Auction-based schemes for multipath routing in selfish networks

We study multipath routing with traffic assignment in selfish networks. Based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, an optimal and strategy-proof scheme, known as optimal auction-based multipath routing (OAMR), is developed. However, OAMR is computationally expensive and cannot run in real time when the network size is large. Therefore, we propose sequential auction-based multipath routing (SAMR). SAMR handles routing requests sequentially using some greedy strategies. In particular, with reference to the Ausubel auction, we develop a water-draining algorithm to assign the traffic of a request among its available paths and determine the payment of the transmission in approximately constant time. Our simulation results show that SAMR can rapidly compute the allocations and payments of requests with small sacrifice on the system cost. Moreover, various sequencing strategies for sequential auction are also investigated. © 2013 IEEE.published_or_final_versio

Pruned Adaptive Routing in the Heterogeneous Internet of Things

Abstract-Recent research endeavours are capitalizing on state of the art technologies to build a scalable Internet of Things (IoT). Envisioned as a technology to integrate the best of Wireless Sensor Networks and RFID systems, there is much promise for a global network of objects that are identifiable, track-able, and harmoniously informing. However, the realization of an IoT framework is hindered by many factors, the most pressing of which is attributed to the integration of these heterogeneous nodes and devices. A considerable subset of these nodes undergoes movement and dynamically enters and leaves the network backbone/topology. Routing packets and inter-nodal communication has received little attention; mainly due to the sheer reliance on the Internet as a backbone. However, spatially correlated entities in the IoT, and those which most often interact, would pose a significant overhead of communication if all intermediate packets need to be routed over distant backhauls. In remedy, we present a Pruned Adaptive IoT Routing (PAIR) protocol that selectively establishes routes of communication between IoT nodes. Since nodes in the IoT belong to different owners, we also introduce a pricing model to cater for the exchange of monetary costs by intermediate nodes to utilize their relaying resources. We also establish a cap on inter-nodal routing to dynamically utilize the Internet backbone if the source to destination distance surpasses a preset (case optimized) threshold. The PAIR routing protocol is elaborated upon, building upon the detailed system model presented in this paper. We finally present a use case to demonstrate the utility and practicality of PAIR in the heterogeneous IoT as it scales

Identifier-Based Discovery in Large-Scale Networks

The design of any network mechanism that requires collaboration among selfish agents could only benefit from accounting for the complex social and economic interactions and incentives of the agents using the design. This chapter presents a broad treatment of the main economic issues that arise in the context of identifier-based discovery on large scale networks, particularly on the Internet. An “identified” object (such as a node or service), referred to as a player, demands to be discoverable by the rest of the network on its “identifier”. A discovery scheme provides such a service to the players and incurs a cost for doing so. Providing such a service while accounting for the cost and making sure that the incentives of the players are aligned is the general economic problem that we address in this work. After introducing the identifier-based discovery problem, we present a taxonomy of discovery schemes and proposals based on their business model and we pose several questions that are becoming increasingly important as we proceed to design the inter-network of the future. An incentive model for distributed discovery in the context of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and path-vector protocols in general is then presented. We model BGP route distribution and computation using a game in which a BGP speaker advertises its prefix to its direct neighbors promising them a reward for further distributing the route deeper into the network. The neighbors do the same thing with their direct neighbors, and so on. The result of this cascaded route distribution is a globally advertised prefix and hence discoverability. We present initial results on the existence of equilibria in the game and we motivate our ongoing work

