Neuronal bases of structural coherence in contemporary dance observation

The neuronal processes underlying dance observation have been the focus of an increasing number of brain imaging studies over the past decade. However, the existing literature mainly dealt with effects of motor and visual expertise, whereas the neural and cognitive mechanisms that underlie the interpretation of dance choreographies remained unexplored. Hence, much attention has been given to the Action Observation Network (AON) whereas the role of other potentially relevant neuro-cognitive mechanisms such as mentalizing (theory of mind) or language (narrative comprehension) in dance understanding is yet to be elucidated. We report the results of an fMRI study where the structural coherence of short contemporary dance choreographies was manipulated parametrically using the same taped movement material. Our participants were all trained dancers. The whole-brain analysis argues that the interpretation of structurally coherent dance phrases involves a subpart (Superior Parietal) of the AON as well as mentalizing regions in the dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex. An ROI analysis based on a similar study using linguistic materials (Pallier et al. 2011) suggests that structural processing in language and dance might share certain neural mechanisms

Quantum Ontologies and Mind-Matter Synthesis

Aspects of a quantum mechanical theory of a world containing efficacious mental aspects that are closely tied to brains, but that are not identical to brains.Comment: 69 pages. Invited contribution to Xth Max Born Symposium: "Quantum Future". Published in "Quantum Future", eds. P. Blanchard and A. Jadczyk, Springer-Verlag, 1999, ISBN 3-540-65218-3. LBNL 4072

Credit assignment in multiple goal embodied visuomotor behavior

The intrinsic complexity of the brain can lead one to set aside issues related to its relationships with the body, but the field of embodied cognition emphasizes that understanding brain function at the system level requires one to address the role of the brain-body interface. It has only recently been appreciated that this interface performs huge amounts of computation that does not have to be repeated by the brain, and thus affords the brain great simplifications in its representations. In effect the brain’s abstract states can refer to coded representations of the world created by the body. But even if the brain can communicate with the world through abstractions, the severe speed limitations in its neural circuitry mean that vast amounts of indexing must be performed during development so that appropriate behavioral responses can be rapidly accessed. One way this could happen would be if the brain used a decomposition whereby behavioral primitives could be quickly accessed and combined. This realization motivates our study of independent sensorimotor task solvers, which we call modules, in directing behavior. The issue we focus on herein is how an embodied agent can learn to calibrate such individual visuomotor modules while pursuing multiple goals. The biologically plausible standard for module programming is that of reinforcement given during exploration of the environment. However this formulation contains a substantial issue when sensorimotor modules are used in combination: The credit for their overall performance must be divided amongst them. We show that this problem can be solved and that diverse task combinations are beneficial in learning and not a complication, as usually assumed. Our simulations show that fast algorithms are available that allot credit correctly and are insensitive to measurement noise

Time, action and psychosis: using subjective time to investigate the effects of ketamine on sense of agency

Sense of agency refers to the experience of initiating and controlling actions in order to influence events in the outside world. A disturbed sense of agency is found in certain psychiatric and neurological disorders, most notably schizophrenia. Sense of agency is associated with a subjective compression of time: actions and their outcomes are perceived as bound together in time. This is known as ‘intentional binding’ and, in healthy adults, depends partly on advance prediction of action outcomes. Notably, this predictive contribution is disrupted in patients with schizophrenia. In the present study we aimed to characterise the psychotomimetic effect of ketamine, a drug model for psychosis, on the predictive contribution to intentional binding. It was shown that ketamine produced a disruption that closely resembled previous data from patients in the early, prodromal, stage of schizophrenic illness. These results are discussed in terms of established models of delusion formation in schizophrenia. The link between time and agency, more generally, is also considered