Young people and political action: who is taking responsibility for positive social change?

A human rights perspective suggests that we are all responsible for ensuring the human rights of others, which in turn ensures that our own human rights are respected and protected. A convenience sample of 108 young people (41 males and 67 females) aged between 16 and 25 completed a questionnaire which asked about (a) levels of involvement in political activity and (b) sense of personal responsibility for ensuring that the human rights of marginalised groups (e.g. ethnic minorities, immigrants, lesbians and gay men) are protected. Findings showed that most respondents supported (in principle) the notion of human rights for all, but tended to engage in low key political activity (e.g. signing petitions; donating money or goods to charity) rather than actively working towards positive social change. Qualitative data collected in the questionnaire suggested three main barriers to respondents viewing themselves as agents of positive social change: (1) "It’s not my problem", (2) "It’s not my responsibility", and (3) a sense of helplessness. Suggestions for how political action might best be mobilised among young people are also discussed.</p

Time-critical decentralised situational awareness in emergencies: An adversarial biosecurity scenario

Abstract Crises in a global setting of interdependencies call for time-critical coordinated responses. However, it is often the case that the mechanisms responsible for these actions do not agree across all their hierarchies. This can be roughly attributed to personal estimations of the situation and to social influence. An ensuing lack of consensus against crises can be dire and echo across entire populations. One such instance is the case of biosecurity threats. A particularly interesting class of threats lie within urban environments, which tend to fall within the scope of bad actors. With this work we aim to computationally contribute to the understanding of the dynamics of perceived danger formation among agents responsible for responding to ongoing biological attacks in urban settings. We assume this perception is a function of a personal estimation of local information about the danger and of social influence stemming from the agents in question framed in an agent-based model. The simulations point towards a high dependence of perceived dangers on the personal estimations of the agents. The conditions under which the perceived dangers deviate from the real ones are explored over a range of assumptions on personal measurements and several dispositions towards the influencing environment. The insight provided by these results at the individual and collective level set the tone for further investigation on such behavioural phenomena, providing a flexible computational framework addressing generic threats (true dangers) in a time-critical context

On the impact of agents with influenced opinions in the swarm social behavior

We consider a simplified version of the Taylor model, typically used in the collective dynamics of continuous exchange of opinions, to describe the properties of swarm formation in the presence of external sources of influence or prejudices affecting a number of agents in the network. Such external sources are responsible for the breakdown of the consensus equilibrium and directly influence certain other individuals in the network, which we denote as quasi-stubborn agents. These quasi-stubborn agents participate in consensus with other individuals, but are able to indirectly influence the opinions of the entire system. In particular, we show that the swarm in steady-state moves towards the convex hull of the opinions of the quasi-stubborn agents. This is an interesting result that allows a more accurate estimation of the final opinions in a social network. In the case of two prejudiced agents, an explicit expression of the stationary opinions is provided in terms of the Moore-Penrose inverse of the Laplacian of the graph. Numerical simulations are presented to illustrate the properties of the considered model

Collective Responsibility for Oppression

Many contemporary forms of oppression are not primarily the result of formally organized collective action nor are they an unintended outcome of a combination of individual actions. This raises the question of collective responsibility. I argue that we can only determine who is responsible for oppression if we understand oppression as a matter of social practices that create obstacles for social change. This social practice view of oppression enables two insights: First, that there is an unproblematic sense in which groups can bear irreducible collective responsibility for oppression. Second, that there are derived forms of individual responsibility for members of dominant groups

The Corporate Social Responsibility is just a twist in a M\"obius Strip

In recent years economics agents and systems have became more and more interacting and juxtaposed, therefore the social sciences need to rely on the studies of physical sciences to analyze this complexity in the relationships. According to this point of view we rely on the geometrical model of the M\"obius strip used in the electromagnetism which analyzes the moves of the electrons that produce energy. We use a similar model in a Corporate Social Responsibility context to devise a new cost function in order to take into account of three positive crossed effects on the efficiency: i)cooperation among stakeholders in the same sector, ii)cooperation among similar stakeholders in different sectors and iii)the stakeholders' loyalty towards the company. By applying this new cost function to a firm's decisional problem we find that investing in Corporate Social Responsibility activities is ever convenient depending on the number of sectors, the stakeholders' sensitivity to these investments and the decay rate to alienation. Our work suggests a new method of analysis which should be developed not only at a theoretical but also at an empirical level.Comment: 15 pages, 4 figure

Artificial morality: Making of the artificial moral agents

Abstract: Artificial Morality is a new, emerging interdisciplinary field that centres around the idea of creating artificial moral agents, or AMAs, by implementing moral competence in artificial systems. AMAs are ought to be autonomous agents capable of socially correct judgements and ethically functional behaviour. This request for moral machines comes from the changes in everyday practice, where artificial systems are being frequently used in a variety of situations from home help and elderly care purposes to banking and court algorithms. It is therefore important to create reliable and responsible machines based on the same ethical principles that society demands from people. New challenges in creating such agents appear. There are philosophical questions about a machine’s potential to be an agent, or mora l agent, in the first place. Then comes the problem of social acceptance of such machines, regardless of their theoretic agency status. As a result of efforts to resolve this problem, there are insinuations of needed additional psychological (emotional and cogn itive) competence in cold moral machines. What makes this endeavour of developing AMAs even harder is the complexity of the technical, engineering aspect of their creation. Implementation approaches such as top- down, bottom-up and hybrid approach aim to find the best way of developing fully moral agents, but they encounter their own problems throughout this effort

Responsible research and innovation: A manifesto for empirical ethics?

In 2013 the Nuffield Council on Bioethics launched their report Novel Neurotechnologies: Intervening in the Brain. The report, which adopts the European Commission's notion of Responsible Research and Innovation, puts forward a set of priorities to guide ethical research into, and the development of, new therapeutic neurotechnologies. In this paper, we critically engage with these priorities. We argue that the Nuffield Council's priorities, and the Responsible Research and Innovation initiative as a whole, are laudable and should guide research and innovation in all areas of healthcare. However, we argue that operationalising Responsible Research and Innovation requires an in-depth understanding of the research and clinical contexts. Providing such an understanding is an important task for empirical ethics. Drawing on examples from sociology, science and technology studies, and related disciplines, we propose four avenues of social science research which can provide such an understanding. We suggest that these avenues can provide a manifesto for empirical ethics.The paper derives from a project that was funded by Wellcome Trust (Wellcome Trust Biomedical Strategic Award 086034)

Social Samaritan Justice: When and Why Needy Fellow Citizens Have a Right to Assistance

In late 2012, Hurricane Sandy hit the East Coast of the U.S., causing much suffering and devastation. Those who could have easily helped Sandy’s victims had a duty to do so. But was this a rightfully enforceable duty of justice, or a non-enforceable duty of beneficence? The answer to this question is often thought to depend on the kind of help offered: the provision of immediate bodily services is not enforceable; the transfer of material resources is. I argue that this double standard is unjustified, and defend a version of what I call “Social Samaritanism.” On this view, within political communities, the duty to help the needy—whether via bodily services or resource transfers—is always an enforceable demand of justice, except when the needy are reckless; across independent political communities, it is always a matter of beneficence. I defend this alternative double standard, and consider its implications for the case of Sandy