Počítač ako sudca

Predmetom nasledujúcej úvahy je zamyslenie sa nad možnosťou súdneho rozhodovania počítačom. V úvode je popísaná história, základné východiská a poslanie kybernetiky a jej vplyvu na právo. Ďalej sú skúmané jednotlivé otázky rozhodovacích procesov, individuálnosti rozhodovania, mysliaceho počítača a axiológie. Úvaha smeruje k záveru, podľa ktorého počítač môže vhodne dopĺňať a podporovať rozhodovaciu činnosť sudcu, avšak nemôže prevziať jeho samostatnú rozhodovaciu spôsobilosť.Předmětem následující úvahy je zamyšlení se nad možností soudního rozhodování počítačem. V úvodu je popsána historie, základní východiska a poslání kybernetiky a jejího vlivu na právo. Dále jsou zkoumány jednotlivé otázky rozhodovacích procesů, individuálnosti rozhodování, myslícího počítače a axiologie. Úvaha směřuje k závěru, podle kterého počítač může vhodně doplňovat a podporovat rozhodovací činnost soudce, avšak nemůže převzít jeho samostatnou rozhodovací způsobilost.The subject of this paper is the possibility of a computer as a judge. The introduction describes the history, mission and fundamental basis of cybernetics and its impact on the law. Furthermore, the author examines various issues of decision-making, decision-individuality, computer thinking and axiology. The reasoning leads to the conclusion that the computer can properly complement and support decision-making activity of a judge, but can’t take over his decision-making capability

Computer as a Judge

Predmetom nasledujúcej úvahy je zamyslenie sa nad možnosťou súdneho rozhodovania počítačom. V úvode je popísaná história, základné východiská a poslanie kybernetiky a jej vplyvu na právo. Ďalej sú skúmané jednotlivé otázky rozhodovacích procesov, individuálnosti rozhodovania, mysliaceho počítača a axiológie. Úvaha smeruje k záveru, podľa ktorého počítač môže vhodne dopĺňať a podporovať rozhodovaciu činnosť sudcu, avšak nemôže prevziať jeho samostatnú rozhodovaciu spôsobilosť.The subject of this paper is the possibility of acomputer as ajudge. The introduction describe the history, fundamental and mission basis of cybernetics and its impact on the law. Furthermore, the author examines various issues of decision making, decision individuality, computer thinking and axiology. The reason leads to the conclusion that the computer can properly complement and support decision-making activity or a judge, but cannot take over its decision-making capability

Polish jurisprudence in a crooked mirror : (a polemic with Tomasz Bekrycht and Rafał Mańko)

Artykuł zawiera krytykę obrazu dwudziestowiecznej teorii i filozofii prawa, jaki przedstawili Tomasz Bekrycht i Rafał Mańko w artykule pt. Polish Jurisprudence in the 20th Century: A General Overview, opublikowanym na łamach Review of Central and East European Law (2020, nr 45). Argumentujemy, że wskazany artykuł nie jest niewyważony i stronniczy, w związku z czym przedstawia nietrafny obraz polskiej teorii i filozofii prawa

Formalising law, or, the return of the Golem

“Good old fashioned” AI, developed first in the 1980s but still an approach used in many contemporary legal apps and law chatbots, is often seen as less likely to create a dangerous “black box society” than machine learning based approaches. The chapter queries this notion by looking at the way in which the very process of formalising the law rests on normative decisions and value commitments that can’t simply be left to software developers. Using the literary figure of the Golem, it traces some of the normative decisions that any legal technology has to make, and posits some desiderata for an ethically responsible theory of legal formalisation

Contested Cases of Statutory Interpretation

This paper proposes an argumentation based procedure for legal interpretation, by reinterpreting the traditional canons of textual interpretation in terms of argumentation schemes,which are then classified, formalized, and represented through argument visualization and evaluation tools. The problem of statutory interpretation is framed as one of weighing contested interpretations as pro and con arguments. The paper builds an interpretation procedure by formulating a set of argumentation schemes that can be used to comparatively evaluate the types of arguments used in cases of contested statutory interpretation in law. A simplified version of the Carneades Argumentation System is applied in a case analysis showing how the procedure works. A logical model for statutory interpretation is finally presented , covering protanto and all things considered interpretive conclusions

Hypotheses and their dynamics in legal argumentation

We investigate some legal interpretation techniques from the viewpoint of the Argentinian jurisprudence. This allows the proposal of a logical framework –from a computer science perspective– for modeling such specific reasoning techniques towards an appropriate construction of legal arguments. Afterwards, we study the usage of assumptions towards construction of hypotheses. This is proposed in the dynamic context of legal procedures, where the referred argumentation framework evolves as part of the investigation instance prior to the trial. We propose belief revision operators to handle such dynamics, preserving a coherent behavior with regards to the legal interpretation used. Abduction is finally proposed to construct systematic hypothesization, with the objective to bring semi-automatic recommendations to push forward the investigation of a legal case

Interpretation, argumentation, and the determinacy of law

Published online: 14 July 2023This article models legal interpretation through argumentation and provides a logical analysis of interpretive arguments, their conflicts, and the resulting indeterminacies. Interpretive arguments are modelled as defeasible inferences, which can be challenged and defeated by counterarguments and be reinstated through further arguments. It is shown what claims are possibly (defensibly) or necessarily (justifiably) supported by the arguments constructible from a given interpretive basis, i.e., a set of interpretive canons coupled with reasons for their application. It is finally established under what conditions such arguments provide single outcomes or rather support alternative interpretive conclusions, thus leading to propositions of law whose truth-value is undetermined