SCOPE: Synergistic Content Distribution and Peer-to-Peer Networks

Distributing content on the Internet is an important economic, educational, social, and cultural endeavor. To this end, several existing efforts use traditional server-based content distribution networks (CDNs) to replicate and distribute Web and multimedia content of big content producers, such as news Web sites, or big businesses, such as online shopping websites, etc., to millions of Internet users. This approach places a large number of content servers at strategic locations on the Internet, incurring a very large deployment and operating cost. Therefore, it is available only to some wealthy companies/organizations. Individual users and small content publishers may rely on a more economical content dissemination approach based on recent peer-to-peer technology to distribute their own content. Nevertheless, it is the ephemeral and the limited resources nature of peer-to-peer networks that hinder a wide spread adoption of peer-to-peer technology as a reliable content distribution solution. It is, therefore, important that a new generation of cost-effective and reliable content distribution framework be proposed and investigated. Building on the successes and failures of previous content distribution approaches, the proposed research goal is to find and evaluate a Synergistic Content Distribution and Peer-to-Peer Networks (SCOPE). SCOPE leverages the reliability and the resourcefulness of traditional server-based CDNs while tapping on the economical and dynamic resources of peers

Criterio previsor para la selección de pares en redes P2P móviles

Proyecto de Graduación (Maestría en Computación con énfasis en Telemática) Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica, Escuela de Ingeniería en Computación, 2015.The traditional telephony structure, with towers centralizyng the communication is offering a service unable to match the ongrowing demand. P2P approaches have probe progress towards a solution. However, the devices's mobility represents a challenge where their migration pattern is diffcult to predict and is determined by the will of living beans.Instituto Tecnol ogico de Costa Ric

Applying the repeated game framework to multiparty networked applications

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2005.Includes bibliographical references (p. 145-154).This thesis presents repeated game analysis as an important and practical tool for networked application and protocol designers. Incentives are a potential concern for a large number of networked applications. Well-studied examples include routing and peer-to-peer networks. To the extent that incentives significantly impact the outcome of a system, system designers require tools and frameworks to better understand how their design decisions impact these incentive concerns. Repetition is a prevalent and critical aspect of many networking applications and protocols. Most networked protocols and architectures seek to optimize performance over a longer timescale and many have explicit support for repetition. Similarly, most players in networked applications are interested in longer horizons, whether they be firms building a business or typical individuals trying to use a system. Fortunately, the study of repeated interaction between multiple self-interested parties, repeated games, is a well-understood and developed area of economic and game theoretic research. A key conclusion from that literature is that the outcome of the repeated game can differ qualitatively from that of the one-shot game. Nonetheless, the tools of repeated games have rarely if ever been brought to bear on networking problems. Our work presents the descriptive and prescriptive power of repeated game analysis by making specific contributions to several relevant networking problems.(cont.) The applications considered are inherently repeated in practice, yet our research is the first to consider the repeated model for each particular problem. In the case of interdomain routing, we first show that user-directed routing (e.g., overlays) transforms routing into a meaningfully repeated game. This motivates us to consider protocols that integrate incentives into routing systems. In designing such a routing protocol, we again use repeated games to identify important properties including the protocol period and the format of certain protocol fields. Leveraging this insight, we show how it is possible to address the problem of the repeated dynamic and arrive at a more desirable outcome. In the case of multicast overlay networks, we show how repeated games can be used to explain the paradox of cooperative user behavior. In contrast to prior models, our repeated model explains the scaling properties of these networks in an endogenous fashion. This enables meaningful examination of the impact architecture and protocol design decisions have on the system outcome. We therefore use this model, with simulation, to descry system parameters and properties important in building robust networks. These examples demonstrate the important and practical insights that repeated game analysis can yield. Further, we argue that the results obtained in the particular problems stem from properties fundamental to networked applications - and their natural relationship with properties of repeated games.(cont.) This strongly suggests that the tools and techniques of this research can be applied more generally. Indeed, we hope that these results represent the beginning of an increased use of repeated games for the study and design of networked applications.by Michael Moïse Afergan.Ph.D

