Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness

We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on the case of two players with additive valuation functions and our purpose is twofold. First, our main result provides a complete characterization of truthful mechanisms that allocate all the items to the players. Our characterization reveals an interesting structure underlying all truthful mechanisms, showing that they can be decomposed into two components: a selection part where players pick their best subset among prespecified choices determined by the mechanism, and an exchange part where players are offered the chance to exchange certain subsets if it is favorable to do so. In the remaining paper, we apply our main result and derive several consequences on the design of mechanisms with fairness guarantees. We consider various notions of fairness, (indicatively, maximin share guarantees and envy-freeness up to one item) and provide tight bounds for their approximability. Our work settles some of the open problems in this agenda, and we conclude by discussing possible extensions to more players.Comment: To appear in the 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM EC '17

Mathematical programming based approaches for classes of complex network problems : economical and sociological applications

The thesis deals with the theoretical and practical study of mathematical programming methodologies to the analysis complex networks and their application in economic and social problems. More specifically, it applies models and methods for solving linear and integer programming problems to network models exploiting the matrix structure of such models, resulting in efficient computational procedures and small processing time. As a consequence, it allows the study of larger and more complex networks models that arise in many economical and sociological applications. The main efforts have been addressed to the development of a rigorous mathematical programming based framework, which is able to capture many classes of complex network problems. Such a framework involves a general and flexible modeling approach, based on linear and integer programmin, as well as a collection of efficient probabilistic procedures to deal with these models. The computer implementation has been carried out by high level programming languages, such as Java, MatLab, R and AMPL. The final chapter of the thesis introduced an extension of the analyzed model to the case of microeconomic interaction, providing a fruitful mathematical linkage between its optimization-like properties and its multi-agents properties. The theoretical and practical use of optimization methods represents the trait-de-union of the different chapters. The overall structure of the thesis manuscript contains three parts: Part I: The fine-grained structure of complex networks: theories, models and methods; Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Part II: Mathematical Programming based approaches for random models of network formation; Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Part III: Strategic models of network formation. Chapter 6. Results of this research have generated four working papers in quality scientific journals: one has been accepted and three are under review. Some results have been also presented in four international conferences.La tesis aborda el estudio teórico y práctico de las metodologías de programación matemática para el análisis de redes complejas y su aplicación a problemas económicos y sociales. Más específicamente, se aplica modelos y métodos para resolver problemas de programación lineal y de programación lineal entera explotando las estructuras matriciales de tales modelos, lo que resulta en procedimientos computacionales eficientes y bajo coste de procesamiento. Como consecuencia de ello, las metodologías propuestas permiten el estudio de modelos complejos de gran dimensión, para redes complejas que surgen en muchas aplicaciones económicas y sociológicas. Los principales esfuerzos se han dirigido al desarrollo de un marco teórico basado en la programación matemática, que es capaz de capturar muchas clases de problemas de redes complejas. Dicho marco teórico envuelve un sistema general y flexible de modelado y una colección de procedimientos probabilísticos para solucionar eficientemente dichos modelos, basados en la programación linear y entera. Las implementaciones informáticas se han llevado a cabo mediante lenguajes de programación de alto nivel, como Java, Matlab, R y AMPL. El último capítulo de la tesis introduce una extensión de los modelos analizados, para el caso de la interacción microeconómica, con el objetivo de establecer un nexo metodológico entre sus propiedades de optimización y sus propiedades multi-agentes. El uso teórico y práctico de los métodos de optimización representa el elemento de conjunción de los distintos capítulos. Parte I: The fine-grained structure of complex networks: theories, models and methods; - Capitulo 1 y Capitulo 2. Parte II: Mathematical Programming based approaches for random models of network formation; - Capitulo 3, Capitulo 4 y Capitulo 5. Parte III: Strategic models of network formation. - Capitulo 6. Los resultados de esta investigación han generado cuatro papers en revistas científicas indexadas: uno ha sido aceptado, tres están en revisión. Algunos resultados han sido también presentados en cuatro conferencias internacionale

Worst case compromises in matroids with applications to the allocation of indivisible goods

International audienceWe consider the problem of equitably allocating a set of indivisible goods to n agents with additive utilities so as to provide worst case guarantees on agents' utilities. Demko and Hill [6] showed the existence of an allocation where every agent values his share at least Vn(α)Vn(α), which is a family of nonincreasing functions of α, defined as the maximum value assigned by an agent to a single good. A deterministic algorithm returning such an allocation in polynomial time was proposed in [15]. Interestingly, Vn(α)Vn(α) is tight for some values of α, i.e. it matches the highest possible utility of the least happy agent. However, this is not true for all values of α . We propose a family of functions WnWn such that Wn(x)≥Vn(x)Wn(x)≥Vn(x) for all x , and Wn(x)>Vn(x)Wn(x)>Vn(x) for values of x where Vn(x)Vn(x) is not tight. The functions WnWn apply on a problem that generalizes the allocation of indivisible goods. It is to find a base in a matroid which is common to n agents. Our results are constructive, they are achieved by analyzing an extension of the algorithm of Markakis and Psomas. We also present an upper bound on the utility of the least happy agent