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DESKTOP SECURITY AS A THREE-DIMENSIONAL PROBLEM

George R S Weir* & Nikolaos Zonidis

Department of Computer and Information Sciences
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow G1 1XH
UK

ABSTRACT

In this paper we argue against viewing computer desktop security solely as a technical issue. Instead, we propose a perspective that combines three related dimensions: technical infrastructure, usability and user engagement. In this light, we suggest that a viable approach to desktop security should embrace these three key dimensions of the end-user context. An example desktop application is described that has been engineered to embody these dimensions in support of the desktop user.

KEYWORDS:

Desktop security, security applications, usability, user engagement.

*Corresponding author. Tel/Fax: (+44) 141 548 3915 E-mail: george.weir@cis.strath.ac.uk

1. INTRODUCTION

Despite the reasonable view that end-users play a vital role in establishing and maintaining desktop security, the major focus of most security texts falls upon technical aspects such as perimeter defences, firewalls, intrusion detection, system vulnerabilities, and security exploits. Along the way, we commonly meet issues such as malware, public key encryption, privacy enhanced email, secure sockets layer and virtual private networks. For instance, such topics form the bulk of Bishop's 'Computer Security: Art and Science' [1], which runs to over one thousand pages. Notably, Pfleeger's 'Security in Computing' [2], moves straight from an introductory chapter entitled 'Is there a security problem in computing?' to a second chapter entitled 'Basic Encryption and Decryption'. Encryption engages a further two chapters in Pfleeger's text before we meet malware, operating system issues, database security and security in a distributed environment.

This focus on technical aspects is evident across many publications, whether their purpose is reference, education or practice and we can readily understand this focus. Security is analogous to health. Many ailments can be cured by use of appropriate remedies but there is considerable benefit in adopting preventative measures. The common emphasis on perimeter security reasonably identifies the organisation's boundary as a locus of attack and seeks to defend against potential hazards by installing strong defences. Since network-based attacks are technical in nature, the defensive measures are accordingly software and hardware based; hence, the perceived importance of firewalls, intrusion detection and content filtering.

Even where the locus of security concern moves from network perimeter to computer desktop, we generally find an emphasis upon system configuration and software applications. The following advice on security improvement is given by the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT): 'Securing desktop workstations should be a significant part of your network and information-security strategy because of the sensitive information often stored on workstations and their connection to the rest of the networked world. Many security problems

can be avoided if the workstations and network are appropriately configured. Default hardware and software configurations, however, are set by vendors who tend to emphasize features and functions more than security. Since vendors are not aware of your security needs, you must configure new workstations to reflect your security requirements and reconfigure them as your requirements change' [3].

The application of such advice is evident, for example, in the 'four basic steps' to desktop security promoted by University College Dublin: (1). Create a strong password for all accounts on your computer; (2). Ensure the anti-virus software is loaded onto your machine; (3). Accept the Auto Updates from Microsoft or your software supplier; (4). Visit the UCD Desktop Security page regularly [4]. Note how these 'basic steps' focus on system configuration and software updates.

Such narrow focus is itself risky. The degree of success for any technical solution is affected by its installation and subsequent management. These are subject to the reliability and understanding of security administrators or end-users. Furthermore, many organisations learn to their cost that local users are a greater source of security issues than external threats. While clearly critical as determinants of security success, the compliance and performance of local users (including administrators) is not a technical consideration. Nor does control of factors lend itself to technical solution.

A final example emphasises the vulnerability of technical measures to user perturbation. Individual users may deploy personal firewalls as a desktop protection against intrusion and other exploits. In the absence of full comprehension, users are often innocently guilty of subverting such security measures. Figure 1 illustrates that a user's desktop firewall facility has been disabled. The firewall was intentionally switched off by the user in order to print a document to a local network printer. By default the required network print communication was blocked by the personal firewall. After printing, the user re-enabled the firewall. Temporary firewall switch off was the user's remedy to the printing obstacle.



Figure 1 Firewall turned off to facilitate local network printing

Most organisations recognise the importance of user participation in security matters and this is often reflected in the establishment of company security policies and conditions of use. Such non-technical measures aim to engage the social and personal involvement of the local user community as a component in network and computer security.

An over-reliance on technical solutions may lead to a false confidence in local security measures, especially if individual users presume that all aspects of security are solely addressed at the network level by security administrators. In contrast, we propose that a balanced approach to desktop security requires not only software and hardware solutions, but needs equal attention to user engagement. Finally, any end-user facilities must be easily accommodated by the users themselves. In consequence, this broader perspective embraces security from three aspects: (i) technical infrastructure, (ii) usability; and (iii) user engagement. We refer to this combination as three-dimensional desktop security.

