Educating for Intellectual Virtue: a critique from action guidance

Virtue epistemology is among the dominant influences in mainstream epistemology today. An important commitment of one strand of virtue epistemology – responsibilist virtue epistemology (e.g., Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996; Battaly 2006; Baehr 2011) – is that it must provide regulative normative guidance for good thinking. Recently, a number of virtue epistemologists (most notably Baehr, 2013) have held that virtue epistemology not only can provide regulative normative guidance, but moreover that we should reconceive the primary epistemic aim of all education as the inculcation of the intellectual virtues. Baehr’s picture contrasts with another well-known position – that the primary aim of education is the promotion of critical thinking (Scheffler 1989; Siegel 1988; 1997; 2017). In this paper – that we hold makes a contribution to both philosophy of education and epistemology and, a fortiori, epistemology of education – we challenge this picture. We outline three criteria that any putative aim of education must meet and hold that it is the aim of critical thinking, rather than the aim of instilling intellectual virtue, that best meets these criteria. On this basis, we propose a new challenge for intellectual virtue epistemology, next to the well-known empirically-driven ‘situationist challenge’. What we call the ‘pedagogical challenge’ maintains that the intellectual virtues approach does not have available a suitably effective pedagogy to qualify the acquisition of intellectual virtue as the primary aim of education. This is because the pedagogic model of the intellectual virtues approach (borrowed largely from exemplarist thinking) is not properly action-guiding. Instead, we hold that, without much further development in virtue-based theory, logic and critical thinking must still play the primary role in the epistemology of education

Reason and Rationality in the Post-Pandemic Era

This paper investigates human reason’s proper function and role in the post-pandemic era. Sections 1 and 2 analyze recent literature on Kahneman’s dual processing theory and Hugo Mercier’s and Dan Sperber’s (M&S) interactionalist approach toward human reason. Kahneman’s theory cannot explain how System 2 is still prone to make serious mistakes, and M&S provide a more plausible alternative: reasoning is all intuitive. Humans can intuit reasons for their beliefs and intuitions. But more importantly, reason is the metarepresentational ability to evaluate the strengths or weaknesses of reasons and arguments. Reason, through the process of evolution, is fundamentally used for justification and argumentation. Section 3 outlines that the individual can summon reason to justify an established moral intuition. Argumentation helps interlocutors self-reflect on political and moral beliefs, opinions, and intuitions, influencing people to change their minds. Section 4 introduces the internal cognitive limitations that accompany human reason and rationality: confirmation bias influences the individual reasoner to look for reasons to support their own intuitions and beliefs with little regard for the strength or reliability of those reasons. Reasoning in like-minded groups without dissenting opinions, called groupthink, gives off the impression of sound reasoning. However, this only exacerbates reason’s flaws and limitations. Additionally, willful and strategic ignorance, i.e., ignoring certain aspects of reality on purpose, which is used as a coping and convenience mechanism, can lead to negative real-world consequences if used improperly or excessively. People who denied the existence of the Covid-19 virus, objected to the vaccine’s efficacy, and doubted the results of the 2020 presidential election are topical examples of confirmation bias, groupthink, and willful or strategic ignorance influencing contemporary American society and politics. Section 5 identifies the MAGA movement’s effect on public reason. Specifically, the movement’s “Great American Utopia” mythology is used to justify radical political change and totalitarianism. Section 6 discusses how the internet, particularly social media, stifles the spread of knowledge and contributes to a decline of critical thinking in American society by exploiting reason’s deficiencies. Accordingly, it also emphasizes how these exacerbated flaws negatively affected American culture during the Covid-19 pandemic and the 2020 US Presidential Election. Section 7 discusses possible solutions for improving public reasoning, such as focusing on epistemic virtues, vigilance, rules, and developing internet and social media navigation skills. The section also highlights how individuals, groups, and institutions can tailor human reason and rationality toward positive epistemological ends. Lastly, section 8 briefly refutes M&S and Johnathan Haidt’s reductionist claims that individuals are only motivated to obtain knowledge and truth for self-interest and to improve their social reputation. Their premise severely undermines the possibility of trustworthy objective knowledge and neglects other motivating forces and the human emotional relationship towards knowledge and truth. By arguing that humans are solely motivated by their reputation, M&S and Haidt not only unsatisfactorily narrow the complexity of human experience but also subvert the audience’s confidence in their theory with their own argument

