E. Kalai

E. Lehrer

English

Research Papers in Economics

A Theory of Learning, Experimentation and Equilibrium in Games,&quot;

A Two-Armed Bandit Theory of Market Pricing,&quot;

Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Normal Form Games,&quot;

Adaptive Learning in Two Person Games,&quot;

An Iterative Method of Solving a Game,&quot;

Average Behavior in Learning Models,&quot;

Axiomatic Characterizations of Rational Choice in Strategic Environments,&quot;

Bargaining Market Behavior in

Bayesian Learning and Nash Equilibrium,&quot;

Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games,&quot;

Behavior and Efficiency in the Sealed-bid Mechanism,&quot;

Bounded Learning Leads to Correlated Equilibrium,&quot;

Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games,&quot;

Controlling a Stochastic Process with Unknown Parameters,&quot;

Economic Dynamics With Learning: Some Instability Examples,&quot;

Equilibrium Points in n-person Games,&quot;

Experimental Economics: Behavioral Lessons for Theory and Microeconomic Policy,&quot; Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lecture,

Extensive Games and the Problem of Information,&quot;

Games of Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players, Part I,&quot;

Informationally Decentralized Learning Algorithms for Finite-Player, Finite-Action Games of Incomplete Information,&quot;

Introduction to the Stability of Rational Expectations Equilibrium,&quot;

Lakates and Experimental Economics,&quot; in Appraising Economic Theories,

Learning and Convergence to Equilibrium in Repeated Strategic Interactions: An Introductory Survey,&quot; Ricerche Economiche,

Learning and Mixed Strategy Equilibria in Evolutionary Games,&quot;

Learning in Mis-Specified Models and the Possibility of Cycles,&quot;

Learning Rational Expectations: The Finite State Case,&quot;

Learning to Believe in Sunspots,&quot;

Merging Economic Forecasts,&quot;

Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information,&quot;

Mixed and Behaviour Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games,&quot;

Nonzero-sum Two-person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information,&quot;

On Mistaken Beliefs and Resultant Equilibria,&quot; in Individual Forecasting and Aggregate Outcomes,

On the Convergence of the Learning Process in a 2 x 2 Non-Zero-Sum Game,&quot;

Pre-Stable Strategies in Discounted Duopoly Games,&quot;

Rational Expectations and Rational Learning,&quot;

Rational Learning and Rational Expectations,&quot;

Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection,&quot;

Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points ir Extensive Games,&quot;

Repeated Games,&quot;

Self Confirming Equilibrium,&quot;

Some Topics in Two-Person Games,&quot;

Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium,&quot;

Stochastic Common Learning,&quot;

Stochastic Games,&quot;

Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games,&quot;

Survey of Repeated Games,&quot;

The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing,&quot;

The Exponential Convergence of Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games,&quot;

Weak and Strong Merging of Opinion,&quot;

Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium

http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4529.pdf

Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium

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Research Papers in Economics