Crying Over the Cache: Why Technology Has Compromised the Uniform Application of Child Pornography Laws

As thousands of individuals surf the internet daily, every image on every web page is saved automatically to their computer’s cache, absent user direction. Sections 2252(a)(2) and 2252(a)(4)(B) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code criminalize knowing possession and knowing receipt of child pornography images. For the defendant who intentionally saves illicit images to his computer, the cache simply verifies already-proven knowing possession or receipt. However, for the defendant who only views child pornography online, the presence of images in the cache may not be enough to prove knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. How can the prosecution prove a defendant knowingly received an image he has potentially never seen? How can a prosecutor prove a defendant knowingly possessed an image that may have been a pop-up? Questions like these have split circuit courts over the application of § 2252(a)(2). Several circuit courts have confronted cases with defendants who undoubtedly viewed child pornography images online, but who only left one clue as to their “knowing” receipt—the presence of images in the cache. The Tenth Circuit found that absent direct proof that a defendant viewed the image, the presence of a file in the cache is not enough to meet the “knowing receipt” standard. The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits disagreed, holding that a pattern of seeking out images satisfies the knowledge requirement. This Note analyzes the split and concludes that the presence of images in the cache proves a defendant’s knowing receipt. The Tenth Circuit’s demand of “direct proof of viewership of the image in question” imposes impossible evidentiary requirements. Defendants who view child pornography online have satisfied § 2252(a)(2)’s mens rea requirement even without direct proof of viewership of the image in question

How Do Tor Users Interact With Onion Services?

Onion services are anonymous network services that are exposed over the Tor network. In contrast to conventional Internet services, onion services are private, generally not indexed by search engines, and use self-certifying domain names that are long and difficult for humans to read. In this paper, we study how people perceive, understand, and use onion services based on data from 17 semi-structured interviews and an online survey of 517 users. We find that users have an incomplete mental model of onion services, use these services for anonymity and have varying trust in onion services in general. Users also have difficulty discovering and tracking onion sites and authenticating them. Finally, users want technical improvements to onion services and better information on how to use them. Our findings suggest various improvements for the security and usability of Tor onion services, including ways to automatically detect phishing of onion services, more clear security indicators, and ways to manage onion domain names that are difficult to remember.Comment: Appeared in USENIX Security Symposium 201

Easy on that trigger dad: a study of long term family photo retrieval

We examine the effects of new technologies for digital photography on people's longer term storage and access to collections of personal photos. We report an empirical study of parents' ability to retrieve photos related to salient family events from more than a year ago. Performance was relatively poor with people failing to find almost 40% of pictures. We analyze participants' organizational and access strategies to identify reasons for this poor performance. Possible reasons for retrieval failure include: storing too many pictures, rudimentary organization, use of multiple storage systems, failure to maintain collections and participants' false beliefs about their ability to access photos. We conclude by exploring the technical and theoretical implications of these findings

Information Outlook, October 2006

Volume 10, Issue 10https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_io_2006/1009/thumbnail.jp

Easy on that trigger dad: a study of long term family photo retrieval

We examine the effects of new technologies for digital photography on people's longer term storage and access to collections of personal photos. We report an empirical study of parents' ability to retrieve photos related to salient family events from more than a year ago. Performance was relatively poor with people failing to find almost 40% of pictures. We analyze participants' organizational and access strategies to identify reasons for this poor performance. Possible reasons for retrieval failure include: storing too many pictures, rudimentary organization, use of multiple storage systems, failure to maintain collections and participants' false beliefs about their ability to access photos. We conclude by exploring the technical and theoretical implications of these findings

Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online Harassment

Efforts to decrease the sexist aspects of online fora have been largely ineffective, and in some instances seemingly counterproductive, in the sense that they have provoked even greater amounts of abuse and harassment with a gendered aspect. And so, in the wake of a series of high profile episodes of cyber sexual harassment, and a grotesque abundance of low profile ones, a new business model was launched. Promising to clean up and monitor online information to defuse the visible impact of coordinated harassment campaigns, a number of entities began to market themselves as knights in cyber shining armor, ready to defend otherwise defenseless people whose reputations have been sullied on the Internet Of course these companies charge a fee and place particular emphasis on women who they recognize as potential clients. This article raises three concerns about these businesses. First, these companies have economic incentives to foster conditions online that perpetuate acts of online harassment, as the more harassment there is online, the greater the number of potential clients. These companies are also incentivized to create fora with hostile climates and to stir up trouble themselves. Second, these companies have economic incentives to oppose legal reforms that might enable online defamation and harassment victims to seek recourse from law enforcement agencies or through the courts. And finally, though they cloak themselves in the mantel of protectors of the innocent, their real agenda is to sell their services to wealthy corporations and individuals for far more nefarious purposes: to help bad actors hide negative information about themselves. This practice creates information asymmetries that can harm anyone who detrimentally relies on what they incorrectly assume to be the best available information and can lead to increases in the sorts of financial losses and personal vulnerability that access to unmanipulated Internet search results might otherwise reduce