A security analysis of email communications

The objective of this report is to analyse the security and privacy risks of email communications and identify technical countermeasures capable of mitigating them effectively. In order to do so, the report analyses from a technical point of view the core set of communication protocols and standards that support email communications in order to identify and understand the existing security and privacy vulnerabilities. On the basis of this analysis, the report identifies and analyses technical countermeasures, in the form of newer standards, protocols and tools, aimed at ensuring a better protection of the security and privacy of email communications. The practical implementation of each countermeasure is evaluated in order to understand its limitations and identify potential technical and organisational constrains that could limit its effectiveness in practice. The outcome of the above mentioned analysis is a set of recommendations regarding technical and organisational measures that when combined properly have the potential of more effectively mitigating the privacy and security risks of today's email communications.JRC.G.6-Digital Citizen Securit

Protection of Information and Communications in Distributed Systems and Microservices

Distributed systems have been a topic of discussion since the 1980s, but the adoption of microservices has raised number of system components considerably. With more decentralised distributed systems, new ways to handle authentication, authorisation and accounting (AAA) are needed, as well as ways to allow components to communicate between themselves securely. New standards and technologies have been created to deal with these new requirements and many of them have already found their way to most used systems and services globally. After covering AAA and separate access control models, we continue with ways to secure communications between two connecting parties, using Transport Layer Security (TLS) and other more specialised methods such as the Google-originated Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone (SPIFFE). We also discuss X.509 certificates for ensuring identities. Next, both older time- tested and newer distributed AAA technologies are presented. After this, we are looking into communication between distributed components with both synchronous and asynchronous communication mechanisms, as well as into the publish/subscribe communication model popular with the rise of the streaming platform. This thesis also explores possibilities in securing communications between distributed endpoints and ways to handle AAA in a distributed context. This is showcased in a new software component that handles authentication through a separate identity endpoint using the OpenID Connect authentication protocol and stores identity in a Javascript object-notation formatted and cryptographically signed JSON Web Token, allowing stateless session handling as the token can be validated by checking its signature. This enables fast and scalable session management and identity handling for any distributed system

Comparison of different ways to avoid internet traffic interception

Projecte fet en col.laboració amb la Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Department of Telematic EngineeringEnglish: The main objective of this thesis is to analyze and compare different ways to avoid the Internet traffic eavesdropping (carried out both by governments or malicious particulars). The analysis consists on a description of the different protocols and technologies involved in each option as well as the difficulties to implement them and the technical knowledge of the users in order to take profit of them

Understanding Flaws in the Deployment and Implementation of Web Encryption

In recent years, the web has switched from using the unencrypted HTTP protocol to using encrypted communications. Primarily, this resulted in increasing deployment of TLS to mitigate information leakage over the network. This development has led many web service operators to mistakenly think that migrating from HTTP to HTTPS will magically protect them from information leakage without any additional effort on their end to guar- antee the desired security properties. In reality, despite the fact that there exists enough infrastructure in place and the protocols have been “tested” (by virtue of being in wide, but not ubiquitous, use for many years), deploying HTTPS is a highly challenging task due to the technical complexity of its underlying protocols (i.e., HTTP, TLS) as well as the complexity of the TLS certificate ecosystem and this of popular client applications such as web browsers. For example, we found that many websites still avoid ubiquitous encryption and force only critical functionality and sensitive data access over encrypted connections while allowing more innocuous functionality to be accessed over HTTP. In practice, this approach is prone to flaws that can expose sensitive information or functionality to third parties. Thus, it is crucial for developers to verify the correctness of their deployments and implementations. In this dissertation, in an effort to improve users’ privacy, we highlight semantic flaws in the implementations of both web servers and clients, caused by the improper deployment of web encryption protocols. First, we conduct an in-depth assessment of major websites and explore what functionality and information is exposed to attackers that have hijacked a user’s HTTP cookies. We identify a recurring pattern across websites with partially de- ployed HTTPS, namely, that service personalization inadvertently results in the exposure of private information. The separation of functionality across multiple cookies with different scopes and inter-dependencies further complicates matters, as imprecise access control renders restricted account functionality accessible to non-secure cookies. Our cookie hijacking study reveals a number of severe flaws; for example, attackers can obtain the user’s saved address and visited websites from e.g., Google, Bing, and Yahoo allow attackers to extract the contact list and send emails from the user’s account. To estimate the extent of the threat, we run measurements on a university public wireless network for a period of 30 days and detect over 282K accounts exposing the cookies required for our hijacking attacks. Next, we explore and study security mechanisms purposed to eliminate this problem by enforcing encryption such as HSTS and HTTPS Everywhere. We evaluate each mechanism in terms of its adoption and effectiveness. We find that all mechanisms suffer from implementation flaws or deployment issues and argue that, as long as servers continue to not support ubiquitous encryption across their entire domain, no mechanism can effectively protect users from cookie hijacking and information leakage. Finally, as the security guarantees of TLS (in turn HTTPS), are critically dependent on the correct validation of X.509 server certificates, we study hostname verification, a critical component in the certificate validation process. We develop HVLearn, a novel testing framework to verify the correctness of hostname verification implementations and use HVLearn to analyze a number of popular TLS libraries and applications. To this end, we found 8 unique violations of the RFC specifications. Several of these violations are critical and can render the affected implementations vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks

Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Mesh Networks: A Survey

This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols, user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed, use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed before the chapter is finally concluded.Comment: 62 pages, 12 figures, 6 tables. This chapter is an extension of the author's previous submission in arXiv submission: arXiv:1102.1226. There are some text overlaps with the previous submissio

