95,733 research outputs found
Optimal Market Design
This paper introduces three methodological advances to study the optimal design of static and dynamic markets. First, we apply a mechanism design approach to characterize all incentive-compatible market equilibria. Second, we conduct a normative analysis, i.e. we evaluate alternative competition and innovation policies from a welfare perspective. Third, we introduce a reliable way to measure competition in dynamic markets with nonlinear pricing. We illustrate the usefulness of our approach in several ways. We reproduce the empirical finding that innovation levels are higher in markets with lower price-cost margins, yet such markets are not necessarily more competitive. Indeed, we prove the Schumpeterian conjecture that more dynamic markets characterized by higher levels of innovation should be less competitive. Furthermore, we demonstrate how our approach can be used to determine the optimal combination of market regulation and innovation policies such as R&D subsidies or a weakening of the patent system. Finally, we show that optimal markets are characterized by strictly positive price-cost margins.competition policy;dynamic markets;competition measures;Schumpeter;mechanism design
Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks
This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio
networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to
delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two
paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we
examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary
markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic
shared-use DSA, we study the operator's pricing effect on the equilibrium
behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. %This queue represents
the congestion of the multiple SUs sharing the operator's single \ON-\OFF
channel that models the primary users (PUs) traffic. We provide a queueing
delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU
traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players
employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition
and iterative algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators,
two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization
and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator
exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated
separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the
equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal
pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market,
we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and
exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a
backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for
this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.Comment: 30 pages, one column, double spac
Designing Target Rules for International Monetary Policy Cooperation
This study analyzes a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, monopolisticcompetition and producer currency pricing. A quadratic approximation to the utility of the consumers is derivedand assumed as the policy objective function of the policymakers. It is shown that only under special conditionsthere are no gains from cooperation and moreover that the paths of the exchange rate and prices in theconstrained-efficient solution depend on the kind of disturbance that affects the economy. It might be the caseeither for fixed or floating exchange rates. Despite this result, simple targeting rules that involve only targets forthe growth of output and for both domestic GDP and CPI inflation rates can replicate the cooperative allocation.monetary policy cooperation, sticky prices, welfare analysis, targeting rules, inflation target
A truthful (1-É›)-optimal mechanism for on-demand cloud resource provisioning
On-demand resource provisioning in cloud computing provides tailor-made resource packages (typically in the form of VMs) to meet users’ demands. Public clouds nowadays provide more and more elaborated types of VMs, but have yet to offer the most flexible dynamic VM assembly, which is partly due to the lack of a mature mechanism for pricing tailor-made VMs on the spot. This work proposes an efficient randomized auction mechanism based on a novel application of smoothed analysis and randomized reduction, for dynamic VM provisioning and pricing in geo-distributed cloud data centers. This auction, to the best of our knowledge, is the first one in literature that achieves (i) truthfulness in expectation, (ii) polynomial running time in expectation, and (iii) (1-ɛ)-optimal social welfare in expectation for resource allocation, where ɛ can be arbitrarily close to 0. Our mechanism consists of three modules: (1) an exact algorithm to solve the NP-hard social welfare maximization problem, which runs in polynomial time in expectation, (2) a perturbation-based randomized resource allocation scheme which produces a VM provisioning solution that is (1-ɛ)-optimal and (3) an auction mechanism that applies the perturbation-based scheme for dynamic VM provisioning and prices the customized VMs using a randomized VCG payment, with a guarantee in truthfulness in expectation. We validate the efficacy of the mechanism through careful theoretical analysis and trace-driven simulations.published_or_final_versio
RSMOA: a revenue and social welfare maximizing online auction for dynamic cloud resource provisioning
We study online cloud resource auctions where users can arrive anytime and bid for heterogeneous types of virtual machines (VMs) assembled and provisioned on the fly. The proposed auction mechanism RSMOA, to the authors’ knowledge, represents the first truthful online mechanism that timely responds to incoming users’ demands and makes dynamic resource provisioning and allocation decisions, while guaranteeing efficiency in both the provider’s revenue and system social welfare. RSMOA consists of two components: (1) an online mechanism that computes resource allocation and users’ payments based on a global, non-decreasing pricing curve, and guarantees truthfulness; (2) a judiciously designed pricing curve, which is derived from a threat-based strategy and guarantees a competitive ratio O(ln(p)) in both system social welfare and the provider’s revenue, as compared to the celebrated offline Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction. Here p is the ratio between the upper and lower bounds of users’ marginal valuation of a type of resource. The efficacy of RSMOA is validated through extensive theoretical analysis and trace-driven simulation studies.published_or_final_versio
Optimal and Long-Term Dynamic Transport Policy Design: Seeking Maximum Social Welfare through a Pricing Scheme.
This article presents an alternative approach to the decision-making process in transport strategy design. The study explores the possibility of integrating forecasting,
assessment and optimization procedures in support of a decision-making process designed to reach the best achievable scenario through mobility policies.
Long-term evaluation, as required by a dynamic system such as a city, is provided by a strategic Land-Use and Transport Interaction (LUTI) model. The social welfare
achieved by implementing mobility LUTI model policies is measured through a cost-benefit analysis and maximized through an optimization process throughout the evaluation period. The method is tested by optimizing a pricing policy scheme in Madrid on a cordon toll in a context requiring system efficiency, social equity and environmental quality. The optimized scheme yields an appreciable increase in social surplus through a relatively low rate compared to other similar pricing toll schemes. The results highlight the different considerations regarding mobility impacts on the case study area, as well as the major contributors to social welfare surplus. This leads the authors to reconsider the cost-analysis approach, as defined in the study, as the best option for formulating sustainability measures
Optimal Posted Prices for Online Cloud Resource Allocation
We study online resource allocation in a cloud computing platform, through a
posted pricing mechanism: The cloud provider publishes a unit price for each
resource type, which may vary over time; upon arrival at the cloud system, a
cloud user either takes the current prices, renting resources to execute its
job, or refuses the prices without running its job there. We design pricing
functions based on the current resource utilization ratios, in a wide array of
demand-supply relationships and resource occupation durations, and prove
worst-case competitive ratios of the pricing functions in terms of social
welfare. In the basic case of a single-type, non-recycled resource (i.e.,
allocated resources are not later released for reuse), we prove that our
pricing function design is optimal, in that any other pricing function can only
lead to a worse competitive ratio. Insights obtained from the basic cases are
then used to generalize the pricing functions to more realistic cloud systems
with multiple types of resources, where a job occupies allocated resources for
a number of time slots till completion, upon which time the resources are
returned back to the cloud resource pool
Pricing Multi-Unit Markets
We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets,
where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and
lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be
guaranteed with posted prices, under a range of assumptions about the
designer's information and agents' valuations. Our results provide insights
about the relative power of uniform and non-uniform prices, the relative
difficulty of different valuation classes, and the implications of different
informational assumptions. Among other results, we prove constant-factor
guarantees for agents with (symmetric) subadditive valuations, even in an
incomplete-information setting and with uniform prices
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