A Cut Principle for Information Flow

We view a distributed system as a graph of active locations with unidirectional channels between them, through which they pass messages. In this context, the graph structure of a system constrains the propagation of information through it. Suppose a set of channels is a cut set between an information source and a potential sink. We prove that, if there is no disclosure from the source to the cut set, then there can be no disclosure to the sink. We introduce a new formalization of partial disclosure, called *blur operators*, and show that the same cut property is preserved for disclosure to within a blur operator. This cut-blur property also implies a compositional principle, which ensures limited disclosure for a class of systems that differ only beyond the cut.Comment: 31 page

Verification of information flow security in cyber-physical systems

With a growing number of real-world applications that are dependent on computation, securing the information space has become a challenge. The security of information in such applications is often jeopardized by software and hardware failures, intervention of human subjects such as attackers, incorrect design specification and implementation, other social and natural causes. Since these applications are very diverse, often cutting across disciplines a generic approach to detect and mitigate these issues is missing. This dissertation addresses the fundamental problem of verifying information security in a class of real world applications of computation, the Cyber-physical systems (CPSs). One of the motivations for this work is the lack of a unified theory to specify and verify the complex interactions among various cyber and physical processes within a CPS. Security of a system is fundamentally characterized by the way information flows within the system. Information flow within a CPS is dependent on the physical response of the system and associated cyber control. While formal techniques of verifying cyber security exist, they are not directly applicable to CPSs due to their inherent complexity and diversity. This Ph.D. research primarily focuses on developing a uniform framework using formal tools of process algebras to verify security properties in CPSs. The merits in adopting such an approach for CPS analyses are three fold- i) the physical and continuous aspects and the complex CPS interactions can be modeled in a unified way, and ii) the problem of verifying security properties can be reduced to the problem of establishing suitable equivalences among the processes, and iii) adversarial behavior and security properties can be developed using the features like compositionality and process equivalence offered by the process algebras --Abstract, page iii

CEEME: compensating events based execution monitoring enforcement for Cyber-Physical Systems

Fundamentally, inherently observable events in Cyber-Physical Systems with tight coupling between cyber and physical components can result in a confidentiality violation. By observing how the physical elements react to cyber commands, adversaries can identify critical links in the system and force the cyber control algorithm to make erroneous decisions. Thus, there is a propensity for a breach in confidentiality leading to further attacks on availability or integrity. Due to the highly integrated nature of Cyber-Physical Systems, it is also extremely difficult to map the system semantics into a security framework under existing security models. The far-reaching objective of this research is to develop a science of selfobfuscating systems based on the composition of simple building blocks. A model of Nondeducibility composes the building blocks under Information Flow Security Properties. To this end, this work presents fundamental theories on external observability for basic regular networks and the novel concept of event compensation that can enforce Information Flow Security Properties at runtime --Abstract, page iii

Multiple security domain non deducibility in the FREEDM smart grid infrastructure

The building block of today\u27s world are not materials, but, computers and algorithms with communication networks between physical entities. A cyber physical system (CPS) is a system in which the cyber and physical entities of the system work together towards a common goal, for example a water treatment facility or an electricity distribution system. These cyber physical infrastructures affect day to day lives of people and hence become target point for the attackers to disrupt normal daily life. Owing to the complexity of a cyber physical system, the attacks have themselves become sophisticated and harder to detect. These sophisticated attacks no longer attempt to steal information, however, intend to corrupt it inside the system in order to affect the normal functioning of the system. To identify such attacks in a CPS, this thesis uses the multiple security domain non-deducibility model. The MSDND model divides the system into security domains and reduces the notion of trust into the system by replacing it with invariant based valuation functions. This work concentrates on the Future Renewable Electric Energy Distribution Management System (FREEDM) as a smart grid infrastructure. This thesis will attempt to identify potential ways in which smart grid infrastructure FREEDM can be attacked and suggest measures to identify the attacker using the MSDND model. While doing so this thesis concentrates on building blocks of the FREEDM system i.e. the state collection protocol and its distributed nature --Abstract, page iii

Tests for Establishing Security Properties

Ensuring strong security properties in some cases requires participants to carry out tests during the execution of a protocol. A classical example is electronic voting: participants are required to verify the presence of their ballots on a bulletin board, and to verify the computation of the election outcome. The notion of certificate transparency is another example, in which participants in the protocol are required to perform tests to verify the integrity of a certificate log. We present a framework for modelling systems with such `testable properties', using the applied pi calculus. We model the tests that are made by participants in order to obtain the security properties. Underlying our work is an attacker model called ``malicious but cautious'', which lies in between the Dolev-Yao model and the ``honest but curious'' model. The malicious-but-cautious model is appropriate for cloud computing providers that are potentially malicious but are assumed to be cautious about launching attacks that might cause user tests to fail

