Wait-Free Solvability of Equality Negation Tasks

We introduce a family of tasks for n processes, as a generalization of the two process equality negation task of Lo and Hadzilacos (SICOMP 2000). Each process starts the computation with a private input value taken from a finite set of possible inputs. After communicating with the other processes using immediate snapshots, the process must decide on a binary output value, 0 or 1. The specification of the task is the following: in an execution, if the set of input values is large enough, the processes should agree on the same output; if the set of inputs is small enough, the processes should disagree; and in-between these two cases, any output is allowed. Formally, this specification depends on two threshold parameters k and l, with k<l, indicating when the cardinality of the set of inputs becomes "small" or "large", respectively. We study the solvability of this task depending on those two parameters. First, we show that the task is solvable whenever k+2 <= l. For the remaining cases (l = k+1), we use various combinatorial topology techniques to obtain two impossibility results: the task is unsolvable if either k <= n/2 or n-k is odd. The remaining cases are still open

A dynamic epistemic logic analysis of equality negation and other epistemic covering tasks

In this paper we study the solvability of the equality negation task in a simple wait-free model where two processes communicate by reading and writing shared variables or exchanging messages. In this task, the two processes start with a private input value in the set {0,1,2}, and after communicating, each one must decide a binary output value, so that the outputs of the processes are the same if and only if the input values of the processes are different. This task is already known to be unsolvable; our goal here is to prove this result using the dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) approach introduced by Goubault et al. (2018) [18]. We show that in fact, there is no epistemic logic formula that explains why the task is unsolvable. Furthermore, we observe that this task is a particular case of an epistemic covering task. We thus establish a connection between the existing DEL framework and the theory of covering spaces in topology, and prove that the same result holds for any epistemic covering task: no epistemic formula explains the unsolvability

A Simplicial Model for KB4nKB4_n: Epistemic Logic with Agents that May Die

The standard semantics of multi-agent epistemic logic S5 is based on Kripke models whose accessibility relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive. This one dimensional structure contains implicit higher-dimensional information beyond pairwise interactions, that we formalized as pure simplicial models in a previous work (Information and Computation, 2021). Here we extend the theory to encompass simplicial models that are not necessarily pure. The corresponding class of Kripke models are those where the accessibility relation is symmetric and transitive, but might not be reflexive. Such models correspond to the epistemic logic KB4 . Impure simplicial models arise in situations where two possible worlds may not have the same set of agents. We illustrate it with distributed computing examples of synchronous systems where processes may crash

Simplicial Models for the Epistemic Logic of Faulty Agents

In recent years, several authors have been investigating simplicial models, a model of epistemic logic based on higher-dimensional structures called simplicial complexes. In the original formulation, simplicial models were always assumed to be pure, meaning that all worlds have the same dimension. This is equivalent to the standard S5n semantics of epistemic logic, based on Kripke models. By removing the assumption that models must be pure, we can go beyond the usual Kripke semantics and study epistemic logics where the number of agents participating in a world can vary. This approach has been developed in a number of papers, with applications in fault-tolerant distributed computing where processes may crash during the execution of a system. A difficulty that arises is that subtle design choices in the definition of impure simplicial models can result in different axioms of the resulting logic. In this paper, we classify those design choices systematically, and axiomatize the corresponding logics. We illustrate them via distributed computing examples of synchronous systems where processes may crash

Ptarithmetic

The present article introduces ptarithmetic (short for "polynomial time arithmetic") -- a formal number theory similar to the well known Peano arithmetic, but based on the recently born computability logic (see http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~giorgi/cl.html) instead of classical logic. The formulas of ptarithmetic represent interactive computational problems rather than just true/false statements, and their "truth" is understood as existence of a polynomial time solution. The system of ptarithmetic elaborated in this article is shown to be sound and complete. Sound in the sense that every theorem T of the system represents an interactive number-theoretic computational problem with a polynomial time solution and, furthermore, such a solution can be effectively extracted from a proof of T. And complete in the sense that every interactive number-theoretic problem with a polynomial time solution is represented by some theorem T of the system. The paper is self-contained, and can be read without any previous familiarity with computability logic.Comment: Substantially better versions are on their way. Hence the present article probably will not be publishe

A simplicial model for KB4n : epistemic logic with agents that may die

The standard semantics of multi-agent epistemic logic S5n is based on Kripke models whose accessibility relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive. This one dimensional structure contains implicit higher-dimensional information beyond pairwise interactions, that we formalized as pure simplicial models in a previous work in Information and Computation 2021 [10]. Here we extend the theory to encompass simplicial models that are not necessarily pure. The corresponding class of Kripke models are those where the accessibility relation is symmetric and transitive, but might not be reflexive. Such models correspond to the epistemic logic KB4n. Impure simplicial models arise in situations where two possible worlds may not have the same set of agents. We illustrate it with distributed computing examples of synchronous systems where processes may crash

Semantic and Mathematical Foundations for Intuitionism

Thesis (Ph.D.) - Indiana University, Philosophy, 2013My dissertation concerns the proper foundation for the intuitionistic mathematics whose development began with L.E.J. Brouwer's work in the first half of the 20th Century. It is taken for granted by most philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians interested in foundational questions that intuitionistic mathematics presupposes a special, proof-conditional theory of meaning for mathematical statements. I challenge this commonplace. Classical mathematics is very successful as a coherent body of theories and a tool for practical application. Given this success, a view like Dummett's that attributes a systematic unintelligibility to the statements of classical mathematicians fails to save the relevant phenomena. Furthermore, Dummett's program assumes that his proposed semantics for mathematical language validates all and only the logical truths of intuitionistic logic. In fact, it validates some intuitionistically invalid principles, and given the lack of intuitionistic completeness proofs, there is little reason to think that every intuitionistic logical truth is valid according to his semantics. In light of the failure of Dummett's foundation for intuitionism, I propose and carry out a reexamination of Brouwer's own writings. Brouwer is frequently interpreted as a proto-Dummettian about his own mathematics. This is due to excessive emphasis on some of his more polemical writings and idiosyncratic philosophical views at the expense of his distinctively mathematical work. These polemical writings do not concern mathematical language, and their principal targets are Russell and Hilbert's foundational programs, not the semantic principle of bivalence. The failures of these foundational programs has diminished the importance of Brouwer's philosophical writings, but his work on reconstructing mathematics itself from intuitionistic principles continues to be worth studying. When one studies this work relieved of its philosophical burden, it becomes clear that an intuitionistic mathematician can make sense of her mathematical work and activity without relying on special philosophical or linguistic doctrines. Core intuitionistic results, especially the invalidity of the logical principle tertium non datur, can be demonstrated from basic mathematical principles; these principles, in turn, can be defended in ways akin to the basic axioms of other mathematical theories. I discuss three such principles: Brouwer's Continuity Principle, the Principle of Uniformity, and Constructive Church's Thesis