2. SECURITY DIMENSIONS

The idea of a multi-dimensional, multi-faceted or multi-layered approach to security is not new. Several authors rail against overly narrow views of security requirements, e.g. ‘a one-dimensional security approach is no longer adequate; today, a multidimensional approach is mandatory to control and monitor the ever more-sophisticated network threats’ [5, p. 16] and ‘traditional piecemeal, single layer, single-dimensional security approaches are no longer

adequate. These approaches can create a false sense of security and create problems as they attempt to address' [6, p. 35].

This apparent agreement conceals differences on the nature of the important security dimensions, facets or layers. For instance, Avolio (op. cit.) contrasts 'single-layer, single-dimensional security' with multi-layer, single dimensional security'. In his terms, a security layer, such as a firewall, affords a protective measure against security threats. Multiple layers can be established by embedding further protective measures 'behind' the initial layer. For example, an internal sub-network may be separated by an additional internal firewall from the parent network which is in turn protected by a firewall from the external world. Relative to the external world, the sub-network has a multi-layered defences (two firewalls) while the parent network has a single layer defence (one firewall). In Avolio's view, multi-dimensional security requires 'steps in security management, types of security and platforms for deployment' (op. cit., p.18). In turn, these are expanded as follows:

Security management: planning, policy and procedures.

Types of security: prevention, detection and response.

Platform for deployment: perimeter, server, and desktop.

Given this elaboration of Avolio's security dimensions we find that for the most part they are simply aspects of what we term 'technical infrastructure' (taken to include software components). The exception to this is his initial security management dimension, which embraces planning, policy and procedures. In terms of desktop security, this facet falls under our third dimension, user engagement.

The need for user engagement is apparent when one realises that local users have enormous impact on local security issues. Usually, such users have greater privileges than external network users and are often the source of security compromises or deliberate security breaches. For example, careful password management depends largely upon user commitment toward local security concerns. In turn, this is determined by the degree to which users understand and approve of security risks and local policies. The extent to which desktop users

'buy in' to organisational security concerns is a crucial determinant of successful security measures. This is the dimension we term 'user engagement' and reflects the importance of user comprehension with respect to the risks and implications of their own behaviour.

To a large degree, this depends upon user education, awareness and sensitivity to their role in the institutional security context. This dimension is especially critical at a time when many network exploits rely upon 'social engineering' as a means of compromising computer and network resources (e.g., phishing, Trojans, and worms).

Our third dimension (usability) is closely allied to user engagement. Given that users of desktop computers have (at least) part responsibility for their own security, software applications specifically assigned to this purpose must be accessible to the average user. This is the requirement described by Zurko & Simon as 'applying usability to secure systems' [7, p.28]. If computer users are faced with desktop security applications that prove obscure and difficult to understand, this becomes an obstacle to optimal use and reduces the prospect of user engagement.

3. SELECTING DESKTOP SECURITY COMPONENTS

To illustrate our view that desktop security should be treated as a three-dimensional issue, we offer an example to explicitly address all three dimensions of technical aspects, usability and user comprehension. This takes the form of a desktop application that serves as a user interface to several existing security software programs. Through selection and analysis of existing desktop security programs, we developed a graphical user interface which acts as a control panel and integrates a set of commercial and shareware components. This approach enabled us to address technical issues in desktop security, by providing the functionality of the existing applications, usability issues, by re-engineering a composite user-interface, and the user engagement issue, by affording clearer guidance and information on the purpose, application and relevance of the security applications.

The selected software applications were (1) The cleaner; (2) Who's there?; (3) Retrospect Backup; (4) GFI LAN Guard; and (5) X-setup. These particular components were selected as a basis for desktop protection from malware (especially, viruses, worms and

Trojans), following a series of experiments on a range of potential security applications with viruses and simulated malware activity.

1. The Cleaner

The Cleaner is a Trojan detector (available from <http://www.moosoft.com/products/cleaner/>) that incorporates two utilities 'TC Monitor' and 'TC Active!'. 'TC Monitor' is designed to guard Window's system registry and key system files against malware. (A common ploy of malware software is to make changes to system registry so as to start automatically when the computer is turned on). TC Monitor allows for manual inspection and configuration of registry entries and system folders as a means of providing the user with better means to protect data and files. If the computer has many shared folders TC Monitor can be set to guard these folders too. In the event of any change affecting the files, folders or registry keys under surveillance, the program will generate an alarm to warn the user.

The second component of 'The Cleaner' is 'TC Active!' which performs a similar role to Windows' task manager but with increased functionality. This program reveals information on processes running on a system. Such information, including loaded dynamic linked libraries (DLLs) for each process, may not be useful for the inexperienced user but the 'healthy' state of the system can be outlined and may serve as a comparison against future states.

2. 'Who's there?'

'Who's there?' is a freeware utility (available at <http://www.it-mate.co.uk/>) that monitors ports on the user's computer - checking for ports that are passively listening for incoming connections. This small component is very effective for revealing the behaviour of 'unknown code' (potential malware), since worms and Trojans usually open a port to communicate with the originator machine or to self-propagate across a network. Such 'backdoor' port operation is usually conducted without the knowledge of the user but is revealed by 'Who's there?'. This utility is illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2 Who's there

3. Retrospect Backup

Retrospect backup is a commercial backup and restore facility (available from <http://www.dantz.com>). This program allows for system roll back in the event of changes or damage caused by infected files and enables the user to restore their computer to the most recent 'healthy' state.

4. GFI LAN Guard

LAN Guard is a further commercial component that scans for possible threats, based on known vulnerabilities (see <http://www.gfi.com/lannetscan/>). Remedial actions to cover any security holes are also provided by LAN Guard. These include open ports, missing security patches, open shares, key registry entries and services/applications active on the computer. If used by malicious software. "Trojan Ports" scanning performs the same kind of scan only for ports that are known targets of Trojan malware.

5. X-setup

This small freeware program provides users the opportunity to make better use of system resources and change default settings in order to make their system more effective. This component is especially useful when the system registry file is locked by the action of a malware program. In this case, via the X-setup wizard, the user can reset the key that prevents access to the registry editor.

4. A DESKTOP SECURITY SANDBOX

In developing our three-dimensional desktop security application we aimed to unify all the components under one control panel which would also afford extra user functionality. Since our concern lay with protection against malware, we conceived our application as a 'Sandbox' facility that would afford testing of potentially suspect code (malware) in a recoverable setting.

The individual software components described above each have a contribution to make toward malware protection, detection or recovery. The Sandbox application builds upon these features to afford our three dimensions of desktop security. Through the single interface of the Sandbox application, the user can start individual components as required for specific tasks. Since the differing software components address different conditions, each can be separately co-ordinated via the Sandbox interface. Thereby, Retrospect back-up need not be open at the same time as 'TC Monitor' or 'Who's There?'

For appropriate operation, the users must have an adequate understanding of the services offered by each component application. The Sandbox interface aims to assist in this by structuring its information to reflect the interplay of these components. The Sandbox control panel does not make direct calls to any of the module's APIs but only to the Windows

API in order to indirectly start the applications. Each software module retains its own controls. The Sandbox assists the user by maintaining a record of when each application was last deployed.

The grouping of control buttons on the Sandbox interface assist users in understanding the purpose and relationship of each component. ‘The Cleaner’ components form one group followed by ‘Who’s There?’, the back-up and LAN Guard elements. Since the Sandbox aims both to protect and enlighten the user on malware issues we provide a set of port control buttons, to permit easy simulation of worm activity, while a fourth group of buttons affords access to our malware simulations. Figure 3 illustrates the Sandbox control panel.




Figure 3: The Sandbox Control panel

The button that invokes X-setup is separate to reflect that its operational role is distinct from the other components. This feature is invoked only in the event that malware prevents the user from running the registry editor.

The homogeneous user interface afforded by the Sandbox application aids users in component selection and also shows a timestamp for the last run of each component. In the Sandbox tracking of component operation, a critical period has been set at thirty days. If thirty days have elapsed since a component was invoked, a warning message appears next to the corresponding button (displaying the word ‘CAUTION!!’). To add functionality and usability (to encourage correct usage of the software components), the button groups are positioned to reflect which programs are called first, second and so on.

The Sandbox control panel and its utilities integrate and enhance the stand-alone functionality of the individual components. A package containing the separate applications,

without an appropriate controlling module would place considerably greater burden on the user. The utility and convenience of the individual applications is boosted and their role becomes clearer as stand alone modules as well as parts of an integrated security solution.

4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, our emphasis lies with desktop security. We elaborate the requirements for such security and describe a sample desktop application that seeks to embody our critical three-dimensions. Network or organisational security are larger issues and plausibly merit further dimensions to achieve adequate measures. Our concentration on the desktop limits security considerations to aspects within the remit and control of the end-user. Thereby, usability and user engagement match the importance of technical infrastructure as a basis for desktop security. This leads us to view desktop security as a three-dimensional issue encapsulating technical infrastructure, usability and user engagement. Our Sandbox application exhibits these three dimensions by affording a set of technical components, enhanced usability and greater user engagement.

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