(Dis)Obedience in Digital Societies: Perspectives on the Power of Algorithms and Data

Algorithms are not to be regarded as a technical structure but as a social phenomenon - they embed themselves, currently still very subtle, into our political and social system. Algorithms shape human behavior on various levels: they influence not only the aesthetic reception of the world but also the well-being and social interaction of their users. They act and intervene in a political and social context. As algorithms influence individual behavior in these social and political situations, their power should be the subject of critical discourse - or even lead to active disobedience and to the need for appropriate tools and methods which can be used to break the algorithmic power

(Dis)Obedience in Digital Societies

Algorithms are not to be regarded as a technical structure but as a social phenomenon - they embed themselves, currently still very subtle, into our political and social system. Algorithms shape human behavior on various levels: they influence not only the aesthetic reception of the world but also the well-being and social interaction of their users. They act and intervene in a political and social context. As algorithms influence individual behavior in these social and political situations, their power should be the subject of critical discourse - or even lead to active disobedience and to the need for appropriate tools and methods which can be used to break the algorithmic power

Learning from the novel: feminism, philosophy, literature

Analytic philosophy since Plato has been notoriously hostile to literature, and yet in recent years, increasing numbers of philosophers within the tradition have sought to take seriously the question of how it is that literature can be philosophical. Analytic philosophy has also been noted for its hostility to women and resistance to feminism.In this thesis I seek to make connections between firstly the prejudice against, and then the potential for, the contribution of the perspectives of literature and feminism in philosophy, attempting to answer simultaneously the two questions;How can literature be philosophical? How can feminists write philosophy?In the sense that I attempt to take these questions seriously, and answer them precisely, this thesis fits into the analytic philosophical tradition. However, my response to these questions, and thus the majority of this thesis, takes the form of a non-traditional demonstration of the philosophical potential of literature presented through three feminist literary genres; autographical fiction, Utopian fiction, and detective fiction.Using generic divisions seems to be an appropriate strategy for reclaiming literature as philosophical, since it suggests an identification with the Aristotelian defence of literary arts against Plato's assault. However, I will argue that these literary genres have traditionally been defined in terms which prohibit a philosophical reading. I will expose and then recover this anti-philosophical bias, particularly when it coincides with feminist genre revisions. This recovery will take the form of a philosophical reconceptualizing of each genre, and a specific comparative analysis of two texts adopted as representative of each genre as I conceive it. In this way I hope to show that it is not only possible, but highly advantageous, to learn from the novel

The status of ecophilosophy and the ideology of nature.

Ecophilosophy is an attempt to render a new philosophy of nature, generated by the need to liberate nature from the inherently domineering disposition of humankind. Although I am sympathetic to this effort, I believe that the current ambiguity of its content (who or what is to survive) carries with it the potentiality for new forms of oppression. I argue that ecophilosophy suffers from a kind of Habermasian self-deception, taking on a vague concept of nature that deceptively appears to do the philosophical work of healing the epistemological gap between nature and humans. My reconstruction unifies this loosely-defined vision along the lines of an equivocal use of two key concepts, the domination of nature and nature itself, revealing the potentially subversive character of its implicitly universalist philosophy of nature. Ecophilosophers, rather than distinguishing themselves, fail to improve upon Francis Bacon\u27s suggestion that attention to nature will liberate us. Their satisfaction with ecological solutions indicates that they miss the essential ideological consequence of the modern project: the domination by some humans over others has been covered over by a self-deceptive belief in the liberating character of scientific methodology. By arguing for the emancipatory capacity of ecology, they get themselves into a Marcusian-like bind, advocating this new science while at the same time rejecting scientific rationality as a pivotal component of their notion of the domination of nature. Because of this they are forced to argue that ecology is qualitatively different, offering a new kind of rationality that contains the necessary ingredients for radically changing society. Ecophilosophers must reconsider the epistemologically naive and ideologically negative repercussions of this position as I demonstrate with an analysis of the potentially repressive relationships that exist between fourth world cultures and the environmental community. I conclude by subjecting the Habermasian, universalist framework to revision as indicated by the possibilities of a new eco-vision, emerging from the contextual episteme of a reworked ecofeminist perspective

Care to explain?:A critical epistemic in/justice based analysis of legal explanation obligations and ideals for ‘AI’-infused times

