Indirect Object Constructions in Hausa.

This is a study of the semantics and morpho-syntax of indirect object constructions in Hausa. Hausa is a Chadic language belonging to the Afroasiatic phylum. The phenomena are investigated from both descriptive and theoretical perspectives. The theory within which this investigation is developed is the Government and Binding framework (Chomsky 1981) and subsequent works. The study looks at the two different indirect object constructions in Hausa, 'Internal' and 'External' indirect object constructions. The properties of indirect object constructions and that of the indirect object markers are examined. It is shown that the indirect object markers used in the External indirect object constructions are independent prepositions capable of assigning Case and Theta-role to their NP complements, whereas the indirect object markers used in the Internal indirect object constructions are considered to be part of the verb. In this latter case the verb and the indirect object marker together are involved in determining the ultimate Theta-role of the indirect object NP. Internal indirect object constructions are most interesting and in which I focus my investigation. The properties of constructions are then considered with respect to two major approaches recently proposed within the theory, the Syntactic Incorporation approach of Baker (1985a, 1988a) and the Lexical Incorporation approach of Di Sciullo and Williams (1987). In this thesis it will be argued that the evidence from Hausa data favour the Lexical Incorporation approach. The behaviour of both the indirect object and direct object NPs with respect to Wh-movement, NP-movement and word order facts are discussed. It is shown that in Hausa Internal indirect object constructions, the indirect object NP is freely allowed to undergo Wh-movement. In contrast, the indirect object NP cannot undergo Wh- movement in English Internal indirect object constructions and Chichewa dative applicative constructions. However, the indirect object NP in Hausa cannot undergo NP- movement. I will argue that the syntactic behaviour of the direct object end indirect object NPs is assumed to be derived through the notion Head and Feature Percolation Convention as proposed in Di Sciullo and Williams (1987) and Lieber (1980) respectively. With regard to the kind of Case parameters that the indirect object constructions employ to satisfy the Case Filter requirement, I argue that, contrary to the standard view, the direct object NP in Hausa Internal indirect object constructions is not assigned am (inherent) accusative Case. Instead, using evidence from the pronominal systems of the language, I argue that the direct object NP receives a default nominative Case. The study also presents a general overview of the morpho-syntactic behaviour and semantic interpretation associated with certain Hausa verbs when they occur before indirect object constructions. Based on semantic and syntactic evidence, it will be argued that the pre-datival suffix /-r/ used by certain verb grades is not related to the causative morpheme /-r/, contrary to both Parsons (1971/72) and Frajzyngier (1985). Finally, the study compares the syntactic behaviour of NP complements in indirect object constructions with similar NP complements in Hausa morphological causative constructions. It will be argued that both the Internal Indirect object markers and the causative affix /-r/ are lexically incorporated to the verb. However, the two affixes differ with respect to the kind of argument they introduce

The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny

Professor Gerken uses Baker v. Carr as a case study for exploring whether and when a minimalist strategy is likely to succeed in voting cases. She makes two arguments. First, she suggests that Baker and its progeny reveal the costs of atheoretical decisionmaking. Without an intermediary theory for explaining what the vague norm of equality should mean in the context of malapportionment, the Court could describe equality only in the most abstract terms. It could not identify sensible limiting principles for the rule it was developing, nor could it defend its own measure of equality against alternative measures. The result was a doctrine plagued by inconsistency, incoherence, and the unthinking adherence to a rigid, mechanical test. The second argument offered in this Article concerns the causes of minimalism in the malapportionment cases. Professor Gerken argues that it is difficult for the Court to develop an appropriate intermediary theory in voting cases because of the unique nature of the claims that arise from the political process. For such claims, the structures by which votes are aggregated and the ways in which individuals align themselves are crucial for understanding most harms. Both elements are difficult to square with a conventional individual-rights approach and the familiar protections it affords against judicial excess and error. Taken together, these two arguments point up the irony of the Court\u27s minimalist strategy in applying one person, one vote. The Court\u27s failure to articulate a set of mediating principles seems to stem from the Court\u27s fear of abandoning the familiar protections against judicial mistake and excess that accompany a conventional individual-rights approach. It turns out, however, that an individual-rights approach without an adequate intermediary theory equally lends itself to judicial abus

