Ontologies, Mental Disorders and Prototypes

As it emerged from philosophical analyses and cognitive research, most concepts exhibit typicality effects, and resist to the efforts of defining them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This holds also in the case of many medical concepts. This is a problem for the design of computer science ontologies, since knowledge representation formalisms commonly adopted in this field do not allow for the representation of concepts in terms of typical traits. However, the need of representing concepts in terms of typical traits concerns almost every domain of real world knowledge, including medical domains. In particular, in this article we take into account the domain of mental disorders, starting from the DSM-5 descriptions of some specific mental disorders. On this respect, we favor a hybrid approach to the representation of psychiatric concepts, in which ontology oriented formalisms are combined to a geometric representation of knowledge based on conceptual spaces

Modeling the functional genomics of autism using human neurons.

Human neural progenitors from a variety of sources present new opportunities to model aspects of human neuropsychiatric disease in vitro. Such in vitro models provide the advantages of a human genetic background combined with rapid and easy manipulation, making them highly useful adjuncts to animal models. Here, we examined whether a human neuronal culture system could be utilized to assess the transcriptional program involved in human neural differentiation and to model some of the molecular features of a neurodevelopmental disorder, such as autism. Primary normal human neuronal progenitors (NHNPs) were differentiated into a post-mitotic neuronal state through addition of specific growth factors and whole-genome gene expression was examined throughout a time course of neuronal differentiation. After 4 weeks of differentiation, a significant number of genes associated with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are either induced or repressed. This includes the ASD susceptibility gene neurexin 1, which showed a distinct pattern from neurexin 3 in vitro, and which we validated in vivo in fetal human brain. Using weighted gene co-expression network analysis, we visualized the network structure of transcriptional regulation, demonstrating via this unbiased analysis that a significant number of ASD candidate genes are coordinately regulated during the differentiation process. As NHNPs are genetically tractable and manipulable, they can be used to study both the effects of mutations in multiple ASD candidate genes on neuronal differentiation and gene expression in combination with the effects of potential therapeutic molecules. These data also provide a step towards better understanding of the signaling pathways disrupted in ASD

Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders

Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called “direct social perception” : the idea that we can sometimes perceive features of other minds directly in the character of their embodiment and environmental interactions. I argue that if DSP is true, we can probably also perceive certain features of mental disorders as well. I draw upon the developmental psychologist Daniel Stern’s notion of “forms of vitality”—largely overlooked in these debates—to develop this idea, and I use autism as a case study. I argue further that an enactive approach to DSP can clarify some ways we play a regulative role in shaping the temporal and phenomenal character of the disorder in question, and it may therefore have practical significance for both the clinical and therapeutic encounter

What Normative Facts Should Political Theory Be About? Philosophy of Science meets Political Liberalism

Just as different sciences deal with different facts—say, physics versus biology—so we may ask a similar question about normative theories. Is normative political theory concerned with the same normative facts as moral theory or different ones? By developing an analogy with the sciences, we argue that the normative facts of political theory belong to a higher— more coarse-grained—level than those of moral theory. The latter are multiply realizable by the former: competing facts at the moral level can underpin the same facts at the political one. Consequently, some questions that moral theories answer are indeterminate at the political level. This proposal offers a novel interpretation of John Rawls’s idea that, in public reasoning, we should abstract away from comprehensive moral doctrines. We contrast our distinction between facts at different levels with the distinction between admissible and inadmissible evidence and discuss some implications for the practice of political theory

Identification of long non-coding RNAs involved in neuronal development and intellectual disability

Recently, exome sequencing led to the identification of causal mutations in 16–31% of patients with intellectual disability (ID), leaving the underlying cause for many patients unidentified. In this context, the noncoding part of the human genome remains largely unexplored. For many long non-coding RNAs (lncRNAs) a crucial role in neurodevelopment and hence the human brain is anticipated. Here we aimed at identifying lncRNAs associated with neuronal development and ID. Therefore, we applied an integrated genomics approach, harnessing several public epigenetic datasets. We found that the presence of neuron-specific H3K4me3 confers the highest specificity for genes involved in neurodevelopment and ID. Based on the presence of this feature and GWAS hits for CNS disorders, we identified 53 candidate lncRNA genes. Extensive expression profiling on human brain samples and other tissues, followed by Gene Set Enrichment Analysis indicates that at least 24 of these lncRNAs are indeed implicated in processes such as synaptic transmission, nervous system development and neurogenesis. The bidirectional or antisense overlapping orientation relative to multiple coding genes involved in neuronal processes supports these results. In conclusion, we identified several lncRNA genes putatively involved in neurodevelopment and CNS disorders, providing a resource for functional studies