Formal models and analysis of secure multicast in wired and wireless networks

The spreading of multicast technology enables the development of group communication and so dealing with digital streams becomes more and more common over the Internet. Given the flourishing of security threats, the distribution of streamed data must be equipped with sufficient security guarantees. To this aim, some architectures have been proposed, to supply the distribution of the stream with guarantees of, e.g., authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of the digital contents. This paper shows a formal capability of capturing some features of secure multicast protocols. In particular, both the modeling and the analysis of some case studies are shown, starting from basic schemes for signing digital streams, passing through proto- cols dealing with packet loss and time-synchronization requirements, concluding with a secure distribution of a secret key. A process-algebraic framework will be exploited, equipped with schemata for analysing security properties and compositional principles for evaluating if a property is satisfied over a system with more than two components

A semantic analysis of key management protocols for wireless sensor networks

Gorrieri and Martinelli's timed Generalized Non-Deducibility on Compositions (tGNDC) schema is a well-known general framework for the formal verification of security protocols in a concurrent scenario. We generalise the tGNDC schema to verify wireless network security protocols. Our generalisation relies on a simple timed broadcasting process calculus whose operational semantics is given in terms of a labelled transition system which is used to derive a standard simulation theory. We apply our tGNDC framework to perform a security analysis of three well-known key management protocols for wireless sensor networks: \u3bcTESLA, LEAP+ and LiSP

Guess my vote : a study of opacity and information flow in voting systems

With an overall theme of information flow, this thesis has two main strands. In the first part of the thesis, I review existing information flow properties, highlighting a recent definition known as opacity [25]. Intuitively, a predicate cP is opaque if for every run in which cP is true, there exists an indistinguishable run in which it is false, where a run can be regarded as a sequence of events. Hence, the observer is never able to establish the truth of cPo The predicate cP can be defined according to requirements of the system, giving opacity a great deal of flexibility and versatility. Opacity is then studied in relation to several well-known definitions for information flow. As will be shown, several of these properties can be cast as variations of opacity, while others have a relationship by implication with the opacity property [139]. This demonstrates the flexibility of opacity, at the same time establishing its distinct character. In the second part of the thesis, I investigate information flow in voting systems. Pret a Voter [36] is the main exemplar, and is compared to other schemes in the case study. I first analyse information flow in Pret a Voter and the FOO scheme [59], concentrating on the core protocols. The aim is to investigate the security requirements of each scheme, and the extent to which they can be captured using opacity. I then discuss a systems-based analysis of Pret a Voter [163], which adapts and extends an earlier analysis of the Chaum [35] and Neff [131]' [132]' [133] schemes in [92]. Although this analysis has identified several potential vulnerabilities, it cannot be regarded as systematic, and a more rigorous approach may be necessary. It is possible that a combination of the information flow and systems- based analyses might be the answer. The analysis of coercion-resistance, which is performed on Pret a Voter and the FOO scheme, may exemplify this more systematic approach. Receipt-freeness usually means that the voter is unable to construct a proof of her vote. Coercion-resistance is a stronger property in that it accounts for the possibility of interaction between the coercer and the voter during protocol execution. It appears that the opacity property is ideally suited to expressing the requirements for coercion-resistance in each scheme. A formal definition of receipt-freeness cast as a variation of opacity is proposed [138], together with suggestions on how it might be reinforced to capture coercion-resistance. In total, the thesis demonstrates the remarkable flexibility of opacity, both in expressing differing security requirements and as a tool for security analysis. This work lays the groundwork for future enhancement of the opacity framework.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceDSTL : EPSRCGBUnited Kingdo

Verifying Privacy-Type Properties in a Modular Way

Formal methods have proved their usefulness for analysing the security of protocols. In this setting, privacy-type security properties (e.g. vote-privacy, anonymity, unlink ability) that play an important role in many modern applications are formalised using a notion of equivalence. In this paper, we study the notion of trace equivalence and we show how to establish such an equivalence relation in a modular way. It is well-known that composition works well when the processes do not share secrets. However, there is no result allowing us to compose processes that rely on some shared secrets such as long term keys. We show that composition works even when the processes share secrets provided that they satisfy some reasonable conditions. Our composition result allows us to prove various equivalence-based properties in a modular way, and works in a quite general setting. In particular, we consider arbitrary cryptographic primitives and processes that use non-trivial else branches. As an example, we consider the ICAO e-passport standard, and we show how the privacy guarantees of the whole application can be derived from the privacy guarantees of its sub-protocols