Automating Diagrammatic Proofs of Arithmetic Arguments

Centre for Intelligent Systems and their ApplicationsThis thesis is on the automation of diagrammatic proofs, a novel approach to mechanised mathematical reasoning. Theorems in automated theorem proving are usually proved by formal logical proofs. However, there are some conjectures which humans can prove by the use of geometric operations on diagrams that somehow represent these conjectures, so called diagrammatic proofs. Insight is often more clearly perceived in these diagrammatic proofs than in the algebraic proofs. We are investigating and automating such diagrammatic reasoning about mathematical theorems.Concrete rather than general diagrams are used to prove ground instances of a universally quantified theorem. The diagrammatic proof in constructed by applying geometric operations to the diagram. These operations are in the inference steps of the proof. A general schematic proof is extracted from the ground instances of a proof. it is represented as a recursive program that consists of a general number of applications of geometric operations. When gien a particular diagram, a schematic proof generates a proof for that diagram. To verify that the schematic proof produces a correct proof of the conjecture for each ground instance we check its correctness in a theory of diagrams. We use the constructive omega-rule and schematic proofs to make a translation from concrete instances to a general argument about the diagrammatic proof.The realisation of our ideas is a diagrammatic reasoning system DIAMOND. DIAMOND allows a user to interactively construct instances of a diagrammatic proof. It then automatically abstracts these into a general schematic proof and checks the correctness of this proof using an inductive theorem prover

The layered internal structure and the external syntax of PP

This thesis examines the properties of spatial (i.e., locational and directional) Ps within the minimalist framework (Chomsky 1995,1998,1999), which has put an ultimate emphasis on economy in terms of derivation and representation. The principal goals of this thesis are (i) to investigate how the syntax of such nature derives PPs in accordance with the properties of Ps and (ii) to show how the internal PP structure interacts with the external syntax of PP. Chomsky's minimalist framework assumes two syntactic operations, i.e.. Merge and Move, and two different types of outcome of the operations, depending on the properties of lexical items involved in each operation executed. One outcome results from a merger of two items, of which one selects the other. The other results from a merger of two items, neither of which selects the other. I propose that there are three heads involved in deriving a layered PP structure: functional p, lexical P and locative N. This analysis is shown to be empirically supported from languages such as Dutch, English, Hungarian, Japanese and K'ekchi. I also claim that there are also intransitive Ps that adjoin to either or pP. The internal structure of PP interacts with its external syntax. One apparent area of grammar that shows desirable consequences for the layered PP analysis is P-to-V incorporation. For instance, the incorporability versus the unincorporability of Ps in Dutch can be accounted for by the principle (i.e.. Minimal Link Condition) that forbids skipping over an intermediate head, thus supporting the layered structure of PP. Another area offering support is locative inversion: the presence versus the absence of locative N head in PP can account for a contrast observed in locative inversion facts. Provided that an EPP-feature of T is category-specific, a contrast between PPs that can undergo movement to [Spec, T] and those that cannot stems from their respective internal structures

Rightly or for Ill: the Ethics of Remembering and Forgetting

Forgetting a birthday, a wedding anniversary, a beloved child\u27s school play or a dear colleague\u27s important accomplishments is often met with blame, whereas remembering them can engender praise. Are we in fact blameworthy or praiseworthy for such remembering and forgetting? When ought we to remember, in the ethical sense of \u27ought\u27? And ought we in some cases to allow ourselves to forget? These are the questions that ground this philosophical work. In fact, we so often unreflectively assign moral blame and praise to ourselves and others for memory behaviors that this faculty, and moral responsibility for it, deserve careful philosophical attention. These questions of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness for memory do not pertain only to individual memory behaviors. Collective memory behaviors may also be morally blameworthy or praiseworthy. Consider the matters of how South Africans go about remembering apartheid, how Bosnian Serbs and Albanian Muslims go about remembering their conflicts, or whether and how Americans never forget September 11, 2001. In fact, individual and collective memory are not as separate as you might think. Though individual memory is based in the individual\u27s biology—the functions of the brain—individuals are members of collectives; our individual memories are both shaped by social interaction to a surprising degree and major loci of collective memory. Thus, determining moral blameworthiness or praiseworthiness for memory behaviors is a complicated philosophical endeavor. To address these issues, I set myself three tasks. First, to analyze the nature of both individual and collective memory using philosophical, neuropsychological, sociological sources. This reveals that both individual and collective memory are best conceived as constructions, not necessarily inaccurate, but certainly not perfect recordings of events. Individual memory constructions are influenced not only by our choices, but also by neurological and social determinants. Individuals are one locus for collective memory storage—others include memorials, books, songs, and national holidays—and are agents for collective memory construction. My second task is to analyze moral responsibility, specifically what makes us praiseworthy and blameworthy. Ultimately, I reject libertarian conceptions of moral responsibility and adopt Nomy Arpaly\u27s influential reasons-responsiveness which holds that the moral worth of an agent depends on the moral desirability of an action and the degree of moral concern with which she pursues it. My third task is to apply this analysis to both individual and collective memory behaviors. In doing so, I generate a preliminary set of twelve rules for both individual and collective memory behaviors, each defeasible under conditions that change whether, and the degree to which, moral agents should be held praiseworthy or blameworthy. I intend that these twelve rules and their attendant considerations of application and defeasibility provide not only philosophers but moral agents more generally with useful tools for a reflective ethics of memory. By such means may we all remember and forget rightly, and not for ill