145 research outputs found
Child-Centered Security
Children are spending more time online through the use of digital toys, games and the internet. These activities make children potentially vulnerable to security threats. This position paper puts forward an argument for and against creating a new research discipline in child-centered security, as a fusion of user-centered security and child computer interaction
Towards Enhanced Usability of IT Security Mechanisms - How to Design Usable IT Security Mechanisms Using the Example of Email Encryption
Nowadays, advanced security mechanisms exist to protect data, systems, and
networks. Most of these mechanisms are effective, and security experts can
handle them to achieve a sufficient level of security for any given system.
However, most of these systems have not been designed with focus on good
usability for the average end user. Today, the average end user often struggles
with understanding and using security mecha-nisms. Other security mechanisms
are simply annoying for end users. As the overall security of any system is
only as strong as the weakest link in this system, bad usability of IT security
mechanisms may result in operating errors, resulting in inse-cure systems.
Buying decisions of end users may be affected by the usability of security
mechanisms. Hence, software provid-ers may decide to better have no security
mechanism then one with a bad usability. Usability of IT security mechanisms is
one of the most underestimated properties of applications and sys-tems. Even IT
security itself is often only an afterthought. Hence, usability of security
mechanisms is often the after-thought of an afterthought. This paper presents
some guide-lines that should help software developers to improve end user
usability of security-related mechanisms, and analyzes com-mon applications
based on these guidelines. Based on these guidelines, the usability of email
encryption is analyzed and an email encryption solution with increased
usability is presented. The approach is based on an automated key and trust
man-agement. The compliance of the proposed email encryption solution with the
presented guidelines for usable security mechanisms is evaluated
Desktop security as a three-dimensional problem
In this paper we argue against viewing computer desktop security solely as a technical issue. Instead, we propose a perspective that combines three related dimensions: technical infrastructure, usability and user engagement. In this light, we suggest that a viable approach to desktop security should embrace these three key dimensions of the end-user context. An example desktop application is described that has been engineered to embody these dimensions in support of the desktop user
The Value of User-Visible Internet Cryptography
Cryptographic mechanisms are used in a wide range of applications, including
email clients, web browsers, document and asset management systems, where
typical users are not cryptography experts. A number of empirical studies have
demonstrated that explicit, user-visible cryptographic mechanisms are not
widely used by non-expert users, and as a result arguments have been made that
cryptographic mechanisms need to be better hidden or embedded in end-user
processes and tools. Other mechanisms, such as HTTPS, have cryptography
built-in and only become visible to the user when a dialogue appears due to a
(potential) problem. This paper surveys deployed and potential technologies in
use, examines the social and legal context of broad classes of users, and from
there, assesses the value and issues for those users
Usable Security: Why Do We Need It? How Do We Get It?
Security experts frequently refer to people as “the weakest link in the chain” of system
security. Famed hacker Kevin Mitnick revealed that he hardly ever cracked a password,
because it “was easier to dupe people into revealing it” by employing a range of social
engineering techniques. Often, such failures are attributed to users’ carelessness and
ignorance. However, more enlightened researchers have pointed out that current security
tools are simply too complex for many users, and they have made efforts to improve
user interfaces to security tools. In this chapter, we aim to broaden the current perspective,
focusing on the usability of security tools (or products) and the process of designing
secure systems for the real-world context (the panorama) in which they have to operate.
Here we demonstrate how current human factors knowledge and user-centered design
principles can help security designers produce security solutions that are effective in practice
Privacy Vulnerabilities in the Practices of Repairing Broken Digital Artifacts in Bangladesh
This paper presents a study on the privacy concerns associated with the practice of repairing broken digital objects in Bangladesh. Historically, repair of old or broken technologies has received less attention in ICTD scholarship than design, development, or use. As a result, the potential privacy risks associated with repair practices have remained mostly unaddressed. This paper describes our three-month long ethnographic study that took place at ten major repair sites in Dhaka, Bangladesh. We show a variety of ways in which the privacy of an individual’s personal data may be compromised during the repair process. We also examine people’s perceptions around privacy in repair, and its connections with their broader social and cultural values. Finally, we discuss the challenges and opportunities for future research to strengthen the repair ecosystem in developing countries. Taken together, our findings contribute to the growing discourse around post-use cycles of technology
Finding and Resolving Security Misusability with Misusability Cases
Although widely used for both security and usability concerns, scenarios used in security design may not necessarily inform the design of usability, and vice- versa. One way of using scenarios to bridge security and usability involves explicitly describing how design deci- sions can lead to users inadvertently exploiting vulnera- bilities to carry out their production tasks. This paper describes how misusability cases, scenarios that describe how design decisions may lead to usability problems sub- sequently leading to system misuse, address this problem. We describe the related work upon which misusability cases are based before presenting the approach, and illus- trating its application using a case study example. Finally, we describe some findings from this approach that further inform the design of usable and secure systems
User-Centric IT Security - How to Design Usable Security Mechanisms
Nowadays, advanced security mechanisms exist to protect data, systems, and
networks. Most of these mechanisms are effective, and security experts can
handle them to achieve a sufficient level of security for any given system.
However, most of these systems have not been designed with focus on good
usability for the average end user. Today, the average end user often struggles
with understanding and using security mechanisms. Other security mechanisms are
simply annoying for end users. As the overall security of any system is only as
strong as the weakest link in this system, bad usability of IT security
mechanisms may result in operating errors, resulting in insecure systems.
Buying decisions of end users may be affected by the usability of security
mechanisms. Hence software providers may decide to better have no security
mechanism then one with a bad usability. Usability of IT security mechanisms is
one of the most underestimated properties of applications and systems. Even IT
security itself is often only an afterthought. Hence, usability of security
mechanisms is often the afterthought of an afterthought. Software developers
are missing guidelines on how to build security mechanisms with good usability
for end users. This paper presents some guidelines that should help software
developers to improve end user usability of security-related mechanisms, and
analyzes common applications based on these guidelines.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1506.0698
Understanding the Experience-Centeredness of Privacy and Security Technologies
The joint study of computer security, privacy and human-computer interaction (HCI) over the last two decades has shaped a research agenda focused upon usable privacy & security. However, in HCI research more generally there has long been an awareness of the need to understand and design for user experience, in recognition of the complex and multi-faceted role that technology now plays in our lives. In this paper we add to the growing discussion by introducing the notion of experience-centered privacy and security. We argue that in order to engage users of technology around issues related to experiences of privacy and security, research methods are required that may be outside of the normal repertoire of methods that we typically call upon. We describe three projects that developed non-typical research methods to reveal experiential insights into user interactions with privacy and security-related technologies. We conclude by proposing a research agenda that begins to illustrate how the discourse and methods of experience-centered design might serve to provide valuable alternative perspectives on new and enduring user-facing privacy and security problems
- …