Systems-compatible Incentives

Originally, the Internet was a technological playground, a collaborative endeavor among researchers who shared the common goal of achieving communication. Self-interest used not to be a concern, but the motivations of the Internet's participants have broadened. Today, the Internet consists of millions of commercial entities and nearly 2 billion users, who often have conflicting goals. For example, while Facebook gives users the illusion of access control, users do not have the ability to control how the personal data they upload is shared or sold by Facebook. Even in BitTorrent, where all users seemingly have the same motivation of downloading a file as quickly as possible, users can subvert the protocol to download more quickly without giving their fair share. These examples demonstrate that protocols that are merely technologically proficient are not enough. Successful networked systems must account for potentially competing interests. In this dissertation, I demonstrate how to build systems that give users incentives to follow the systems' protocols. To achieve incentive-compatible systems, I apply mechanisms from game theory and auction theory to protocol design. This approach has been considered in prior literature, but unfortunately has resulted in few real, deployed systems with incentives to cooperate. I identify the primary challenge in applying mechanism design and game theory to large-scale systems: the goals and assumptions of economic mechanisms often do not match those of networked systems. For example, while auction theory may assume a centralized clearing house, there is no analog in a decentralized system seeking to avoid single points of failure or centralized policies. Similarly, game theory often assumes that each player is able to observe everyone else's actions, or at the very least know how many other players there are, but maintaining perfect system-wide information is impossible in most systems. In other words, not all incentive mechanisms are systems-compatible. The main contribution of this dissertation is the design, implementation, and evaluation of various systems-compatible incentive mechanisms and their application to a wide range of deployable systems. These systems include BitTorrent, which is used to distribute a large file to a large number of downloaders, PeerWise, which leverages user cooperation to achieve lower latencies in Internet routing, and Hoodnets, a new system I present that allows users to share their cellular data access to obtain greater bandwidth on their mobile devices. Each of these systems represents a different point in the design space of systems-compatible incentives. Taken together, along with their implementations and evaluations, these systems demonstrate that systems-compatibility is crucial in achieving practical incentives in real systems. I present design principles outlining how to achieve systems-compatible incentives, which may serve an even broader range of systems than considered herein. I conclude this dissertation with what I consider to be the most important open problems in aligning the competing interests of the Internet's participants

Naming and discovery in networks : architecture and economics

In less than three decades, the Internet was transformed from a research network available to the academic community into an international communication infrastructure. Despite its tremendous success, there is a growing consensus in the research community that the Internet has architectural limitations that need to be addressed in a effort to design a future Internet. Among the main technical limitations are the lack of mobility support, and the lack of security and trust. The Internet, and particularly TCP/IP, identifies endpoints using a location/routing identifier, the IP address. Coupling the endpoint identifier to the location identifier hinders mobility and poorly identifies the actual endpoint. On the other hand, the lack of security has been attributed to limitations in both the network and the endpoint. Authentication for example is one of the main concerns in the architecture and is hard to implement partly due to lack of identity support. The general problem that this dissertation is concerned with is that of designing a future Internet. Towards this end, we focus on two specific sub-problems. The first problem is the lack of a framework for thinking about architectures and their design implications. It was obvious after surveying the literature that the majority of the architectural work remains idiosyncratic and descriptions of network architectures are mostly idiomatic. This has led to the overloading of architectural terms, and to the emergence of a large body of network architecture proposals with no clear understanding of their cross similarities, compatibility points, their unique properties, and architectural performance and soundness. On the other hand, the second problem concerns the limitations of traditional naming and discovery schemes in terms of service differentiation and economic incentives. One of the recurring themes in the community is the need to separate an entity\u27s identifier from its locator to enhance mobility and security. Separation of identifier and locator is a widely accepted design principle for a future Internet. Separation however requires a process to translate from the identifier to the locator when discovering a network path to some identified entity. We refer to this process as identifier-based discovery, or simply discovery, and we recognize two limitations that are inherent in the design of traditional discovery schemes. The first limitation is the homogeneity of the service where all entities are assumed to have the same discovery performance requirements. The second limitation is the inherent incentive mismatch as it relates to sharing the cost of discovery. This dissertation addresses both subproblems, the architectural framework as well as the naming and discovery limitations