{SoK}: {An} Analysis of Protocol Design: Avoiding Traps for Implementation and Deployment

Today's Internet utilizes a multitude of different protocols. While some of these protocols were first implemented and used and later documented, other were first specified and then implemented. Regardless of how protocols came to be, their definitions can contain traps that lead to insecure implementations or deployments. A classical example is insufficiently strict authentication requirements in a protocol specification. The resulting Misconfigurations, i.e., not enabling strong authentication, are common root causes for Internet security incidents. Indeed, Internet protocols have been commonly designed without security in mind which leads to a multitude of misconfiguration traps. While this is slowly changing, to strict security considerations can have a similarly bad effect. Due to complex implementations and insufficient documentation, security features may remain unused, leaving deployments vulnerable. In this paper we provide a systematization of the security traps found in common Internet protocols. By separating protocols in four classes we identify major factors that lead to common security traps. These insights together with observations about end-user centric usability and security by default are then used to derive recommendations for improving existing and designing new protocols---without such security sensitive traps for operators, implementors and users

My Email Communications Security Assessment (MECSA): 2018 Results

This JRC technical report presents the results obtained by the My Email Communications Security Assessment (MECSA) tool. MECSA is an online1 tool developed by the Joint Research Centre to assess the security of email communications between email providers. Email communications continue to be one of the most widespread forms of digital communications with thousands of millions of emails exchanged on a daily basis. It is estimated that 72% of the European population use email either in mobile phones, tablets or computers. It is the means of digital communication used by most Europeans on a daily basis (Special Eurobarometer 462, 2017. Published July 2018.) MECSA is the outcome of our research on the security of email communications. It servers a triple purpose. Firstly, it allows us to monitor the adoption of modern email security standards in the current ecosystem of email providers, assessing their capability to protect the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the email exchange amongst them. Secondly, MECSA aims to become a one-stop shop for email users to receive an indication of the capability of their email providers to protect their email exchange in the communication with other providers of the ecosystem. Finally, MECSA aims to become a reference tool for professionals and a mean to promote the adoption of modern email security standards in Europe.JRC.E.3-Cyber and Digital Citizens' Securit

{SoK}: {An} Analysis of Protocol Design: Avoiding Traps for Implementation and Deployment

Today's Internet utilizes a multitude of different protocols. While some of these protocols were first implemented and used and later documented, other were first specified and then implemented. Regardless of how protocols came to be, their definitions can contain traps that lead to insecure implementations or deployments. A classical example is insufficiently strict authentication requirements in a protocol specification. The resulting Misconfigurations, i.e., not enabling strong authentication, are common root causes for Internet security incidents. Indeed, Internet protocols have been commonly designed without security in mind which leads to a multitude of misconfiguration traps. While this is slowly changing, to strict security considerations can have a similarly bad effect. Due to complex implementations and insufficient documentation, security features may remain unused, leaving deployments vulnerable. In this paper we provide a systematization of the security traps found in common Internet protocols. By separating protocols in four classes we identify major factors that lead to common security traps. These insights together with observations about end-user centric usability and security by default are then used to derive recommendations for improving existing and designing new protocols---without such security sensitive traps for operators, implementors and users

A method for securing online community service: A study of selected Western Australian councils

Since the Internet was made publicly accessible, it has become increasingly popular and its deployment has been broad and global thereby facilitating a range of available online services such as Electronic Mail (email), news or bulletins, Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and World Wide Web (WWW). Progressively, other online services such as telephony, video conference, video on demand, Interactive Television (ITV) and Geographic Information System (GIS) have been integrated with the Internet and become publicly available. Presently, Internet broadband communication services incorporating both wired and wireless network technologies has seen the emergence of the concept of a digital community which has been growing and expanding rapidly around the world. Internet and the ever expanding online services to the wider digital community has raised the issue of security of these services during usage. Most local councils throughout Western Australia have resorted to delivering online services such as library, online payments and email accessibility. The provision and usage of these services have inherent security risks. Consequently, this study investigated the concept of a secure digital community in the secure provision and usage of these online services in selected local councils in Western Australia (WA). After an extensive review of existing literature, information security frameworks were derived from the adaptation of various resources, such as the OSSTMM 2.2 Section C: Internet Technology Security benchmark which was used as the main template. In addition, this template was enhanced into a framework model by incorporating other benchmarks such as NIST, CIS, ISSAF as well as other sources of information. These included information security related books, related ICT network and security websites such as CERT, CheckPoint, Cisco, GFI, Juniper, MS, NESSUS and NMAP together with journals and personal interviews. The proposed information security frameworks were developed to enhance the level of security strength of the email and online web systems as well as to increase the level of confidence in the system security within the selected local councils in WA. All the investigative studies were based upon the available selected local councils’ data and the associated analyses of the results as obtained from the testing software. In addition, the interpretive multiple-case study principles were used during the investigation to achieve or fulfil the purpose of this study. The findings from this study were then abstracted for use in a framework and made available for use as a model for possible adaptation and implementation to other similarly structured councils or organisations. As a result, the study confirmed that the proposed information security frameworks have the capability and potential to improve the level of security strength. In addition, the level of satisfaction and confidence of council staff of the selected local councils in WA in the system security would also be increased due to the application of these frameworks. Although these information security frameworks may be recommended as practical and supporting tools for local councils, the findings from this study were specific only to the selected local councils used in this study. Further research using other councils, may be necessary in order for the information security frameworks to be adopted within a wider range of councils or organisations in WA or elsewhere