Fundamental legal explanation rights are seen to be in peril because of the use of inscru-table computational methods in decision making across important domains such as health care, welfare, and the judiciary. New technology-oriented explanation rules are created in response to this. As part of such rules, human explainers are tasked with re-humanizing the automated decisional processes. By providing their explainees with meaningful information, explainers are expected to help protect these decision subjects from AI-related harms such as wrongful discrimination, and to sustain their ability to participate in decision making about them in responsible ways.De Groot questions the merits, and the ideas behind these legislative approaches. Harms that are typically ascribed to the use of algorithms and modern ‘AI’ are not so different in character from harms that existed long before the ‘digital revolution.’ If explanation rights have a role to play as a tool against what De Groot describes as knowledge related wrong-doing, law has something to answer for since its explanation rules have thus far underserved those in less privileged societal positions; before and after decisions were automated.To conduct this critical questioning this thesis approaches explanation as a form of knowledge making. It builds a ‘re-idealized’ model of explanation duties based on val-ues described in the philosophical fields of epistemic justice and injustice. Starting from critical insights with regard to responsibly informed interaction in situations of social-informational inequality, the model relates duties of explanation care to different phases of an explanation cycle. The model is then applied in an analysis of the main explanation rules for administrative and medical decision making in The Netherlands. In ‘technology and regulation’ discus-sions, both domains are appealed to as benchmarks for the dignified treatment of ex-plainees. The analysis however teases out how the paradigms ignore important dimen-sions of decision making, and how explainers are not instructed to engage with explain-ees in ways that allow to fundamentally respect them as knowers and rights holders. By generating conceptual criticism and making practical, detailed points, the thesis demon-strates work that can be done to improve explanation regulation moving forward.<br/

Foundations of Trusted Autonomy

Trusted Autonomy; Automation Technology; Autonomous Systems; Self-Governance; Trusted Autonomous Systems; Design of Algorithms and Methodologie

Volume XI, Nos. 3 & 4

Arbones, Gloria. “Feminism and Philosophy for Children in Argentina.” 39-­42. Cahn, Edmond. “The Right to be Young.” 41­-42. Daniel, Marie­-France. “Women, Philosophical Community of Inquiry and the Liberation of Self.” 63-­71. Bosch, Eulalia. “Primary School: Love Versus Knowledge 7.” 71­-72. Carneiro de Moura, Zaza. “Seeds of Change, Seeds of Chance.” 33­-38. De la Garza, Teresa. “Women’s Education in Mexico and Philosophy for Children.” 47­ 50. Dudina, Margarita Nikolayevna. “Some Reflections on Our System of Education.” 44­47. Glaser, Jen. “Reasoning as Dialogical Inquiry: A Model for the Liberation of Women.” 14­-17. Hagaman, Sally. “Education in Philosophy and Art in the United States: A Feminist Account.” 77­-79. Haynes, Felicity. “Male Dominance and the Mastery of Reason.” 1-­24. Laverty, Megan. “Putting Ethics at the Center.” 73-­76. MacColl, San. “Opening Philosophy.” 5­-9. Miroiu, Mihaela. “The Vicious Circle of Anonymity” or “Pseudo­-Feminism and Totalitarism.” 54-­62. Redshaw, Sarah. “Body Knowledge.” 9­-14. Sharp, Ann Margaret. “Feminism and Philosophy for Children: The Ethical Dimension.” 24­-28. ­­­­­ ----- “Introduction.” 1­-4. Slade, Christina. “Harryspeak and the Conversation of Girls.” 29­-32. Smyke, Patricia. “Threading My Way Towards Philosophy for Children.” 82­-85. Tultkova, Roumiana. “Bulgarian Women Facing Their Problems and the Changes in the Educational System.” 51-­53. Turgeon, Wendy. “Choosing Not to Play the Game.” 80­-81. Van den Aardweg, Helena. “Transforming the Community.” 86-­89. Young Silva, Catherine. “On Women, Feminism and Philosophy for Children.” 90-­91. Young Silva, Catherine. “Catherine’s Story: The Echo of the Voice of the Children” 92­96. Yulina, N.S. “Prospects for Feminism and Philosophy for Children in Russia.” 43

Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional Meaning for the Uninitiated

A parody of postmodern writing

Generating explanatory discourse: a plan-based, interactive approach

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre- DSC:D91660 / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo