Methoden und Beschreibungssprachen zur Modellierung und Verifikation vonSchaltungen und Systemen: MBMV 2015 - Tagungsband, Chemnitz, 03. - 04. März 2015

Der Workshop Methoden und Beschreibungssprachen zur Modellierung und Verifikation von Schaltungen und Systemen (MBMV 2015) findet nun schon zum 18. mal statt. Ausrichter sind in diesem Jahr die Professur Schaltkreis- und Systementwurf der Technischen Universität Chemnitz und das Steinbeis-Forschungszentrum Systementwurf und Test. Der Workshop hat es sich zum Ziel gesetzt, neueste Trends, Ergebnisse und aktuelle Probleme auf dem Gebiet der Methoden zur Modellierung und Verifikation sowie der Beschreibungssprachen digitaler, analoger und Mixed-Signal-Schaltungen zu diskutieren. Er soll somit ein Forum zum Ideenaustausch sein. Weiterhin bietet der Workshop eine Plattform für den Austausch zwischen Forschung und Industrie sowie zur Pflege bestehender und zur Knüpfung neuer Kontakte. Jungen Wissenschaftlern erlaubt er, ihre Ideen und Ansätze einem breiten Publikum aus Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft zu präsentieren und im Rahmen der Veranstaltung auch fundiert zu diskutieren. Sein langjähriges Bestehen hat ihn zu einer festen Größe in vielen Veranstaltungskalendern gemacht. Traditionell sind auch die Treffen der ITGFachgruppen an den Workshop angegliedert. In diesem Jahr nutzen zwei im Rahmen der InnoProfile-Transfer-Initiative durch das Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung geförderte Projekte den Workshop, um in zwei eigenen Tracks ihre Forschungsergebnisse einem breiten Publikum zu präsentieren. Vertreter der Projekte Generische Plattform für Systemzuverlässigkeit und Verifikation (GPZV) und GINKO - Generische Infrastruktur zur nahtlosen energetischen Kopplung von Elektrofahrzeugen stellen Teile ihrer gegenwärtigen Arbeiten vor. Dies bereichert denWorkshop durch zusätzliche Themenschwerpunkte und bietet eine wertvolle Ergänzung zu den Beiträgen der Autoren. [... aus dem Vorwort

Block level voltage

Over the past years, state-of-art power optimization methods move towards higher abstraction levels that result in more efficient power savings. Among existing power optimization approaches, dynamic power management (DPM) is considered to be one of the most effective strategies. Depending on abstraction levels, DPM can be implemented in different formats but here we focus on scheduling that is more suitable for real-time system design use. This differs from the concurrent scheduling approaches that start from either the HLS (High-Level Synthesis) or RTS (Real-Time System) point of view, we propose a synergy solution of both approaches, namely block-level voltage/frequency scheduling (BLVFS). The presented block-level voltage/ frequency scheduling approach shows a generic solution for low power SoC (System on Chip) system design while the approaches which belong to the HLS and RTS categories have a strong dependency on the system functionalities. Consider a SoC as a combination of heterogeneous functional blocks, our approach provides efficient power savings by dynamically scheduling the scaling of voltage and frequency at the same time. Simulation results indicate that by using heuristic based strategies significant power savings can be achieved

Dependable Embedded Systems

This Open Access book introduces readers to many new techniques for enhancing and optimizing reliability in embedded systems, which have emerged particularly within the last five years. This book introduces the most prominent reliability concerns from today’s points of view and roughly recapitulates the progress in the community so far. Unlike other books that focus on a single abstraction level such circuit level or system level alone, the focus of this book is to deal with the different reliability challenges across different levels starting from the physical level all the way to the system level (cross-layer approaches). The book aims at demonstrating how new hardware/software co-design solution can be proposed to ef-fectively mitigate reliability degradation such as transistor aging, processor variation, temperature effects, soft errors, etc. Provides readers with latest insights into novel, cross-layer methods and models with respect to dependability of embedded systems; Describes cross-layer approaches that can leverage reliability through techniques that are pro-actively designed with respect to techniques at other layers; Explains run-time adaptation and concepts/means of self-organization, in order to achieve error resiliency in complex, future many core systems

