The Norm Implementation Problem in Normative Multi-Agent Systems

Abstract. The norm implementation problem consists in how to see to it that the agents in a system comply with the norms specified for that system by the system designer. It is part of the more general problem of how to synthesize or create norms for multi-agent systems, by, for example, highlighting the choice between regimentation and enforcement, or the punishment associated with a norm violation. In this paper we discuss how various ways to implement norms in a multi-agent system can be distinguished in a formal game-theoretic framework. In particular, we show how different types of norm implementation can all be uniformly specified and verified as types of transformations of extensive games. We introduce the notion of retarded preconditions to implement norms, and we illustrate the framework and the various ways to implement norms in the blocks world environment

Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game

We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located around a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find that a large diversity of equilibria exists in this game. In particular, we derive conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist. We also discuss the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria.Common property, Evolutionary game theory, Local interactions game, Self-organization, Cooperation

The Cold Peace: Russo-Western Relations as a Mimetic Cold War

In 1989–1991 the geo-ideological contestation between two blocs was swept away, together with the ideology of civil war and its concomitant Cold War played out on the larger stage. Paradoxically, while the domestic sources of Cold War confrontation have been transcended, its external manifestations remain in the form of a ‘legacy’ geopolitical contest between the dominant hegemonic power (the United States) and a number of potential rising great powers, of which Russia is one. The post-revolutionary era is thus one of a ‘cold peace’. A cold peace is a mimetic cold war. In other words, while a cold war accepts the logic of conflict in the international system and between certain protagonists in particular, a cold peace reproduces the behavioural patterns of a cold war but suppresses acceptance of the logic of behaviour. A cold peace is accompanied by a singular stress on notions of victimhood for some and undigested and bitter victory for others. The perceived victim status of one set of actors provides the seedbed for renewed conflict, while the ‘victory’ of the others cannot be consolidated in some sort of relatively unchallenged post-conflict order. The ‘universalism’ of the victors is now challenged by Russia's neo-revisionist policy, including not so much the defence of Westphalian notions of sovereignty but the espousal of an international system with room for multiple systems (the Schmittean pluriverse)

Solidarity under duress: Defending state vigilantism

Published online: 06 September 2021May European Union (EU) member states, in the pursuit of enforcing the norms of ‘EU justice’, unilaterally adopt harmful policies that are ordinarily impermissible in the course of voluntary cooperation amongst democratic states? Though conditions of permissible vigilantism are strict and only rarely met, there are some basic EU duties the compliance with which each individual member state is permitted to enforce unilaterally. Such measures are sometimes permissible even if European community law says otherwise: to the extent that European law prevents states from enforcing these duties, it lacks authority.This article was published Open Access with the support from the EUI Library through the CRUI - Wiley Transformative Agreement (2020-2023

Essays in behavioral economics - evidence on self-selection into jobs, social networks and leniency

Die Dissertation mit dem Titel „Essays in Behavioral Economics – Evidence on Self-Selection into Jobs, Social Networks and Leniency“ besteht aus einer Sammlung von vier wissenschaftlichen Abhandlungen. Alle Arbeiten verbindet die Analyse von theoretischen Konzepten und Erkenntnissen der Verhaltensökonomie unter Verwendung der experimentellen Methode. Die erste wissenschaftliche Abhandlung trägt den Titel „Sorting of Motivated Agents - Empirical Evidence on Self-Selection into the German Police“ und untersucht Selbstselektion bestimmter Individuen in den Polizeiberuf. Die experimentelle Studie untersucht die Frage, ob Polizeibewerber sich hinsichtlich ihrer Präferenzen in Bezug auf ihr Normdurchsetzungsverhalten in den Polizeiberuf selektieren. Die zweite Abhandlung greift diese Erkenntnisse auf und untersucht Polizeianwärter in ihrer Berufsausbildung ebenfalls hinsichtlich ihrer Normdurchsetzungsbereitschaft. Die Arbeit trägt den Titel „Selection and formation of motivated agents -- empirical evidence from the German Police”. In der dritten wissenschaftlichen Abhandlung werden geschlechterspezifische Unterschiede bei der Wahl von Partnern und dem Aufbau des sozialen Netzwerkes untersucht. Diese trägt den Titel „Selectivity and opportunism: two dimensions of gender differences in trust games and network formation“ und wurde zusammen mit Guido Friebel, Marie Lalanne, Paul Seabright und Peter Schwardmann verfasst. Die vierte Abhandlung geht einer aktuellen Fragestellung der Industrieökonomie nach und trägt den Titel „Antitrust, auditing and leniency programs: evidence from the laboratory“, verfasst mit Mehdi Feizi and Ali Mazyaki. In ihrer Gesamtheit liefert meine Dissertation Antworten auf personalpolitische, soziale und industrieökonomische Fragestellungen

GROUP SELECTION WITH IMPERFECT SEPARATION - AN EXPERIMENT

We experimentally investigate the effect of imperfect separation of groups on group selection and cooperation in a standard prisoner¿s dilemma environment. Subjects can repeatedly choose between two groups, where in one of them an institutionalized norm fosters cooperation. The degree of separation of the two groups is varied between treatments. We find that both, the share of participants that choose into the group where the norm is implemented and the share of participants that cooperate, rise monotonously with the degree of group separation. Furthermore with higher group separation significantly more subjects support the enforcement of the norm.Experiments, Cooperation, Group Selection, Social Norms, Population Viscosity.

OperA/ALIVE/OperettA

Comprehensive models for organizations must, on the one hand, be able to specify global goals and requirements but, on the other hand, cannot assume that particular actors will always act according to the needs and expectations of the system design. Concepts as organizational rules (Zambonelli 2002), norms and institutions (Dignum and Dignum 2001; Esteva et al. 2002), and social structures (Parunak and Odell 2002) arise from the idea that the effective engineering of organizations needs high-level, actor-independent concepts and abstractions that explicitly define the organization in which agents live (Zambonelli 2002).Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft