Grounding knowledge and normative valuation in agent-based action and scientific commitment

Philosophical investigation in synthetic biology has focused on the knowledge-seeking questions pursued, the kind of engineering techniques used, and on the ethical impact of the products produced. However, little work has been done to investigate the processes by which these epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical forms of inquiry arise in the course of synthetic biology research. An attempt at this work relying on a particular area of synthetic biology will be the aim of this chapter. I focus on the reengineering of metabolic pathways through the manipulation and construction of small DNA-based devices and systems synthetic biology. Rather than focusing on the engineered products or ethical principles that result, I will investigate the processes by which these arise. As such, the attention will be directed to the activities of practitioners, their manipulation of tools, and the use they make of techniques to construct new metabolic devices. Using a science-in-practice approach, I investigate problems at the intersection of science, philosophy of science, and sociology of science. I consider how practitioners within this area of synthetic biology reconfigure biological understanding and ethical categories through active modelling and manipulation of known functional parts, biological pathways for use in the design of microbial machines to solve problems in medicine, technology, and the environment. We might describe this kind of problem-solving as relying on what Helen Longino referred to as “social cognition” or the type of scientific work done within what Hasok Chang calls “systems of practice”. My aim in this chapter will be to investigate the relationship that holds between systems of practice within metabolic engineering research and social cognition. I will attempt to show how knowledge and normative valuation are generated from this particular network of practitioners. In doing so, I suggest that the social nature of scientific inquiry is ineliminable to both knowledge acquisition and ethical evaluations

Scepticism and the genealogy of knowledge: situating epistemology in time

My overarching purpose is to illustrate the philosophical fruitfulness of expanding epistemology not only laterally across the social space of other epistemic subjects, but at the same time vertically in the temporal dimension. I set about this by first presenting central strands of Michael Williams' diagnostic engagement with scepticism, in which he crucially employs a Default and Challenge model of justification. I then develop three key aspects of Edward Craig's ‘practical explication' of the concept of knowledge so that they may be seen to resonate positively with Williams's epistemological picture: the admixture of internalist and externalist features; the proto-contextualism; and, finally, the distinctively genealogical antisceptical impetus. In this way I aim to support and augment the socialized anti-sceptical case mounted by Williams, and so to show that expanding epistemology in the temporal dimension can be a productive move in central debates in epistemology

Creationism and evolution

In Tower of Babel, Robert Pennock wrote that “defenders of evolution would help their case immeasurably if they would reassure their audience that morality, purpose, and meaning are not lost by accepting the truth of evolution.” We first consider the thesis that the creationists’ movement exploits moral concerns to spread its ideas against the theory of evolution. We analyze their arguments and possible reasons why they are easily accepted. Creationists usually employ two contradictive strategies to expose the purported moral degradation that comes with accepting the theory of evolution. On the one hand they claim that evolutionary theory is immoral. On the other hand creationists think of evolutionary theory as amoral. Both objections come naturally in a monotheistic view. But we can find similar conclusions about the supposed moral aspects of evolution in non-religiously inspired discussions. Meanwhile, the creationism-evolution debate mainly focuses — understandably — on what constitutes good science. We consider the need for moral reassurance and analyze reassuring arguments from philosophers. Philosophers may stress that science does not prescribe and is therefore not immoral, but this reaction opens the door for the objection of amorality that evolution — as a naturalistic world view at least — supposedly endorses. We consider that the topic of morality and its relation to the acceptance of evolution may need more empirical research

Virtue, Social Knowledge, and Implicit Bias

This chapter is centered around an apparent tension that research on implicit bias raises between virtue and social knowledge. Research suggests that simply knowing what the prevalent stereotypes are leads individuals to act in prejudiced ways—biasing decisions about whom to trust and whom to ignore, whom to promote and whom to imprison—even if they reflectively reject those stereotypes. Because efforts to combat discrimination obviously depend on knowledge of stereotypes, a question arises about what to do next. This chapter argues that the obstacle to virtue is not knowledge of stereotypes as such, but the “accessibility” of such knowledge to the agent who has it. “Accessibility” refers to how easily knowledge comes to mind. Social agents can acquire the requisite knowledge of stereotypes while resisting their pernicious influence, so long as that knowledge remains, in relevant contexts, relatively inaccessibl

Proof of Concept Research

Researchers often pursue proof of concept research, but criteria for evaluating such research remain poorly specified. This paper proposes a general framework for proof of concept research that knits together and augments earlier discussions. The framework includes prototypes, proof of concept demonstrations, and post facto demonstrations. With a case from theoretical evolutionary genetics, the paper illustrates the general framework and articulates some of the reasoning strategies used within that field. This paper provides both specific tools with which to understand how researchers evaluate models in theoretical evolutionary genetics, and general tools that apply to proof of concept research more generally