Processor Microarchitecture Security

As computer systems grow more and more complicated, various optimizations can unintentionally introduce security vulnerabilities in these systems. The vulnerabilities can lead to user information and data being compromised or stolen. In particular, the ending of both Moore\u27s law and Dennard scaling motivate the design of more exotic microarchitectural optimizations to extract more performance -- further exacerbating the security vulnerabilities. The performance optimizations often focus on sharing or re-using of hardware components within a processor, between different users or programs. Because of the sharing of the hardware, unintentional information leakage channels, through the shared components, can be created. Microarchitectural attacks, such as the high-profile Spectre and Meltdown attacks or the cache covert channels that they leverage, have demonstrated major vulnerabilities of modern computer architectures due to the microarchitectural~optimizations. Key components of processor microarchitectures are processor caches used for achieving high memory bandwidth and low latency for frequently accessed data. With frequently accessed data being brought and stored in caches, memory latency can be significantly reduced when data is fetched from the cache, as opposed to being fetched from the main memory. With limited processor chip area, however, the cache size cannot be very large. Thus, modern processors adopt a cache hierarchy with multiple levels of caches, where the cache close to processor is faster but smaller, and the cache far from processor is slower but larger. This leads to a fundamental property of modern processors: {\em the latency of accessing data in different cache levels and in main memory is different}. As a result, the timing of memory operations when fetching data from different cache levels, e.g., the timing of fetching data from closest-to-processor L1 cache vs. from main memory, can reveal secret-dependent information if attacker is able to observe the timing of these accesses and correlate them to the operation of the victim\u27s code. Further, due to limited size of the caches, memory accesses by a victim may displace attacker\u27s data from the cache, and with knowledge, or reverse-engineering, of the cache architecture, the attacker can learn some information about victim\u27s data based on the modifications to the state of the cache -- which can be observed by the timing~measurements. Caches are not only structures in the processor that can suffer from security vulnerabilities. As an essential mechanism to achieving high performance, cache-like structures are used pervasively in various processor components, such as the translation lookaside buffer (TLB) and processor frontend. Consequently, the vulnerabilities due to timing differences of accessing data in caches or cache-like structures affect many components of the~processor. The main goal of this dissertation is the {\em design of high performance and secure computer architectures}. Since the sophisticated hardware components such as caches, TLBs, value predictors, and processor frontend are critical to ensure high performance, realizing this goal requires developing fundamental techniques to guarantee security in the presence of timing differences of different processor operations. Furthermore, effective defence mechanisms can be only developed after developing a formal and systematic understanding of all the possible attacks that timing side-channels can lead to. To realize the research goals, the main main contributions of this dissertation~are: \begin{itemize}[noitemsep] \item Design and evaluation of a novel three-step cache timing model to understand theoretical vulnerabilities in caches \item Development of a benchmark suite that can test if processor caches or secure cache designs are vulnerable to certain theoretical vulnerabilities. \item Development of a timing vulnerability model to test TLBs and design of hardware defenses for the TLBs to address newly found vulnerabilities. \item Analysis of value predictor attacks and design of defenses for value predictors. \item Evaluation of vulnerabilities in processor frontends based on timing differences in the operation of the frontends. \item Development of a design-time security verification framework for secure processor architectures, using information flow tracking methods. \end{itemize} \newpage This dissertation combines the theoretical modeling and practical benchmarking analysis to help evaluate susceptibility of different architectures and microarchitectures to timing attacks on caches, TLBs, value predictors and processor frontend. Although cache timing side-channel attacks have been studied for more than a decade, there is no evidence that the previously-known attacks exhaustively cover all possible attacks. One of the initial research directions covered by this dissertation was to develop a model for cache timing attacks, which can help lead towards discovering all possible cache timing attacks. The proposed three-step cache timing vulnerability model provides a means to enumerate all possible interactions between the victim and attacker who are sharing a cache-like structure, producing the complete set of theoretical timing vulnerabilities. This dissertation also covers new theoretical cache timing attacks that are unknown prior to being found by the model. To make the advances in security not only theoretical, this dissertation also covers design of a benchmarking suite that runs on commodity processors and helps evaluate their cache\u27s susceptibility to attacks, as well as can run on simulators to test potential or future cache designs. As the dissertation later demonstrates, the three-step timing vulnerability model can be naturally applied to any cache-like structures such as TLBs, and the dissertation encompasses a three-step model for TLBs, uncovering of theoretical new TLB attacks, and proposals for defenses. Building on success of analyzing caches and TLBs for new timing attacks, this dissertation then discusses follow-on research on evaluation and uncovering of new timing vulnerabilities in processor frontends. Since security analysis should be applied not just to existing processor microarchitectural features, the dissertation further analyzes possible future features such as value predictors. Although not currently in use, value predictors are actively being researched and proposed for addition into future microarchitectures. This dissertation shows, however, that they are vulnerable to attacks. Lastly, based on findings of the security issues with existing and proposed processor features, this dissertation explores how to better design secure processors from ground up, and presents a design-time security verification framework for secure processor architectures, using information flow tracking methods

Doctor of Philosophy

dissertationCompilers are indispensable tools to developers. We expect them to be correct. However, compiler correctness is very hard to be reasoned about. This can be partly explained by the daunting complexity of compilers. In this dissertation, I will explain how we constructed a random program generator, Csmith, and used it to find hundreds of bugs in strong open source compilers such as the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) and the LLVM Compiler Infrastructure (LLVM). The success of Csmith depends on its ability of being expressive and unambiguous at the same time. Csmith is composed of a code generator and a GTAV (Generation-Time Analysis and Validation) engine. They work interactively to produce expressive yet unambiguous random programs. The expressiveness of Csmith is attributed to the code generator, while the unambiguity is assured by GTAV. GTAV performs program analyses, such as points-to analysis and effect analysis, efficiently to avoid ambiguities caused by undefined behaviors or unspecifed behaviors. During our 4.25 years of testing, Csmith has found over 450 bugs in the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) and the LLVM Compiler Infrastructure (LLVM). We analyzed the bugs by putting them into different categories, studying the root causes, finding their locations in compilers' source code, and evaluating their importance. We believe analysis results are useful to future random testers, as well as compiler writers/users