Organizational epistemology

Diese Arbeit stellt ein Begriffs-Instrumentarium zur Verfügung um (1) Wissen in Organisationen beschreiben zu können und um (2) allgemeine Bedingungen für erfolgreiche, organisationale Wissenserzeugung vorgeben zu können. Das vorgestellte theoretische Rahmenwerk wird erkenntnistheoretisch begründet und richtet sich an Wissenschafter/innen wie an Praktiker/innen. (1) Eine Theorie organisationalen Wissens wird vorgestellt, die Begriffe zur Verfügung stellt um Wesen, Typen, Relevanz, Anwendung und Erzeugung von Wissen in Organisationen zu verstehen. Von philosophischen Grundlagen ausgehend, wird organisationales Wissen als das Erzeugen von „organisationalen Unterscheidungen“ auf den drei Ebenen „Repräsentation“, „Bedeutung“, und „Handeln“, verstanden. Ausserdem werden die zwei Typen „propositionales Wissen“ (z.B. Regeln oder Routinen) und „narratives Wissen“ (z.B. Erzählungen oder Best-Practices) vorgestellt. Wissenserzeugung wird als offener Prozess („Werden“, „becoming“) verstanden, der sich in temporär-stabilen Ergebnissen entäußert („Sein“, „being“). (2) Ergänzend wird eine „Organisationale Epistemologie“ vorgeschlagen, die einen normativen Zugang zu Wissenserzeugung einnimmt. Inspiriert durch erkenntnistheoretische Reflexionen wird eine Sichtweise vorgeschlagen, die eine Differenz zwischen Glauben und Wissen („belief and knowledge“), zwischen blosse organisationale Unterscheidung und organisationales Wissen, einführt. Eine Differenz, die in Organisationstheorien bisher kaum Beachtung fand. Durch Rückgriff auf eine philosophische „soziale Epistemologie“ („social epistemology“) werden die drei Richtlinien „Ermöglichen“ („enable“), „Beschränken“ („constrain“) und „Reflektieren“ („reflect“) vorgestellt und auf Organisationen angewandt. Letztere plädieren für eine offene und reflexive Umgebung organisationaler Wissenserzeugung („organizational spaces of knowledge creation“), die entlang der Ziele und Strukturen der Organisation ausgerichtet werden soll. (1) und (2) werden anhand zahlreicher Beispiele aus der Praxis erläutert, sowie im Rahmen einer detaillierten Fallstudie (aus dem Unternehmen „Seven-Eleven Japan“) angewandt.This inquiry presents a theoretical toolkit on the topic of organizational knowledge. It provides concepts (1) to describe knowledge in organizations, and (2) to prescribe the general conditions for successful organizational knowledge creation. It is rooted in philosophical-epistemological reflections on the nature of knowledge and addressed to researchers and practitioners both-alike. (1) A theory of organizational knowledge is outlined which provides concepts to understand nature, relevance, application, and creation of knowledge in organizations. Departing from a philosophical grounding, knowledge is located within „distinction-making“ on the three levels of „representation“, „meaning“, and „action“. Additionally, the two general types of „propositional knowledge“ (e.g. rules, or routines) and „narrative knowledge“ (e.g. stories, or best practices) are presented. Knowledge creation is summarized as open-ended process („becoming“) which results in temporarily stable outcomes („being“). (2) Supplementary, a normative theory of „organizational epistemology“ is developed. Driven by epistemological reflections, a view is presented which acknowledges the crucial difference between beliefs and knowledge, between mere organizational distinctions and successful organizational knowledge; a difference which has widely been neglected by organizational studies so far. Drawing from a „social epistemology“ the three guidelines „enabling“, „constraining“, and „reflecting“ are discussed and shifted to organizations. Those guidelines call for an open and reflective space of knowledge creation, aligned with goals and structures of the organization. Both (1) and (2) are demonstrated along numerous examples, connected to field-studies, and applied to one main use-case at the company „Seven-Eleven Japan“

Demarcation without Dogmas

This paper reviews how research on the demarcation problem has developed, starting from Popper's criterion of falsifiability and ending with recent naturalistically oriented approaches. The main differences between traditional and contemporary approaches to the problem are explicated in terms of six postulates called the traditional assumptions. It is argued that all of the assumptions can be dismissed without giving up on the demarcation problem and that doing so might benefit further discussions on pseudoscience. Four present-day research movements on evaluating the boundaries of science are introduced: (1) philosophy of pseudoscience, (2) social epistemology of dissent, (3) agnotology, and (4) evaluation of expertise. Researchers working within these areas have abandoned some or all traditional assumptions.Peer reviewe

