A pragmatic approach to proverb use and interpretation

Proverbs are interesting pieces of popular wisdom and tradition belonging to any culture, which help us to foreground the values and shared beliefs held by a speech community. However, its study has received little attention up to now. Thus, this dissertation research aims to analyze the functions and uses of proverbs taking examples from English and Spanish them. In order to achieve this goal, we have applied Sperber and Wilson’s Relevant Theory to explain how proverbs allow the speaker to express his/her intention in an implicit way. The findings demonstrate that the main functions of proverbs are criticism, advice and warning. In addition, we have offered an explanation of how their often ironical and metaphorical nature affects proverbs’ understanding. Besides, we have studied the use of the ellipsis in proverbs, which takes place in familiar proverbs, analyzing how familiarity and unfamiliarity influences on proverb use. Finally, we summed up our conclusions to achieve a better comprehension of proverbs’ functions and usesLos proverbios son ejemplos de sabiduría popular y tradición de cualquier cultura que nos ayudan a descubrir los valores y creencias compartidas por una comunidad de hablantes. Sin embargo, este estudio ha recibido poca atención hasta ahora. Por lo tanto, el propósito del presente trabajo es describir las funciones y usos de los proverbios y refranes concentrándonos en refranes de la lengua inglés y española para analizar y explicar las funciones y usos de los proverbios en general. Para conseguir nuestro propósito hemos aplicado la Teoría de la Relevancia de Sperber y Wilson a este estudio para explicar como ellos permiten al hablante expresar su intención de forma implícita. Las conclusiones demostrarán que la mayor función de los proverbios es la crítica, el consejo y advertencia. Además, hemos ofrecido una explicación de cómo su frecuente naturaleza irónica y metafórica influye en la comprensión de los proverbios. También hemos estudiado el uso de la elipsis en los proverbios, que toma lugar en los proverbios familiares, analizando como la familiaridad o el desconocimiento influye en el uso de los proverbios. Finalmente, resumiremos nuestras conclusiones para llegar a una mejor comprensión de las funciones y usos de los proverbio

Using dialogue to learn math in the LeActiveMath project

We describe a tutorial dialogue system under development that assists students in learning how to differentiate equations. The system uses deep natural language understanding and generation to both interpret students ’ utterances and automatically generate a response that is both mathematically correct and adapted pedagogically and linguistically to the local dialogue context. A domain reasoner provides the necessary knowledge about how students should approach math problems as well as their (in)correctness, while a dialogue manager directs pedagogical strategies and keeps track of what needs to be done to keep the dialogue moving along.

Towards a complete multiple-mechanism account of predictive language processing [Commentary on Pickering & Garrod]

Although we agree with Pickering & Garrod (P&G) that prediction-by-simulation and prediction-by-association are important mechanisms of anticipatory language processing, this commentary suggests that they: (1) overlook other potential mechanisms that might underlie prediction in language processing, (2) overestimate the importance of prediction-by-association in early childhood, and (3) underestimate the complexity and significance of several factors that might mediate prediction during language processing

An integrated theory of language production and comprehension

Currently, production and comprehension are regarded as quite distinct in accounts of language processing. In rejecting this dichotomy, we instead assert that producing and understanding are interwoven, and that this interweaving is what enables people to predict themselves and each other. We start by noting that production and comprehension are forms of action and action perception. We then consider the evidence for interweaving in action, action perception, and joint action, and explain such evidence in terms of prediction. Specifically, we assume that actors construct forward models of their actions before they execute those actions, and that perceivers of others' actions covertly imitate those actions, then construct forward models of those actions. We use these accounts of action, action perception, and joint action to develop accounts of production, comprehension, and interactive language. Importantly, they incorporate well-defined levels of linguistic representation (such as semantics, syntax, and phonology). We show (a) how speakers and comprehenders use covert imitation and forward modeling to make predictions at these levels of representation, (b) how they interweave production and comprehension processes, and (c) how they use these predictions to monitor the upcoming utterances. We show how these accounts explain a range of behavioral and neuroscientific data on language processing and discuss some of the implications of our proposal

How Do Gestures Influence Thinking and Speaking? The Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis.

Peer reviewedPostprin

Grammatical properties of pronouns and their representation : an exposition

This volume brings together a cross-section of recent research on the grammar and representation of pronouns, centering around the typology of pronominal paradigms, the generation of syntactic and semantic representations for constructions containing pronouns, and the neurological underpinnings for linguistic distinctions that are relevant for the production and interpretation of these constructions. In this introductory chapter we first give an exposition of our topic (section 2). Taking the interpretation of pronouns as a starting point, we discuss the basic parameters of pronominal representations, and draw a general picture of how morphological, semantic, discourse-pragmatic and syntactic aspects come together. In section 3, we sketch the different domains of research that are concerned with these phenomena, and the particular questions they are interested in, and show how the papers in the present volume fit into the picture. Section 4 gives summaries of the individual papers, and a short synopsis of their main points of convergence

Testimony and illusion

This paper considers a form of scepticism according to which sentences, along with other linguistic entities such as verbs and phonemes, etc., are never realized. If, whenever a conversational participant produces some noise or other, they and all other participants assume that a specific sentence has been realized (or, more colloquially, spoken), communication will be fluent whether or not the shared assumption is correct. That communication takes place is therefore, one might think, no ground for assuming that sentences are realized during a typical conversation. I reject both this 'folie-à-deux' view and the arguments for it due to Georges Rey. I do so by drawing on Gilbert Harman's no-false-lemmas principle. Since testimony is a form of knowledge and, according to the principle, knowledge cannot depend essentially on false assumptions, testimony is incompatible with the claim that sentence realization is but an illusion. Much of the paper is given over to defending this appeal to the no-false-lemmas principle. After all, a more attractive option might seem to be to infer instead that the principle is itself falsified by the folie-à-deux view

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents

In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine ‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for thought-content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner speech thinking but have problems accounting for unsymbolized thinking. Within this dialectic, we present an account of the nature of unsymbolized thinking that accords with and can be seen as a continuation of the activity of inner speech, while offering a way of explaining thought-content determinacy in terms of linguistic structures and representation

Comprehensibility and the basic structures of dialogue

The study of what makes utterances difficult or easy to understand is one of the central topics of research in comprehension. It is both theoretically attractive and useful in practice. The more we know about difficulties in understanding the more we know about understanding. And the better we grasp typical problems of understanding in certain types of discourse and for certain recipients the better we can overcome these problems and the better we can advise people whose job it is to overcome such problems. It is therefore not surprising that comprehensibility has been the object of much reflection as far back as the days of classical rhetoric and that it is a center of lively interest in several present-day scientific disciplines, ranging from artificial intelligence and educational psychology to linguistics