Updating beliefs with incomplete observations

Currently, there is renewed interest in the problem, raised by Shafer in 1985, of updating probabilities when observations are incomplete. This is a fundamental problem in general, and of particular interest for Bayesian networks. Recently, Grunwald and Halpern have shown that commonly used updating strategies fail in this case, except under very special assumptions. In this paper we propose a new method for updating probabilities with incomplete observations. Our approach is deliberately conservative: we make no assumptions about the so-called incompleteness mechanism that associates complete with incomplete observations. We model our ignorance about this mechanism by a vacuous lower prevision, a tool from the theory of imprecise probabilities, and we use only coherence arguments to turn prior into posterior probabilities. In general, this new approach to updating produces lower and upper posterior probabilities and expectations, as well as partially determinate decisions. This is a logical consequence of the existing ignorance about the incompleteness mechanism. We apply the new approach to the problem of classification of new evidence in probabilistic expert systems, where it leads to a new, so-called conservative updating rule. In the special case of Bayesian networks constructed using expert knowledge, we provide an exact algorithm for classification based on our updating rule, which has linear-time complexity for a class of networks wider than polytrees. This result is then extended to the more general framework of credal networks, where computations are often much harder than with Bayesian nets. Using an example, we show that our rule appears to provide a solid basis for reliable updating with incomplete observations, when no strong assumptions about the incompleteness mechanism are justified.Comment: Replaced with extended versio

Sequential Search with Incompletely Informed Consumers: Theory and Evidence from Retail Gasoline Markets

A large variety of markets, such as retail markets for gasoline or mortgage markets, are characterized by a small number of firms offering a fairly homogenous product at virtually the same cost, while consumers, being uninformed about this cost, sequentially search for low prices. The present paper provides a theoretical examination of this type of market, and confronts the theory with data on retail gasoline prices. We develop a sequential search model with incomplete information and characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which consumers follow simple reservation price strategies. Firms strategically exploit consumers being uninformed about their production cost, and set on average higher prices compared to the standard complete information model. Thus, consumer welfare is lower. Using data on the gasoline retail market in Vienna (Austria), we further argue that incomplete information is a necessary feature to explain observed gasoline prices within a sequential search framework.

Reliable Uncertain Evidence Modeling in Bayesian Networks by Credal Networks

A reliable modeling of uncertain evidence in Bayesian networks based on a set-valued quantification is proposed. Both soft and virtual evidences are considered. We show that evidence propagation in this setup can be reduced to standard updating in an augmented credal network, equivalent to a set of consistent Bayesian networks. A characterization of the computational complexity for this task is derived together with an efficient exact procedure for a subclass of instances. In the case of multiple uncertain evidences over the same variable, the proposed procedure can provide a set-valued version of the geometric approach to opinion pooling.Comment: 19 page

Learning to Play Bayesian Games

This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian games. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about the distribution of Nature's move as well as learning about the opponents' strategies. A second goal is to argue that quite restrictive assumptions are necessary to justify the concept of Nash equilibrium without a common prior as a steady state of a learning process.