Ethical values supporting the disclosure of incidental and secondary findings in clinical genomic testing : a qualitative study

Background: Incidental findings (IFs) and secondary findings (SFs), being results that are unrelated to the diagnostic question, are the subject of an important debate in the practice of clinical genomic medicine. Arguments for reporting these results or not doing so typically relate to the principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence and beneficence. However, these principles frequently conflict and are insufficient by themselves to come to a conclusion. This study investigates empirically how ethical principles are considered when actually reporting IFs or SFs and how value conflicts are weighed. Methods: A qualitative focus group study has been undertaken, including a multidisciplinary group of professionals from Belgian centres for medical genetics. The data were analysed thematically. Results: All eight Belgian centres participated in this study. Ethical values were frequently referred to for disclosure policies on IFs and SFs. Participants invoked respect for patient autonomy to support the disclosure of IFs and optout options for IFs and SFs, non-maleficence for the professional delineation of reportable IFs and opt-out options for IFs and SFs and (the particular scope of) beneficence for the mandatory reporting of actionable IFs, the delineation of reportable IFs and a current decline of actively pursued SFs. Professional assumptions about patients’ genetic literacy were an important factor in the weighing of values. Conclusions: In line with the traditional bioethical discourse, the mandatory reporting of actionable IFs might be interpreted as a “technological, soft paternalism”. Restricting patients’ choices might be acceptable, but then its motives should be valid and its beneficent outcomes highly plausible. Hence, the presuppositions of technological, soft paternalism - patients’ inability to make informed decisions, normative rationality, the efficacy of beneficent outcomes and the delineated spectrum of beneficence - should be approached critically. Moreover, distributive justice should be considered an important value in the delineation of the current scope of the ethical debate on IFs and SFs. This study of guiding values may stimulate the debate on the ethical grounds for a solid policy on IFs and SFs internationally

Indigenous Peoples and Epistemic Injustice: Science, Ethics, and Human Rights

This Article explores the use of science as a tool of public policy and examines how science policy impacts indigenous peoples in the areas of environmental protection, public health, and repatriation. Professor Tsosie draws on Miranda Fricker’s account of “epistemic injustice” to show how indigenous peoples have been harmed by the domestic legal system and the policies that guide the implementation of the law in those three arenas. Professor Tsosie argues that the theme of “discovery,” which is pivotal to scientific inquiry, has governed the violation of indigenous peoples’ human rights since the colonial era. Today, science policy is overtly “neutral,” but it may still be utilized to the disadvantage of indigenous peoples. Drawing on international human rights law, Professor Tsosie demonstrates how public policy could shift from treating indigenous peoples as “objects” of scientific discovery to working respectfully with indigenous governments as equal participants in the creation of public policy. By incorporating human rights standards and honoring indigenous self-determination, domestic public policy can more equitably respond to indigenous peoples’ distinctive experience. Similarly, scientists and scientific organizations can incorporate human rights standards into their disciplinary methods and professional codes of ethics as they respond to the ethical and legal implications of their work

Experiment and bias: the case of parsimony in comparative cognition

Comparative cognition is the interdisciplinary field of animal cognition and behavior studies, which includes comparative psychology and branches of ethology, biology, and neuroscience. My dissertation shows that the quasi-epistemic value of parsimony plays a problematic role in the experimental setting of comparative cognition. More specifically, I argue that an idiosyncratic interpretation of the statistical hypothesis-testing method, known as the Neyman-Pearson Method (NPM), embeds an Occamist parsimony preference into experimental methodology in comparative cognition, which results in an underattribution bias, or a bias in favor of allegedly simple cognitive ontologies. I trace this parsimony preference to the content of the null hypothesis within the NPM, and defend a strategy for modifying the NPM to guard against the underattribution bias. I recommend adopting an evidence-driven strategy for choosing the null hypothesis. Further, I suggest a role for non-empirical values, such as ethical concerns, in the weighting of Type I and Type II error-rates. I contend that statistical models are deeply embedded in experimental practice and are not value-free. These models provide an often overlooked door through which values, both epistemic and non-epistemic, can enter scientific research. Since statistical models generally, and the NPM in particular, play a role in a wide variety of scientific disciplines, this dissertation can also be seen as a case study illustrating the importance of attending to the choice a particular statistical model. This conclusion suggests that various philosophical investigations of scientific practice - from inquiry into the nature of scientific evidence to analysis of the role of values in science - would be greatly enriched by increased attention to experimental methodology, including the choice and interpretation of statistical models