. We present a treatment by treatment comparison of GAAP and IFRS and go on to discuss the differences\u27 implications. FASB maintained its independence during its 35 year history in the teeth of opposition from corporate management, which experienced a steady diminution of its zone of financial reporting discretion. A switch to IFRS would allow management to reclaim some of the lost territory. Meanwhile, the interest group alignment that protected FASB, comprised of auditing firms, actors in the financial markets, and the SEC, has disintegrated as U.S. capital market power has waned in the face of international competition. Management is the shift\u27s incidental beneficiary, with possible negative effects for reporting quality in domestic markets

Treatment Differences and Political Realities in the GAAP-IFRS Debate

The Securities Exchange Commission has introduced a Roadmap that describes a process leading to mandatory use of IFRS by domestic issuers by 2014. The SEC justifies this initiative on the grounds that global standardization yields cost savings and an ultimate gain in comparability, facilitating the search for global opportunities by U.S. investors and making U.S. capital markets more attractive to foreign issuers. This paper enters an objection, noting that the stakes include more than the choice of the framework for standard setting. The accounting treatments themselves are at issue, treatments that for the most part concern domestic reporting firms and domestic users of financial statements. We present a treatment by treatment comparison of GAAP and IFRS and go on to discuss the differences\u27 implications. FASB maintained its independence during its 35 year history in the teeth of opposition from corporate management, which experienced a steady diminution of its zone of financial reporting discretion. A switch to IFRS would allow management to reclaim some of the lost territory. Meanwhile, the interest group alignment that protected FASB, comprised of auditing firms, actors in the financial markets, and the SEC, has disintegrated as U.S. capital market power has waned in the face of international competition. Management is the shift\u27s incidental beneficiary, with possible negative effects for reporting quality in domestic markets

Introduction to \u3ci\u3eInstitutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds and Private Equity, Economics and Regulation\u3c/i\u3e

The increase in institutional ownership of recent decades has been accompanied by an enhanced role played by institutions in monitoring companies’ corporate governance behaviour. Activist hedge funds and private equity firms have achieved a degree of success in actively shaping the business plans of target firms. They may be characterized as pursuing a common goal – in the words used in the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, both seek ‘to increase the market value of their pooled capital through active engagement with individual public companies. This engagement may include demands for changes in management, the composition of the board, dividend policies, company strategy, company capital structure and acquisition/disposal plans which are normally regarded as governance issues.’ This article is the introductory chapter of Institutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds and Private Equity, Economics and Regulation (Oxford University Press 2015). The book collects descriptive expositions and empirical analyses essential for an understanding of both varieties of interventionist shareholder. The twenty-one chapters detail these investors’ strategic approaches, the financial returns they produce, the regulatory context in which they operate, and the policy questions raised by their activities