Creationism and evolution

In Tower of Babel, Robert Pennock wrote that “defenders of evolution would help their case immeasurably if they would reassure their audience that morality, purpose, and meaning are not lost by accepting the truth of evolution.” We first consider the thesis that the creationists’ movement exploits moral concerns to spread its ideas against the theory of evolution. We analyze their arguments and possible reasons why they are easily accepted. Creationists usually employ two contradictive strategies to expose the purported moral degradation that comes with accepting the theory of evolution. On the one hand they claim that evolutionary theory is immoral. On the other hand creationists think of evolutionary theory as amoral. Both objections come naturally in a monotheistic view. But we can find similar conclusions about the supposed moral aspects of evolution in non-religiously inspired discussions. Meanwhile, the creationism-evolution debate mainly focuses — understandably — on what constitutes good science. We consider the need for moral reassurance and analyze reassuring arguments from philosophers. Philosophers may stress that science does not prescribe and is therefore not immoral, but this reaction opens the door for the objection of amorality that evolution — as a naturalistic world view at least — supposedly endorses. We consider that the topic of morality and its relation to the acceptance of evolution may need more empirical research

Demarcation without Dogmas

This paper reviews how research on the demarcation problem has developed, starting from Popper's criterion of falsifiability and ending with recent naturalistically oriented approaches. The main differences between traditional and contemporary approaches to the problem are explicated in terms of six postulates called the traditional assumptions. It is argued that all of the assumptions can be dismissed without giving up on the demarcation problem and that doing so might benefit further discussions on pseudoscience. Four present-day research movements on evaluating the boundaries of science are introduced: (1) philosophy of pseudoscience, (2) social epistemology of dissent, (3) agnotology, and (4) evaluation of expertise. Researchers working within these areas have abandoned some or all traditional assumptions.Peer reviewe

The attractiveness of the project of practical methodology and virtue epistemology for the economic history research

Ewa Domańska, a distinguished historian of historiography and the methodologist of history, has provided an insightful commentary on the state of humanities and social sciences. The development of interdisciplinary research in social sciences and humanities has resulted in varying outcomes and interpenetrations. Interdisciplinary research helps the development of science. However, studies undertaken with less rigor may pose some threats into the long term. According to Domańska, the lack of qualifications and care (especially with respect to theory and methodology) may undermine the autonomy of a disciplines and the credibility of research in the given field. This timely warning prompted the author to create the project with the aim to assert the independence of the threatened disciplines and to “re-professionalize” these areas of study. This is to be achieved by emphasizing the role of theory in science—a strong embeddedness of a discipline in the theory. Domańska’s concept, in the form of a dichotomous project, seems to be a recipe for achieving this goal. It presupposes, on the one hand, a “practical methodology”, i.e. constructing the theory basing on empirical research material, and on the other hand the so-called “virtue epistemology”, which stresses an ethical aspect of the researcher’s attitude and labour. The aim of the paper is to discuss Domańska’s project and to draw attention to the originality of her concept in the context of economic and social sciences. The economic history is a peculiar discipline founded at the intersection of history and economics. Thus, it is possible to put forward the thesis that Domańska’s suggestions are relevant to the research of economic history. The author will seek to determine what cognitive opportunities arise from the ontology of economic history and their potential threats to the main disciplines of history and economics. The article will also examine if Domańska’s project is appropriate for the economic history research as it is deeply embedded in “practical methodology”, and so in theory. Next, the author aims to consider the role of new theoretical approaches in this field, and whether it is possible to formulate novel concepts within the scope of the economic history. Finally, the author will attempt to assess the significance of “virtue epistemology” or the ethical aspect of an economic historian’s work.Publication of English-language versions of the volumes of the “Annales. Ethics in Economic Life” financed through contract no. 501/1/P-DUN/2017 from the funds of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education devoted to the promotion of scholarship

Free Speech and Justified True Belief

Law often prioritizes justified true beliefs. Evidence, even if probative and correct, must have a proper foundation. Expert witness testimony must be the product of reliable principles and methods. Prosecutors are not permitted to trick juries into convicting a defendant, even if that defendant is truly guilty. Judges’ reasons, and not just the correctness of their holdings, are the engines of precedent. Lawyers are, in short, familiar with the notion that one must be right for the right reasons. And yet the standard epistemic theory of the First Amendment—that the marketplace of ideas is the “best test of truth”—has generally focused on truth alone, as if all true beliefs must be treated equally. This thin account leaves the epistemic theory vulnerable to withering criticism, especially in a “post-truth” era. This Article suggests that the epistemic theory of the First Amendment might be reframed around a different value: not truth alone, but knowledge. Beginning with the tripartite definition of knowledge as justified true belief, philosophers from Plato until the present day have tried to account for what makes knowledge distinct and distinctly valuable. And in many ways law, too, already accounts for the existence and value of justifications, not just true beliefs. Identifying and exploring those threads of constitutional theory and doctrine can help provide a richer account of the cognitive First Amendment at a time when it is sorely needed. Doing so can also help resolve thorny doctrinal problems like those involving professional speech and institutional deference