How do you make yourself a theatre without organs? Deleuze, Artaud and the concept of differential presence

This article provides an exposition of four key concepts emerging in the encounter between the philosophical man of the theatre, Antonin Artaud, and the theatrical philosopher, Gilles Deleuze: the body without organs, the theatre without organs, the destratified voice and differential presence. The article proposes that Artaud's 1947 censored radio play To Have Done with the Judgment of God constitutes an instance of a theatre without organs that uses the destratified voice in a pursuit of differential presence – as a nonrepresentative encounter with difference that forces new thoughts upon us. Drawing from various works by Deleuze, including Difference and Repetition, The Logic of Sense, A Thousand Plateaus and ‘One Less Manifesto’, I conceive differential presence as an encounter with difference, or perpetual variation, as that which exceeds the representational consciousness of a subject, forcing thought through rupture rather than communicating meanings through sameness. Contra the dismissal of Artaud's project as paradoxical or impossible, the article suggests that his nonrepresentational theatre seeks to affirm a new kind of presence as difference, rather than aiming to transcend difference in order to reach the self-identical presence of Western metaphysics

The Classification, Definition, and Ontology of Delusion

Although delusion is one of the central concepts of psychopathology, it stills eludes precise conceptualization. In this paper, I present certain basic issues concerning the classification and definition of delusion, as well as its ontological status. By examining these issues, I aim to shed light on the ambiguity of the clinical term ‘delusion’ and its extension, as well as provide clues as to why philosophers are increasingly joining the ranks of psychiatrists, psychologists, and neuroscientists in the effort to come to a comprehensive understanding of delusion

Interdisciplinary perspectives on the development, integration and application of cognitive ontologies

We discuss recent progress in the development of cognitive ontologies and summarize three challenges in the coordinated development and application of these resources. Challenge 1 is to adopt a standardized definition for cognitive processes. We describe three possibilities and recommend one that is consistent with the standard view in cognitive and biomedical sciences. Challenge 2 is harmonization. Gaps and conflicts in representation must be resolved so that these resources can be combined for mark-up and interpretation of multi-modal data. Finally, Challenge 3 is to test the utility of these resources for large-scale annotation of data, search and query, and knowledge discovery and integration. As term definitions are tested and revised, harmonization should enable coordinated updates across ontologies. However, the true test of these definitions will be in their community-wide adoption which will test whether they support valid inferences about psychological and neuroscientific data

25 years again and again : on repetition, time and articulated knowledge at The Bridge of Winds' group

The Bridge of Winds is an ensemble of actors and theatre artists from South America, Europe and Asia, that, guided by Iben Nagel Rasmussen (Odin Teatret’s actress), has been since 1989 researching and exploring the complexity of the actor's stage presence through a psychophysical training based mainly on 5 physical exercises. The group meets to work together every year, for more than 25 years now. Their main energetic exercises may have simple external form but are rather difficult to master. They allow a performer to access and explore an intimate, creative and meditative world of physical theatre impulses, stories and actions. While the structure and essence of the exercises remain the same for all the years, the group members grow old and change both physically and mentally. The age of the group participants ranges from the late 20’s to late 50’s. Moreover, Iben N. Rasmussen, now 70 years old, is still an active participant in the meetings. What are the vital matters keeping the group together for such a long period, investigating, re-thinking, actualizing a training system? What is this path from training to ethos made of? This article proposes to look at a very special relation between repetition, creation and the ethos of the performer through the lenses of the long-term work of the Bridge of Winds. I have been participating in their activities throughout this year and this paper will be based on an empirical experience with their exercises as well as on a series of interviews with Iben Nagel Rasmussen. Along the way, I will look at the concept of repetition as proposed by Gilles Deleuze, I will touch upon neurological matters, to draw an understanding of ethos, which is implicated on the artistic work of the group