CGHub: Kick-starting the Worldwide Genome Web

The University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC) is under contract with the National Cancer Institute (NCI) to construct and operate the Cancer Genomics Hub (CGHub), a nation-scale library and user portal for cancer genomics data.  This contract covers growth of the library to 5 Petabytes. The NCI programs that feed into the library currently produce about 20 terabytes of data each month. We discuss the receiver-driven file transfer mechanism Annai GeneTorrent (GT) for use with the library. Annai GT uses multiple TCP streams from multiple computers at the library site to parallelize genome downloads.  We review our performance experience with the new transfer mechanism and also explain additions to the transfer protocol to support the security required in handling patient cancer genomics data

Improving BitTorrent's Peer Selection For Multimedia Content On-Demand Delivery

The great efficiency achieved by the BitTorrent protocol for the distribution of large amounts of data inspired its adoption to provide multimedia content on-demand delivery over the Internet. As it is not designed for this purpose, some adjustments have been proposed in order to meet the related QoS requirements like low startup delay and smooth playback continuity. Accordingly, this paper introduces a BitTorrent-like proposal named as Quota-Based Peer Selection (QBPS). This proposal is mainly based on the adaptation of the original peer-selection policy of the BitTorrent protocol. Its validation is achieved by means of simulations and competitive analysis. The final results show that QBPS outperforms other recent proposals of the literature. For instance, it achieves a throughput optimization of up to 48.0% in low-provision capacity scenarios where users are very interactive.Comment: International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications(IJCNC) Vol.7, No.6, November 201

Spying the World from your Laptop -- Identifying and Profiling Content Providers and Big Downloaders in BitTorrent

This paper presents a set of exploits an adversary can use to continuously spy on most BitTorrent users of the Internet from a single machine and for a long period of time. Using these exploits for a period of 103 days, we collected 148 million IPs downloading 2 billion copies of contents. We identify the IP address of the content providers for 70% of the BitTorrent contents we spied on. We show that a few content providers inject most contents into BitTorrent and that those content providers are located in foreign data centers. We also show that an adversary can compromise the privacy of any peer in BitTorrent and identify the big downloaders that we define as the peers who subscribe to a large number of contents. This infringement on users' privacy poses a significant impediment to the legal adoption of BitTorrent

Compromising Tor Anonymity Exploiting P2P Information Leakage

Privacy of users in P2P networks goes far beyond their current usage and is a fundamental requirement to the adoption of P2P protocols for legal usage. In a climate of cold war between these users and anti-piracy groups, more and more users are moving to anonymizing networks in an attempt to hide their identity. However, when not designed to protect users information, a P2P protocol would leak information that may compromise the identity of its users. In this paper, we first present three attacks targeting BitTorrent users on top of Tor that reveal their real IP addresses. In a second step, we analyze the Tor usage by BitTorrent users and compare it to its usage outside of Tor. Finally, we depict the risks induced by this de-anonymization and show that users' privacy violation goes beyond BitTorrent traffic and contaminates other protocols such as HTTP

Rethinking Online Privacy in Canada: Commentary on Voltage Pictures v. John and Jane Doe

This article examines the Voltage decision, with the view that the bona fide standard safeguards intellectual property rights at the cost of online privacy rights and will proceed in three parts. Part I provides a brief contextualization of the issues. Part II is an analysis of the Voltage decision. Part III examines how the bona fide standard is a relatively low threshold. This article concludes by considering the possibility of shifting to a higher standard for disclosure, as well as a possible solution for the effect that a higher standard could have on copyright owners

Is Content Publishing in BitTorrent Altruistic or Profit-Driven

BitTorrent is the most popular P2P content delivery application where individual users share various type of content with tens of thousands of other users. The growing popularity of BitTorrent is primarily due to the availability of valuable content without any cost for the consumers. However, apart from required resources, publishing (sharing) valuable (and often copyrighted) content has serious legal implications for user who publish the material (or publishers). This raises a question that whether (at least major) content publishers behave in an altruistic fashion or have other incentives such as financial. In this study, we identify the content publishers of more than 55k torrents in 2 major BitTorrent portals and examine their behavior. We demonstrate that a small fraction of publishers are responsible for 66% of published content and 75% of the downloads. Our investigations reveal that these major publishers respond to two different profiles. On one hand, antipiracy agencies and malicious publishers publish a large amount of fake files to protect copyrighted content and spread malware respectively. On the other hand, content publishing in BitTorrent is largely driven by companies with financial incentive. Therefore, if these companies lose their interest or are unable to publish content, BitTorrent traffic/portals may disappear or at least their associated traffic will significantly reduce

I Know Where You are and What You are Sharing: Exploiting P2P Communications to Invade Users' Privacy

In this paper, we show how to exploit real-time communication applications to determine the IP address of a targeted user. We focus our study on Skype, although other real-time communication applications may have similar privacy issues. We first design a scheme that calls an identified targeted user inconspicuously to find his IP address, which can be done even if he is behind a NAT. By calling the user periodically, we can then observe the mobility of the user. We show how to scale the scheme to observe the mobility patterns of tens of thousands of users. We also consider the linkability threat, in which the identified user is linked to his Internet usage. We illustrate this threat by combining Skype and BitTorrent to show that it is possible to determine the file-sharing usage of identified users. We devise a scheme based on the identification field of the IP datagrams to verify with high accuracy whether the identified user is participating in specific torrents. We conclude that any Internet user can leverage Skype, and potentially other real-time communication systems, to observe the mobility and file-sharing usage of tens of millions of identified users.Comment: This is the authors' version of the ACM/USENIX Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) 2011 pape